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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

On the Wedge between Theoretical and Actual Prices and its Implications for Investment
Decisions
by
Luca Pezzo
Doctor of Philosophy in Finance
Washington University in St. Louis, May 2018
Research Advisor: Professor Phillip, H. Dybvig

State of the arts equilibrium models explain several financial markets’ regularities but still
miss many important dimensions. My research investigates the existing wedge between theoretical and actual prices and its implications for investment decisions. In the first chapter,
I develop a new approach to locate and quantify the wedge between the main-stream Representative Agent pricing of the U.S. market portfolio and actual data. The determinants
of the wedge are high uncertain and illiquid recessionary periods where, according to the
marginal pricing rules, more efficient portfolios than the market can be formed. Since illiquidity is a major determinant, chapter two and three are devoted to the theoretical and
empirical study of the impact of transaction costs on the optimal formation of equilibrium
portfolios. Chapter two develops a single-period Mean-Variance theory able to solve large
scale portfolio optimization problems in the presence of fixed and variable costs. Chapter
three shows its relevance in the representative context of the FX markets.
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Chapter 1
A Non-Parametric Test For
Representative Agent Pricing
1.1

Introduction

Since the seminal work of Markowitz (1952, 1959) and Black (1972), which have laid the
foundation of the CAPM, many asset pricing models in finance assume a representative
agent,1 a hypothetical unconstrained investor who holds the market portfolio. Any asset
in the economy is therefore proportional to the ratio of his marginal utilities, and, as a
consequence, most asset pricing tests are based on strong parametric assumptions on the
agent preferences and the returns.
I make use of a result from Martin (2017) to deliver a more general test for representative
agent pricing which compares the realized excess market returns with an option-implied
bound on their one-period ahead risk premium. The test does not require sharp assumptions
on preferences and returns and jointly applies to a non-trivial class of models (including those
1

Recent leading examples are: the consumption ICAPM of Campbell and Viceria (1999), the external
habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the long run risk models of Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal,
Kiku, Shaliastovich, and Yaron (2014) and Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (2017), as well as the rare
disaster models of Barro (2006) and J. A. Wachter (2013).

1

based on unobservable state variables2 ). In contrast to the standard GMM tests,3 mine is
non-parametric and only requires the time series of a proxy for the market portfolio, quotes
of European puts and calls written on it, and a proxy for the risk-free rate. In particular,
because no Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF hereafter) is estimated, the test avoids the usual
strict point-wise restrictions on the functional form of the preferences of the representative
agent. Rather, it only4 assumes the covariance of the product of the SDF and the market
return with the market return to be non-negative.
Popular representative agent pricing,5 while holding unconditionally, is shown to be robustly
rejected conditioning on highly uncertain and illiquid subperiods, which contain all the major
financial crises and economic recessions in the analyzed sample. These subperiods, endogenously selected out-of-sample based on rules predicting low returns in a training sample, are
defined as times where implied model-based risk premia are too high. Findings suggest that
such conditional model-based implied risk premia are off by striking amounts - at least by
1.3% monthly (or 15.6% annualy) - even after controlling for risk (model based Sharpe ratios
are still higher then actual ones by at least a monthly 0.2). While excessive risk aversion does
not seem to explain such results, ruling out Merton (1980)’s type explanations6 , alternative
explanations are found consistent with the data: either rejected models are too sensitive to
market crash probabilities, which, as in the rare disaster literature (see for example Barro
(2006) and J. A. Wachter (2013)), might be pushing the risk premia too high, or rejected
2

E.g. in the rare disasters models of Barro (2006) and J. A. Wachter (2013) the probability of a rare
disaster is a state variable. Because such probability is unobservable, it is difficult to test these models
following the existing approaches.
3
E.g. Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983), Gallant and Tauchen (1989), Epstein and Zin (1991), Savov
(2011) and Nagel and Singleton (2011).
4
“I am not aware of any model that attempts to match the data quantitatively in which [this condition]
does not hold. ” (Martin (2017))
5
Including those in footnote 1, for a more general description of the class refer to Section 1.2
6
In these models the risk premium is directly proportional to the level of risk aversion.

2

models, typically frictionless, might not be able to account for the high informational and
trading frictions characterizing the rejections.
Interestingly, the alternative marginal intermediary-based pricing setup is found more robust. In these models pricing is performed via a marginal intermediary, not necessarily a
representative agent.7 The representative model of Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) is found
to correctly price assets even during periods where representative pricing is rejected and the
marginal broker/dealer intermediary not to hold the market portfolio in equilibrium: the
correlation of the equilibrium portfolio and the Standard and Poor’s 500 index (SP 500 hereafter) is around 0.20 and not even significant during representative agent pricing rejections.
Overall, these results suggest that marginal pricing generates more efficient portfolios then
the representative agent market portfolio:8 this is a key economic implication of this study
and follows from the fact that during rejections there is no representative agent who holds
the market in equilibrium but there are at least some marginal broker/dealers, which consistently with the data, optimally holds different portfolios. Another contribution of this paper
is to provide a unified formal framework to assess the performance of consumption-based
representative agent pricing in the literature, extending and complementing the existing critiques. Rejections are indeed found to be periods where actual leading frameworks perform
the worst9 and feature the worrisome properties already documented by the extant empirical literature. In particular, Muir (2017) shows how consumption based representative agent
pricing has difficulty in simultaneously matching risk premia during recessions and financial
crises: this is because, despite the different risk premia behavior, the consumption dynamics
7

The main difference being that a marginal agent is not required to hold the entire market portfolio and
his identity might vary over time.
8
A portfolio is efficient if held in equilibrium (see for example Dybvig and Ross (1982)).
9
Following the original calibrations, the Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the Bansal and Yaron (2004), and
the J. A. Wachter (2013) equilibrium models performances are compared in rejection periods with respect
to the rest of the sample.

3

is very similar. While Muir (2017) selects these periods exogenously and ex-post, my test
pins them down endogenously and ex-ante as part of the rejection subsample. Moreira and
Muir (2017) find profitable trading strategies which go against representative agent pricing: because actual Sharpe-ratios are lower during recessions (periods of high volatility) and
higher during normal times (periods of low volatility), it is profitable to time the market
by decreasing the exposure in bad times and increasing it in normal times. However, a
representative agent is expected to bare more risk rather then less during bad times and be
compensated accordingly. Consistently, rejection periods are characterized by higher volatility, lower Moreira-Muir exposure and Sharpe ratios implied by representative agents are too
high. Finally, Amromin and Sharpe (2013) and Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), contrary
to rational expectations, show how representative-agent based required market returns disagree with actual expectations of a non-trivial fraction of investors. Their results are further
exacerbated while conditional on the rejection subsample.
The main technical innovation of this study is the ability of my test to endogenously deliver,
upon rejection, the actual subsample originating it. Identifying periods related to the systematic failure of a non-trivial class of models, constructively enables researchers to study
its characteristics and potentially design more robust models in the future. From a methodological point of view, the paper closest to mine is Nagel and Singleton (2011). As in my
framework, it also provide endogenous conditioning: in a very elegant way, they optimally
select a combination of a pre-determined set of GMM instruments to maximize the power of
their test. The cost they have to pay for such elegance is the fact that their test only applies
to pre-specified null and alternative nested linear models. In contrast, in my framework I
do not have a conditioning rule intrinsically tied to the test properties but my test jointly
applies to any model in which the covariance of the product of the SDF and the market
return with the market return is non-negative.
4

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the empirical setup,
going trhough the logic behind the non-parametric test and how to implement it. Section
1.3 describes the data used in this study. Section 1.4 shows the outcomes from the nonparametric test and describes the characteristics of the detected rejections. Section 1.5
contains the main implications: it explains how to interpret the results, what do they mean
for representative agent pricing, and shows how the marginal intermediary-based pricing
framework might be more efficient. Section 2.6 concludes.

1.2
1.2.1

Empirical Setup
Logic of the non-parametric test

In this subsection I first present the result from Martin (2017) and then explain how to use
it to derive the non-parametric test of this study.
Let us define the gross market and risk-free returns relative to [t : t + 1] as Rt+1 and Rt,f ;
following Martin (2017)

Proposition 1 Given a strictly positive SDF Mt+1 satisfying the pricing equation

Et [Mt+1 Rt+1 ] = 1

(1.1)

and the Negative Covariance Condition (NCC)

Covt (Mt+1 × Rt+1 , Rt+1 ) ≤ 0
5

(1.2)

it is possible to construct a model-free real-time lower bound, LBt , on the market risk premium Et [πt+1 ] ≡ Et [Rt+1 − Rt,f ] by


LBt = 2

1
Ŝt

2



ZF̂t
Z∞

ˆ t (k)
ˆ t (k)dk + call
 put
≥0
0

(1.3)

F̂t

Proof. See Appendix A.1
Quantities with hats are ex-dividend,10 Ŝt is the closing market level at time t, F̂t is the
ˆ t (k) are European
ˆ t (k) and call
forward contract on the market with unity tenor and finally put
put and call option quotes on the market with unity tenor as a function of the common
strike k. By the Put-Call parity the forward contract F̂t ≡ F̂t (k ∗ ) is the unique point
(k ∗ , F̂t (k ∗ )) at which the call and put functions intersect so that LBt is just a function of
ˆ t (ki )}k ∈Kt where Kt is the set of observable strikes with unit tenor at time
ˆ t (ki ), call
Ŝt , {put
i
t over which the integrals have to be approximated. The most direct interpretation of the
lower bound quantity obtains when the NCC equals zero: in this case LBt measures the
market risk premium itself from the perspective of a representative agent with log-utility
assuming independent market returns over time.11
Note that in representative agent models Mt+1 is the ratio of the agent marginal utilities
and it is strictly positive by the non-satiation requirement and (1.1) arises as part of the
first order conditions, then we can interpret Proposition 1 as follows:
10

It is possible to construct a similar lower bound which is an explicit function of market dividends (this
more general task is shown in the proof of Proposition 1), nonetheless an unreported analysis (available upon
request) shows how the empirical role of dividends is negligible. Therefore to avoid unnecessary complications
I will stick to the baseline lower bound measure (which is the same used in Martin (2017)).
11
See Martin (2017) Section III.

6

Proposition 2 Given any representative agent model with preferences satisfying NCC there
exist a model-free real-time lower bound LBt computable via eq. (1.3)

I will refer to the non-trivial class of models such that the NCC holds as the Martin’s class:
“I am not aware of any model that attempts to match the data quantitatively in which the
NCC does not hold”, Martin (2017). In terms of actual models it includes the leading macrofinance frameworks in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal et
al. (2014), Campbell et al. (2017), Barro (2006), and J. A. Wachter (2013). More generally
it at least12 contains any model where the representative agent preferences are:

• strictly increasing: i.e. the non-satiation requirement
• if time-separable have Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) of at least 1 at any level of wealth
• if Epstein and Zin (1989) have RRA as well as Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
(IES) of at least 1 at any level of wealth

if the model setting is dynamic an additional requirement is also needed constraining the
market return Rt+1 to be positively associated13 will all the other state variables.
The logic of the non-parametric test follows immediately from Proposition 2: a lower bound
violation implies a joint violation of all representative agent models with preferences satisfying the NCC: i.e. a test for a lower bound violation is a non-parametric test for the Martin’s
class of representative agent pricing.
12

This is because the following conditions are only sufficient.
An extension of the concept of pairwise correlation to multivariate possibly non-normal settings, see
footnote 9 in Martin (2017).
13
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1.2.2

Empirical Design

In order to make the non-parametric test operational a definition of lower bound violation
is needed and provided next. Based on the premises that the sample average of the excess
market returns is the sample counter part of the risk premium, I define a lower bound
violation as follows

Definition 1 A lower bound violation is a subsample, an indicator function Itv turning 1,
where the excess market return, πt+1 ≡ Rt+1 −Rt,f , is below the lower bound, LBt , on average

A non-parametric test for the Martin’s class of representative agent pricing is then naturally
a one-sided t-test against the alternative of a lower bound violation

H0 : E[πt+1 |Itv ] ≥ E[LBt |Itv ] vs. H1 : E[πt+1 |Itv ] < E[LBt |Itv ]

Note that a lower bound violation (a sample statement) is implied by the the test alternative
(a population statement) given the processes for πt+1 and LBt are covariance-stationary. It
is useful to define a new variable yt+1 ≡ πt+1 − LBt and re-write the non-parametric test
more compactly as
H0 : E[yt+1 |Itv ] ≥ 0 vs. H1 : E[yt+1 |Itv ] < 0

(1.4)

The test simply looks at the time-series of yt+1 in the periods selected by the subsample
Itv and then test if its conditional mean is non-negative, given a lower bound violation is
now expressed in population terms as E[yt+1 |Itv ] < 0. Finally, exploiting the properties of
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conditional expectations,14 it is instructive to re-write (1.4) in its equivalent form

H0 : E[yt+1 × Itv ] ≥ 0 vs. H1 : E[yt+1 × Itv ] < 0

(1.5)

This is because equation (1.5) shows how the non-parametric test is nothing more than a
standard unconditional t-test on the random variable (yt+1 × Itv ), so that normal inference
applies. The non-parametric test of this study will be conducted with respect to both the
equivalent statements (1.5) and (1.5) using both Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors and small-sample bootstrapped standard errors.
The non-parametric test requires a couple of assumptions which are now introduced and
discussed: HP1 - regularity conditions, HP2 - objective rule to select Itv .

HP1: regularity conditions

Given any conditioning set Itv , HP1 requires the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) to hold so
that a proper limiting normal distribution for E[yt+1 |Itv ] exists. The weakest assumptions
under which the CLT holds impose (a) all up the 2 + ∆ moment of yt+1 (for some ∆ > 0) to
be bounded, and (b) the process for yt+1 to be a strong mixing,15 that is, a weakly dependent
process in probability. A sufficient condition for strong mixing is temporal independence. For
concreteness with respect to (a), I require the third moment of πt+1 and LBt to be bounded,
which means that they have to have well-defined skewness and implies that the third moment
of yt+1 is bounded and in principle robust to fatter than normal tails.16 Furthermore as
14

Given that Itv is an indicator function it is non-negative preserving the sign of the inequality tested, then
by assuming P (Itv = 1) > 0 we obtain equation (1.5).
15
See for example Thm. 5.20 of White (2001).
16
No tests can be perform to support assumption (a), this is because in general any assessment on the
boundedness of a given moment of a random variable need such requirement as an assumption in order to
perform the inference. Nonetheless, requiring πt+1 and LBt to have finite skewnesses is a mild restriction
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already noted, we also need to assume πt+1 and LBt to be covariance-stationary in order to
interpret E[yt+1 |Itv ] < 0 as a lower bound violation.
In an unreported analysis (available upon requests) a battery of tests is run which finds πt+1
and LBt consistent with a stationary AR(0) and AR(1) processes as well as yt+1 consistent
with a stationary AR(0) process: these results support the covariance-stationary assumption
on πt+1 and LBt and the temporal independence of yt+1 needed for the CTL.

HP2: objective rules

The non-parametric test needs a conditioning rule that selects the subsample identified by
Itv : with little abuse of notation denote such a rule also as Itv . In the trivial unconditional
case Itv = 1, but for any more general case we need to be careful to design a rule which is
objective in order to avoid sample selection biases: i.e. the rule (i) should not be selected
ad-hoc by the econometrician with the aim of maximizing ex-post the chance of getting a
rejection and (ii) should not be directly linked to the test.
To tackle these kind of sample selection biases I design rules that select periods where the
risk premium is “low” in a training sample, then I compute the lower bound LBt and perform
the non-parametric test in the main (subsequent) sample. In particular, note that the lower
bound measure LBt is violated in t if it is above its conditional risk premium Et [πt+1 ]. Of
course, such quantity is unobservable, however, a rough estimate can be computed via an
which holds in many pricing specifications, even in the presence of jumps: for example in a Black and Scholes
(1973) world all moments are bounded, and the same remains true if we add a jump diffusion component
with constant intensity. In a framework like the time-varying rare disaster of J. A. Wachter (2013), where
the intensities are time-varying according to a Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) model, it would be enough to
impose a strictly positive mean-reversion and long-run mean.
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econometric model of the form
πt+1 = f (Zt ) + et+1

(1.6)

as π̂t+1 (Zt ) ≡ fˆ(Zt ) for some function f (·). Then a rule can be design which turns one at t
if the estimate for the risk premium fˆ(Zt ) ≈ Et [πt+1 ] is below the lower bound, LBt , that
can be computed in t, as

Itv ≡ Itv (Zt , LBt ) = 1(π̂t+1 (Zt ) < LBt )

(1.7)

Such rule is (i) pinned-down by data {Zt , LBt } not ad-hoc by the econometrician, and as long
as (ii) the forecasting model (1.6) is specified in a training sample according to an objective
criterion, say the best in-sample fit, and then Itv computed out-of-sample in a subsequent
sample where the test is conducted, also the second objectivity requirement is met.
I construct rules of the type (1.7) in several steps

1. pre-select a vector of excess market return predictors Zt
2. split the sample {1, ..., T } into a training sample T S ≡ {1, .., Ts } and a main sample
M S ≡ {Ts + 1, .., T }
3. in T S: for each possible subset Wt ⊆ Zt compute the associated forecasting model for
the excess market return πt+1 according to (1.6), and the in-sample adjusted R2
4. in T S: rank models according to the in-sample adjusted R2 and pick few among the
best performers, say K
5. for every t in M S: using just the structures from the best K performers and {Z1 , ..., Zt }
k
compute K out-of-sample forecasts for the market premium as {π̂t+1
(Zt )}K
k=1
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6. for every t in M S: compute the lower bound measure, LBt , using observables in t via
eq. (1.3)
k
7. for every t in M S: compute the K rules as {Itv,k ≡ 1(π̂t+1
(Zt ) < LBt )}K
k=1

Step 1 and 2 are presented in the following data section, while the key intermediate outcomes
from the other steps, as well as the potential17 rejections {Itv,k }K
k=1 , are presented in the Result
section.

1.3

Data

The data used in this study is at the monthly frequency and covers the United States
Financial Markets over the period February 1973 to December 2014. The sample is split into
a training sample T S = {1973 : 02, ..., Ts } and a main sample M S = {Ts + 1, ..., 2014 : 12}
using the last 25 years. The choice of Ts = 1989 : 12 is due to the availability of option data
(necessary for the construction of LBt ), that is, Ts + 1 = 1990 : 01 is the first date for which
LBt is computable.18 Data is divided into two categories: (i) the main variables, namely the
market return Rt+1 , the risk-free return Rt,f and the lower bound LBt and (ii) the predictors
in Zt .
17

Potential because until we perform the test we don’t know if they are rejections.
Choosing Ts this way also allows to maximize the statistical power of the non-parametric test: this is
because to select the model for the risk premium forecasts via the proposed statistical method, I do not need
to waste any single data point involving options and all available option data is used to perform the main
test.
18
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1.3.1

Main Variables

The gross total market return is defined as Rt+1 ≡

Ŝt+1
DYt
Ŝt

where Ŝ represents the closing

level of the Standard & Poor’s 500 (SP500) index and DYt ≡ 1 +

Dt+1
Ŝt+1

is the gross dividend

yield with {Dt } being the SP 500 dividend time series (divided by 12) available on Prof.
Shiller website.19 The gross return on a risk-free investment, Rt,f , is defined as the gross
1-month yield to maturity extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
continuously compounded yield curve computed over liquid secondary market transactions
on U.S. Treasuries.
The time-series of the market premium lower bound, {LBt }, is computed according to equation (1.3) in the most conservative way by linearly interpolating20 the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE) SPX options closing bid prices; Data from January 1990 trhough December 1995 is provided by Optsum Data, while data from January 1996 trough December 2014
is taken from OptionMetrics. For dates t in which the data is not sufficient/absent to deliver
LBt at the exact maturity of 1 month I linearly interpolate between the contemporaneous t
lower bounds with the two closest maturities.
Table 1.1 summarizes the main variables: note how the estimate for the unconditional risk
premium E[Rt+1 − Rt,f ] × 100 is 0.51 monthly or 0.61 ≈ E[πt+1 |M S] in the main sample
only, yielding the usual annualized unconditional estimates of 6.1% and 7.3%. The last two
rows already show how the lower bound LBt is unconditionally below its risk premium in
the main sample: i.e. πt+1 is on average above LBt , a result we formalize later.
19

at http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm
In the Appendix A.2 I show how very similar results are obtained if we use a cubic spline interpolation
instead.
20
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Figure 1.1 plots the dynamics for πt+1 and LBt : as was already evident from Table 1.1
the lower bound series LBt , even if volatile21 , is less volatile than the excess market return
πt+1 and, by construction, never negative. The time-series of conservative lower bounds
LBt features an annualized average of 3.96% and standard deviation of 3.84%.22 The lower
bounds dynamics portrayed in Figure 1.1 are thoroughly described in Martin (2017).

1.3.2

Predictors for the market risk premium

In what follows I describe the list of pre-selected predictors Zt which will enter the forecasting
model (1.6) for the excess market return (step 1 of the procedure detailed in Section 1.2).
In principle there are infinite ways to select such predictors, giving rise to data-mining issues
that can potentially bias the test.23 To tackle this issue I discipline the choice of Zt according
to a constructive economic rationale which I explain in Appendix A.3.24 The actual list of
predictors Zt contains the following 11 variables which proxy for the usual dimensions found
in the forecasting literature.25

F: Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2016) Financial uncertainty index, computed as the average
forecasting error from 150 financial time-series. It captures the underlying level of
uncertainty surrounding financial markets.
21

Note that its mean is of the same order of magnitude as its standard deviation.
Numbers that, once are restricted to the appropriate sample are very similar to those in Martin (2017):
the annualized sample mean and standard deviation of my lower bounds, computed using bid quotes, are
4.83% and 4.39%. Martin (2017)’s figures, which use mid rather than bid quotes, are 5% and 4.60%.
23
The researcher could start with a given list Zt , perform step 3 to 7 in Section 1.2, run the test and not
reject, then he could go back to step 2, modify the list of Zt ...and repeat these steps until he finds a list Zt
which “works”.
24
A piece of evidence further supporting the claim that the test is not driven by data-snooping is given by
the fact that, as further discussed later, the characteristics of the detected rejections match those scattered
around the exogenous extant literature criticizing representative agent pricing.
25
E.g. Goyal and Welch (2008), Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2016).
22
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SII: Rapach et al. (2016) Short Interest Index, constructed as the log of the equal-weighted
mean of short interest (as a percentage of share outstanding) across all publicly listed
stocks on U.S. exchanges. It captures the superior informational content of short sellers.
TAXchg: The annual percentage changes in the aggregate dollar amount paid in capital
gain taxes. The dollar amounts are reported by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
ILLIQpi: The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) (il)liquidity index, computed ad the (negative
of the) aggregate average (over a month) daily response of signed volume to next day
return for all individual stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and the American
Stock Exchange. It represents the % cost incurred in a 1 million 1962 USD trade in
the market. Similarly to the Amihud (2002) measure, it is a price impact proxy.
ILLIQts: The W. Liu (2006) (il)liquidity index, computed as the standardized turnoveradjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months. Similarly to
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) measure, captures the trading speed dimension of liquidity.
MDI: The Pasquariello (2014) Market Dislocation Index, computed as the monthly average
of hundreds of abnormal absolute violations (mid-quotes minus theoretical prices) of
three textbook arbitrage parities in the Stock, Bond and Exchange markets. It tracks
potential violations of the Law of One Price when positive.
USDg: The U.S. dollar appreciation index, computed as the percentage rate on the trade
weighted dollar index available from FRED Data.26 The index is a weighted (over
the volume of bilateral transactions) average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S.
dollar against the currencies of a broad group of major U.S. trading partners.
BM: The Dow-Jones Industrial Average book-to-market ratio.
26

At https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
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M1g: The monthly percentage growth rate on the Federal Reserve M1 money supply stock.
Available from FRED data.
Sent: The Baker and Wurgler (2006) Sentiment index, a composite index based on the common variation of five underlying proxies for sentiment: the closed-end fund discount,
the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues,
and the dividend premium. It captures miss-pricing due to subjective valuations not
reflecting rational risk compensation.

The list is parsimonious yet comprehensive: parsimonious in that it conveys a wide variety
of non-redundant information as certified by the average absolute correlation of 0.10 from
the correlation matrix displayed in Table 1.2: note that the absolute correlation is never
higher than 0.44 and greeter or equal than 0.35 only in 4 out of 55 pairs. The list is also
comprehensive in that excluded popular variables are highly correlated with Zt .27

1.4

Results

This section is organized in three parts: (i) first the key intermediate steps to construct the
rules {Itv,k }K
k=1 and the outcomes are presented and discussed, then (ii) the non-parametric
results are shown and analyzed and (iii) finally the main characteristics of the rejection
subsamples are described.
27
E.g. U.S. inflation correlates 0.55 with M 1g and with BM , market volatility correlates 0.70 with F
when measured as a GARCH(1,1) on the SP 500 index and 0.82 when measured by the CBOE V IX index
and BM correlates highly with the other excluded popular Goyal and Welch (2008) predictors as reported
in the next table

Corr
BM

DP
0.90

DY
0.90

EP
0.82
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T BL
0.69

LT Y
0.71

1.4.1

Construction of the rules for the non-parametric test

Estimating the excess market return in the training sample

Given the pre-selected list of predictors in Zt , for each subset Wt ⊆ Zt , the following four
flexible specifications for f (·) in model (1.6) are implemented in the training sample T S =
{1973 : 02, ..., 1989 : 12}

Linear f (W ) = β0 +

Pw

i=1

βi Wi

Pure quadratic f (W ) = β0 +
Interaction f (W ) = β0 +
Quadratic f (W ) = β0 +

Pw

i=1 βi Wi +

Pw

i=1 βi Wi +

Pw

i=1

βi W i +

Pw

j=1

Pw+ w(w−1)
2
k>l>w

Pw

j=1

2
βw+j Ww+j

βl Wl Wk

2
βw+j Ww+j
+

Pw+ w(w−1)
2
k>l>2w

β2w+l Wl Wk

with w representing the number of elements in W . A total of 8188 models to predict the
excess market return πt+1 are estimated along with their adjusted R2 . To minimize a model
selection purely driven by over-fitting, for each possible set of Wt , only the best model
specification is retained.28
Figure 1.2 plots the first 100 out of the remaining 2047 models’ adjusted R2 : the first 6
models immediately sets apart, a battery of Chow (1960) tests using polynomial up to the
third degree highlights a structural brake in the displayed ranking at any significance level
between model 6 and 7, and the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test finds the Mean Squared
Error (MSE) of model 6 not statistically different from any of the first 5 but statistically
lower than the MSE of model 7 at the 1% level. Thus K = 6 empirically.
28

This way I avoid comparisons only made in terms of functional form.
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Table 1.3 details each of the selected model in terms of predictors Wt and functional form f (·).
4 out of 6 models use the “Quadratic” functional form while the other 2 the “Interaction”
one. In terms of selected predictors, ILLIQts, the W. Liu (2006) (il)liquidity measure, is
never picked, M DI, the Pasquariello (2014) market dislocation index, is picked by half of
the models and the Rapach et al. (2016) short interest index, SII, and the GIN Ichg index
are selected by 4 out of 6 models.
Even if the most important requirement at this level is to show that data rather than
the econometrician is selecting the model specifications from (1.6) to be used in the main
sample, I nonetheless conclude this subsection by listing evidence against a ranking purely
driven by over-fitting: (i) the best in-sample model has the smallest number of regressions,
(ii) bootstrapped adjusted R2 and regression p-values confidence intervals for the 6 selected
models are such that no model has an adjusted R2 smaller than 10% and a regression p-value
higher than 0.02 at the 5% level.

Predicting the excess market return out-of-sample

Having at disposal the first K = 6 model specifications and the predictors Zt , for each t in
the main sample M S we can perform step 5 of Section 1.2 and forecast πt+1 out-of-sample
for each model k ∈ K: this yields the set of time t out-of-sample risk premium Et [πt+1 ]
k
(Zt )}6k=1 .
forecasts {π̂t+1

Because Goyal and Welch (2008) show how a naive OLS regression of excess market returns
on a large number of predictors will over-parametrize the model and lead to poor out-ofsample forecasts, I combine the information from the set of predictors to obtain optimal
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forecasts using the Iterated Combination Method (ICM) of Lin, Wu, and Zhou (2016).29 A
couple of important properties of the time series of these forecasts are discussed next.
First, despite the procedure adopted so far, over-fitting might still play a role in the choice
of selecting the first K bests models in T S to be used in M S. As a matter of facts, best
performers in a given sample tend to under-perform when adopted in another sample and
vice-versa with median models remaining more stable. One then might argue for a selection
of the K models around the median of the in-sample R2 ranking distribution rather than
in its tail. Panel (a) in Figure 1.3 shows how this is not a concern when constructing the
forecasts using the ICM approach: the graph plots the out-of sample ICM MSE on the insample counter-part for the 6 selected forecasting models. Models above and to the left of the
45 degree line passing through the origin performed better in-sample while those below and
to the right performed better out-of-sample. As it is apparent from the graph, the selected
subsample of models present similar in-sample/out-of-sample MSEs30 and it is more or less
balanced.
The second point is about the validity of the specifications of the selected models in the
main sample: i.e., is the selection of the subset Wt ⊆ Zt carried over in T S according to
the best fit valid in M S? to answer this question, for each k-th selected model, I compute
k
the residuals rt+1
≡ πt+1 − π̂tk and for every zt ∈ Zt such that zt ∈
/ Wt I run the following

regression
k
rt+1
= α + βzt + ut+1
29

(1.8)

The ICM method is describe in Appendix A.4 where results from a horse-race against standard OLS
forecasts are also reported. The exercise indeed confirm ex-post the superior choice of the ICM over the OLS
method.
30
The highest MSE % difference between any two models is 8.64%.
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if model k is well-specified with respect to Wt in M S β should be statistically insignificant.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.3 reports for each model the t-statistics associated to β in eq. (1.8).
Except for the first best, all model specifications remain correct in M S. Fortunately the
miss-specification in the first best model turns out to be negligible; The forth best model is
exactly the correction needed to take such miss-specification into account, this is because the
only difference between the first and the forth model is the inclusion of SII. Furthermore,
and most importantly, they generate two rules that are very similar (with a correlation of
0.62), more generally, as it can be checked later, no result this paper finds is affected by the
exclusion of SII.

The actual rules for the non-parametric test

Figure 1.4 shows the dynamics of the six best rules {Itv,k }6k=1 as well as their correlations.
The top graph plots the time series of the six rules {Itv,k }6k=1 against the real GDP growth
(the dotted black line). In order to make the graph more readable I multiply each rule
by its associated model, i.e. rule for model k is plotted as k × Itv,k and assumes values 0
and k in the rejection periods. The six rules clearly display a counter-cyclical pattern, the
least correlated rule, rule 1, displays a negative 0.16 correlation with GDP growth, the most
correlated rule, rule 2, shows a negative correlation of 0.40, and the average correlation is
-0.29. Furthermore, the rules are highly correlated with each other: the smallest correlation,
the one between rule 1 and and rule 2, is 0.424, while the highest, the one between rule
2 and rule 3, is 0.927, and the average correlation among all rules is 0.626. The source of
this high correlation comes from the high number of shared observations among the different
rules: the average pairwise percentage overlap is 77.32%, with the smallest percentage, the
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one between rule 1 and and rule 2, in the order of 50%, and the highest, the one between
rule 2 and rule 3, in the order of 95%.
The bottom graph highlights in green the sample periods which are systematically detected
by all the rejection rules for a total of 35 observations: these are times associated with negative GDP growth (correlation coefficient of -0.30), include all the major economic recessions
of the last 25 years (the gray NBER recessions) as well as the 1997 Asian financial crises,
the 1998 LTCM crises, the period (late 1999 to 2001) during which the dotcom bubble collapsed, a period in late 2002 when stock market was hitting new lows following the end of
the dotcom boom, the quant meltdown in August 2007 and the European sovereign debt
crises which accounts for the last two green stripes.
To summarize: the detected rules are very consistent with each other and unambiguously
pin-down subperiods containing all the major economic recessions and financial crises. The
consistency feature is particularly important in that no apriori structure, linking the byproduct of particular subset of instruments Wt ⊆ Zt and a given specification for the forecasting
model (1.6) to yield similar result, is imposed. Once again this seem to suggest that the
selected rules are driven by the intrinsic properties of the data and are uncovering systematic
patterns unrelated to ad-hoc selections by the econometrician.
At this point such rules has to be considered only as potential rejection periods since no test
has yet been performed conditional on them: this is indeed the topic of the next subsection.
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1.4.2

The non-parametric test

Table 1.4 reports the main results from the test: each row shows the results for the k-th
specification of forecasting model (1.6): four different versions of the key statistic E[yt+1 |Itv,k ]
associated with four different rules Itv,k are reported in percentages and at the monthly
frequency. Version (1) reports the outcomes of the unconditional test, version (2) corresponds
to the key rule object of this study (detailed in Section 1.2) and shows the outcomes of
the main non-parametric test. Versions (3) and (4) replace the lower bound series LBt in
¯ or 0: these rules serve the
the key rules of version (2) with its unconditional mean, LB,
purpose of understanding the actual role played by the lower bound in the main version
(2). Stars, which are inversely related to the intensity of the green color highlighting the
figures, represent the usual confidence levels: they are reported conservatively as the lowest
confidence among the two computed from the equivalent test specifications in eq. (1.4) and
(1.5) using Newey and West (1987) adjustments and the one derived from p-values adjusted
for potential small-sample issues.31
Note how unconditionally, at any level of confidence, the lower bound holds: LBt is on
average below the risk premium by 0.281%, consistently with an unconditionally tight32
lower bound, such estimates are not different from 0. The bulk of this article resides in
31

P-values associated to version (2) to (4) are obtained by bootstrapping 1000000 random samples Itv of the
same size as those derived via the rules implemented in the respective versions, computing the 5-th quantlies
of the respective simulated distributions for E[yt+1 |Itv ], and finally comparing them with the actual estimates
for E[yt+1 |Itv ] presented in Table 1.4. This exercise applied to the main version (2) reviles simulated quantiles
of the order of 0.5% which means that if truly random rules where adopted (in place of the proposed ones)
we would have found the results reported only 0.5% of the time; this, together with the fact that we find
significant results, can again be viewed as evidence against rules purely based on over-fitting and also show
how the test results are robust to non-normal, potentially fatter and asymmetric, tails in the distribution of
Itv which might arise since Itv contains many recessions and crises.
32
An unreported analysis (available upon request), consistently with the documented violations, shows
that when the lower bound is conditioned on Itv from version (2) it becomes a much less tight and more
noisy risk premium predictor.
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the next set of results, mainly revealed by version (2) in the table: conditional on the rules
k
< LBt )}6k=1 the lower bound is on average always violated at the 10% level and in
{1(π̂t+1

4 out of 6 cases at confidence 95%33 . In particular the average lower bound is above its
conditional risk premium by impressive values that range from 1.262 to 1.654. The number
of observations involved is on average 66 (as reported in the table), between 23% and 29% of
the main sample, with a mean of 70 if we exclude model 6. According to eq. (1.3) LBt ≥ 0:
the results associated to version (3) and (4) speaks to the importance of its informational
k
< 0)}6k=1 are
content in the test rejections. An informative lower bound is essential: {1(π̂t+1
k
proper subsets of {1(π̂t+1
< LBt )}6k=1 and they are never able to pin-down rejection, yielding

test statistics which are on average 63% (figure in the bottom-right corner of the table) of
those in version (2) and p-values grater than 0.10. A non-negative (informative) dynamic
k
¯ 6 associated to version (3) share
< LB)}
lower bound is needed: the rejection rule {1(π̂t+1
k=1

an average of 91% (a minimum of 86%) of the observations with those from version (2) and
significantly improve the test performance, allowing one rejection and four marginal ones
with statistics that are on average 78% (figure to the left of the one located in the bottom
right corner of the table) of those from version (2). This tells us that three-fourth of the main
rejection magnitude (version (2) figures) is due to the dynamics of the excess market return
πt+1 rather than that of the lower bound LBt , nonetheless its dynamics it is not negligible
yielding the extra quantum, the average residual 22% gap, needed to consistently achieve
the rejections.
To sum up, the lower bound is found to hold unconditionally (corroborating the interpretation given in Martin (2017)) but is robustly rejected conditioning on the rules detailed in
Section 1.2: as a matter of fact, conditional to these periods, the realized risk premium is
33

With model 2 being borderline between 10% and 5% and model 6 generating rejections that are at the
5% if evaluated according to eq. (1.4) and at the 7% if evaluated according to eq. (1.5).
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below its average lower bound by at least a huge 1.262% (15.144% annualized). The presence
of the Martin (2017) lower bound LBt is crucial to the results and, even if the major role in
terms of dynamics is played by the excess market return πt+1 , it also have a non-negligible
dynamic impact.

1.4.3

Rejection characteristics

This subsection investigates the main characteristics of the rejection periods detected by the
k
< LBt )}6k=1 . We already showed that they are counter-cyclical and contain the
rules {1(π̂t+1

main economic recessions and financial crises in the main sample M S. Table 1.5 analyzes
them using the predictors in Zt : each row corresponds to a different predictor zt ∈ Zt , while
different columns identifies rule n.1, Itv,1 , trhough rule n.6, Itv,6 . The table displays the difference in conditional means of each predictor, zt , between the rejection subsample and the
rest of the sample, E[zt |Itv,1 = 1] − E[zt |Itv,1 = 0]; only predictors with statistically different
means can discriminate, and thus characterize (up to a first order approximation), the rejection periods. As it is apparent, only the Ludvigson et al. (2016) uncertainty index F and
the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) (il)liquidity index ILLIQpi can consistently discriminate
between rejections and the rest of the sample. As a matter of facts, rejections are periods
in which uncertainty is higher by at least 3.89 VIX percentage points34 on average and the
percentage cost incurred in a 1 million transaction in the market is at least 4.387% higher.
This point is made even clearer in Figure 1.5 which plots the time series of F and ILLIQpi
respectively, highlighting in bold the portion of the time series which belong to the rejection
subsample for the case of the rule n.1.35 Note how, in both series, most of the spikes are
34

Due to the high correlation of 0.82 between F and V IX I regressed the first on the latter in order to
obtain interpretable magnitudes.
35
Unreported graphs (available upon request) are very similar for all the other rules.
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inside the rejections and how the general level of the series in the rest of the sample is
significantly lower.
k
< LBt )}6k=1 pin-down periods characterized
In summary, the rejection rules {Itv,k ≡ 1(π̂t+1

by high financial uncertainty and market illiquidity, which contain all the major financial
crises and economic recessions in the main sample.

1.5

Implications

This section is also organized in three parts: (i) the first part explains the meaning of
the non-parametric rejections and offer potential explanations concerning the causes of these
failures, (ii) the second part turns to the implications of the rejections for consumption-based
representative agent pricing, while the last part (iii) shows evidence in favor of intermediarybased pricing being a more robust setup, and more generally, marginal pricing as a setup
able to generate optimal portfolios which are more efficient than the representative agent
market portfolio.

1.5.1

Too high model-based representative agent risk premia

Remember from the logic of Section 1.2 that a lower bound violation implies the joint failure
of the Martin’s class of representative agent pricing: in particular, we have shown that even if
k
unconditionally this class seem to hold, conditioning on the rules {Itv,k ≡ 1(π̂t+1
< LBt )}6k=1

described in the previous section, it is robustly rejected.
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The reason why we reject these models is because their implied risk premia predictions are
too high conditioning on the periods identified by the rules: the following chain of inequalities
makes this point clearer

RP models |Itv ≡ E[Emodels
[πt+1 ]|Itv ] ≥ E[LBt |Itv ] > E[πt+1 |Itv ] ≡ RP |Itv
t
by construction, the rejection subsample, Itv , contains subperiods where on average the lower
bound from eq. (1.3)36 is above the average excess market return πt+1 as shown by the strict
inequality. Now, to the right of that inequality we see that the average risk premium given
the subsample Itv is by definition the actual risk premium in that subsample, while the
weak inequality to the left side follows from the pointwise definition of LBt , which in our
test act as the smallest possible bound for the Martin’s class of pricing models. Finally
E[Emodels
[πt+1 ]|Itv ] is by definition the average risk premium implied by the Martin’s class
t
of representative agent pricing, RP models |Itv . In other words, the rejected models assume
conditional risk premia which are at least 1.26% (15.12% annualized) higher than the actual
conditional risk premium from the data.
This difference is huge and, as shown in Appendix A.5, carries over to risk-adjustments: an
analogous chain of inequalities makes this point clearer

SR

models

|Itv




Emodels
[πt+1 ] v
LBt
E[πt+1 |Itv ]
t
v
≡E
|It ≥ E
|It >
≡ SR|Itv
σt (πt+1 )
σt (πt+1 )
σ(πt+1 |Itv )


eq. (A.2) in Appendix A.5 shows the result from the strict inequality: the minimum implied
Sharpe ratio of the Martin’s class is above the analog sample count-part (this is so by at least
36

Remember that such lower bound is computed conservatively using bid rather than mid-quotes.
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0.21, or 0.72 annualized). Therefore also the Sharpe ratios implied by the rejected models
are also too high.

Possible explanations

Why popular representative agent pricing delivers implied risk premia which are too high
in the subsamples {Itv,k }6k=1 ? I first show how this fact does not seem to be driven by risk
aversion and then offer two potential, non-mutually exclusive, explanations.
In models of the Merton (1980)’s type the risk premium is proportional to the level of risk
aversion, it is thus possible that too high risk premia are due to too high representative
agent risk aversion; if this is the case we should expect risk aversion to be on average higher
during rejections. Panel A of Table 1.6 plots in blue the conditional mean of the Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) proxy for time-varying risk aversion, ηt , during rejections and in red
the analog conditional mean during the rest of the sample for the discussed rules, while the
table at the bottom of the figure reports the difference in these means together with their
levels of significance. Both means are very similar and statistically insignificant, with rule 3
and 4 even displaying opposite then expected signs.
While risk aversion in general cannot explain the rejections, I find that implied market crash
probabilities are consistent with them. In frameworks such as rare disasters (e.g. Barro
(2006) or J. A. Wachter (2013)) the risk premia is an increasing function of the probability
of a rare disaster, while these models define a disaster as a consistent drop in consumption
or GDP growths, I look at the analogous but observable behavior of the market portfolio:
in particular I use the time series of implied market crash probabilities extracted from the
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SP 500 futures by Bollerslev and Todorov (2011)37 . Panel B of Figure 1.6 plots in blue the
conditional mean of the Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) left tail intensities for the SP 500
futures, CPt , during rejections and in red the analog conditional mean during the rest of
the sample for the discussed rules, while the table at the bottom of the figure reports the
difference in these means together with their levels of significance. Results show that the
implied crash probabilities are on average around 3% in rejections and only 1% in the rest
of the sample, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level in 5 out of 6 rules.
This is consistent with rejected models being too sensitive to crash probabilities which, in
the same spirit as in the classical rare disaster frameworks, might be pushing the risk premia
too high.
The last proposed explanation is a direct consequence of the main characteristics of the detected rules. In the previous section we showed that they are characterized by high level of
trading frictions (illiquidity) as well as high level of uncertainty: both being on average statistically higher than the unconditional median only during rejection times.38 In Appendix
A.3 it is shown how financial uncertainty, as measured by F , is very highly correlated with
classical proxies for asymmetric information, and has itself the typical features an asymmetric information proxy should have. We therefore can conclude that another potential
cause for the failure of the Martin’s class is the fact that such models do not account for
informational and trading frictions: as a matter of fact their absence is behind the required
set of assumptions for the existence of a representative agent.39
37

I am thankful to the authors for proving me with such data.
This last unreported claim can be easily verified qualitatively by looking at the plots displayed in Figure
1.5 or formally via an analysis available upon request.
39
Specifically, the absence of market frictions is required for the existence of an SDF M satisfying 1 =
E[M R], while there are currently no frameworks that can construct a representative agent starting from
agents with asymmetric information (there are examples, such as Basak (2005), where a representative agent
can be constructed with agents having symmetric information but different beliefs).
38
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1.5.2

A unified setup to assess consumption-based representative
pricing

As I described in Section 1.2, a key subclass of the Martin’s class of models is given by the
popular consumption based representative agent setups: leading macro-finance framework
including external habit (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), long-risk (e.g. Bansal and Yaron
(2004), Bansal et al. (2014), Campbell et al. (2017)) and rare disaster (e.g. Barro (2006) and
J. A. Wachter (2013)) models are jointly rejected conditioning on {Itv,k }6k=1 . Therefore my
test act as a unified formal setup to assess the characteristics of this type of pricing: in this
subsection I show how the rejection characteristics are indeed able to explain, confirm and
complement the critique that the extant empirical literature has with respect to consumptionbased representative agent pricing.
As a starting point, an unreported analysis40 shows that the rejection subsamples are characterized by low consumption and GDP growths, while in Appendix A.6 I document how
these periods indeed coincide with instances where actual representative models perform the
worst.41
In the rest of this subsection I link the characteristics of the rejections to the recent findings
of Martin (2017), Muir (2017), Moreira and Muir (2017), and Greenwood and Shleifer (2014),
confirming and extending their critiques.
40

The analysis is available upon request and is analogous to the one performed for risk aversion and market
crash probabilities in the previous subsection.
41
The absolute pricing errors coming from the SDFs implied by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal
and Yaron (2004) and J. A. Wachter (2013) using their original calibrations are on average 41% higher during
rejections, with those produced by the J. A. Wachter (2013) model being less pronounced no matter the
conditioning. The results are robust to nominal as well as real total market returns as proxied by the SP 500.
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One of the reason why rejected models fail might simply be due to the fact that they are
not tailor-made to match option data, this is because the lower bound, LBt , according to eq.
(1.3) is just a portfolio of puts and calls on the market portfolio. However, Martin (2017)
in his 2017 seminal paper shows how even models such as Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou
(2009), Drechsler and Yaron (2011), that explicitly address the properties of option prices
are not able to replicate trhough simulations the properties of the lower bound. My test is
built using such lower bound and extends Martin’s concerns to the entire class of models
that satisfy the NCC (eq. (1.2)) within a formal econometric setup.
Muir (2017) shows how consumption based representative agent pricing has difficulty in
simultaneously matching risk premia during recessions and financial crises: this is because,
despite the different risk premia behavior, the consumption dynamics is very similar. While
Muir select these periods exogenously and ex-post, my test pins them down endogenously
and ex-ante: as a matter of facts, we already showed that both financial crises as well as
economic recessions are inside the rejection subsamples.
Moreira and Muir (2017) find profitable trading strategies which go against representative
agent pricing: because actual Sharpe-ratios are lower during recessions (periods of high
volatility) and higher during normal times (periods of low volatility), it is profitable to
time the market by decreasing the exposure in bad times and increasing it normal times.
However, a representative agent is expected to bare more risk rather then less during bad
times and be compensated accordingly, therefore the authors claim their strategies to go
against representative agent pricing predictions (or equivalently that implied Sharpe ratios
of representative agents are too high). In the next paragraph I show how indeed rejections
are characterized by higher volatility, lower Moreira-Muir exposures and implied modelbased Sharpe ratio which are too high. Table 1.7 shows the average impact of volatility
30

(measured via the VIX index) and the Moreira and Muir (2017) exposures (computed using
the procedure detailed in their paper and using a GARCH(1,1) on the SP 500 returns42 ).
Panel A shows how the rejections are characterized by higher level of volatility (on average
higher then the median only during rejections), while panel B reports lower Moreira-Muir
exposures (on average higher then the median only in the rest of the sample but during
rejections) in the subsamples {Itv,k }6k=1 . Finally, recall that during rejections Sharpe ratios
implied by the Martin’s class of representative agent pricing are on average higher than
actual ones by at least 0.21 (or 0.72 annaulized). In summary, the rejections characteristics
explain the success of the Moreira-Muir strategies and give a formal test to their claim.
Finally, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) and Amromin and Sharpe (2013), contrary to rational expectations, show how representative-agent-based required market returns disagree
with actual expectations from a non-trivial fraction of investors. Their results are further
exacerbated while conditional on the rejection subsample. Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)
measure the correlation between two sets of proxies:

Mod representative agent based proxies for require market returns (the dividend price ratio,
DP , the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) consumption to wealth ratio, CAY , and the
negative of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) surplus consumption ration, −SCR)
Dat market return actual expectations from survey data (quarterly Graham-Harvey Survey
administered to CEOs of big US company, GH, monthly Gallup Survey administered
to households with at least 10000 dollar invested, Gall)43
42

Results are robust to the usage of the VIX and different rolling windows to compute the GARCH(1,1)
on the SP 500 returns.
43
See Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) for more details.
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under the null of rational expectations the correlation between the two sets of proxies should
be one, but the authors find correlations that are either not statistically different from zero
or negative. Table 1.8 reports a similar exercise conducted conditionally on no rejections
(Itv = 0) as well as given rejections (Itv = 1): the upper panel reports the correlations
between M od and Dat conditioning on no rejections, while the bottom panel shows the
differential between the conditional correlations of M od and Dat in rejections with respect
to no rejections: conditioning on no rejections already returns similar conclusions to the
unconditional Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) test, while the second table shows how on
average the correlation between M od and Dat in rejections is negative and, most of the
time, statistically lower than in no rejections.44

1.5.3

Marginal versus representative agent pricing

In this subsection I show how the leading marginal intermediary based model of Adrian et
al. (2014) is robust to the non-parametric test, and how this might more generally be related
to the fact that marginal pricing is able to generate equilibrium portfolios which are more
efficient than the representative agent market portfolio.

Adrian et al. (2014): a robust intermediary-based setup

In intermediary based theories the Stochastic Discount Factor depends on the health of the
financial sector (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012),
44

The only exception being the divided price ratio under the Graham-Harvey Survey where the conditional
correlations are not statistically different one with another. But is is mainly because the no rejection
conditional starting point is already very negative and statistically significant as displayed in the first raw
of the upper panel.
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He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Moreira and Savov (2017)) and in place of a representative agent there is a marginal financial intermediary.45 The model of Adrian et al. (2014)
postulates a linear 1-factor structure for the SDF of a marginal broker/dealer

Mt+1 = 1 − b × LevF actort+1

(1.9)

where LevF actort+1 proxies for shocks to the intermediary wealth by capturing changes in its
leverage. Adrian et al. show how this SDF is able to price, explaining 77% of the variation, a
non-trivial cross-section of expected returns including equity portfolios sorted by size, bookto-market, and momentum, as well as the cross-section of Treasury bond portfolios sorted
by maturity. I this subsection I document that (i) the model correctly prices asset even
conditioning on periods where representative agent pricing is rejected, (ii) as a matter of
facts, because it does not satisfy the NCC, it is not among the class of models rejected
in this study, and finally (iii) the marginal broker/dealer does not hold in equilibrium the
market portfolio (at least during representative agent pricing rejections).
In order to assess the correct pricing of the model, I estimate the SDF in eq. (1.9) imposing
the pricing equation (1.1) via the following GMM system of equations




E M

j
t+1 Rt+1

− 1] = 0, j= 1, ..., J




j
E Mt+1 Rt+1
− 1|Itv ] = 0, j= 1, ..., J
where I use the 41 test assets of Adrian et al. (2014) plus the market portfolio Rt+1 for a
total of J = 42 assets and the monthly proxy for LevF actort+1 constructed in Adrian et al.
(2014). Results are shown in Panel A of Table 1.9: the model correctly prices the assets
unconditionally as well as conditioning on subsamples {Itv,k }6k=1 where the representative
45

Who might or not be the representative agent.
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agent pricing is rejected: no matter which rule (subsample) we look at or whether we use
equally weighted (EV) or value weighted (VW) portfolios to form the test assets, the J test
does not reject the system of equations at the conventional 5% level and the SDF parameter
b is statistically positive as it should be.46
Panel B of Table 1.9 reports for each rule (supsample) as well as for the case of equally
weighted (EV) and value weighted (VW) test assets the NCC (translating eq.(1.2) in terms
of correlations) unconditionally47 and conditionally on the subsamples {Itv,k }6k=1 : regardless
of the rule or the weighting used to form the test assets all correlation are positive and very
high both unconditionally and conditionally. For the NCC to hold such values should be
smaller or equal to zero.
Finally, Panel C of Table 1.9 shows the correlations, unconditionally and conditionally on the
subsamples {Itv,k }6k=1 , of the implied equilibrium portfolio held by the marginal broker/dealer
and the market portfolio: while unconditionally the two are 0.235 and 0.231 positively
correlated, conditioning on the rejections {Itv,k }6k=1 in general they are uncorrelated. If
the broker/dealer was holding the market portfolio in equilibrium the correlations should
have been much closer to one.48
46

Meaning that periods where leverage is low are associated with periods where the marginal utility of the
intermediary is high, this is a standard prediction of intermediary-based modes where the leverage is driven
by debt considerations as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) or Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012).
47
The unconditional figures are slightly different because they are computed as a second stage using the
SDF parameter values of b in eq. (1.9) from Panel A.
48
Not exactly one since the SP 500, following the Roll (1977)’s critique, might not be a perfect proxy for
the truly unobservable market portfolio.
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Is marginal pricing able to generate more efficient equilibrium portfolios?

We have seen that the subsamples {Itv,k }6k=1 give hard times to the Martin’s class of representative agent pricing but are not an issue for the leading marginal intermediary setup
of Adrian et al. (2014). In particular, the conditional failure of representative agent pricing
implies that there is no agent holding the market portfolio (as proxied by the SP 500) in equilibrium, thus, at least for the rejection subperiods, the market portfolio is not efficient in the
sense used for example in Dybvig and Ross (1982). On the other hand, in the setup of Adrian
et al. (2014), (i) there is no explicit structure that constrains the intermediary broker/dealer
to be a representative agent,49 (ii) the total financial wealth held by broker/dealers is only
around 3% (as reported in He and Krishnamurthy (2013) with respect to the year 2010)
and (iii) the marginal broker/dealer always (no matter the conditioning) hold some optimal
portfolio, other than the market, in equilibrium.
These results suggests the marginal intermediary-based setup of Adrian et al. (2014) to be
more robust than those in the Martin’s class of representative pricing, and perhaps find more
generally, marginal pricing, as able to generate more efficient equilibrium portfolios than the
representative agent market portfolio. This latter claim as well as the potential reason why
this might indeed be the case are left to be further investigated by future research.

1.6

Conclusion

This paper makes use of a new result by Martin (2017) to deliver a more general and
constructive non-parametric test for a non-trivial class of representative agent pricing models.
49

In particular no assumptions constraining preferences to be homotetic or identical across broker/dealers
are imposed.
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The test is more general in that it does not impose sharp restrictions on the preferences of the
agent and only uses the time series of the market return, its options’ quotes and a proxy for
the risk-free rate. It is more constructive because, upon rejection, endogenously returns the
conditional subsample originating the rejection: a feature which enable the econometrician
to study the characteristics of periods associated with the systematic failure of asset pricing
models, and theorists to potentially design more robust setups in the future.
Popular representative agent pricing is rejected conditionally on high uncertain and illiquid
periods, which contains all the major financial crises and economic recessions in the analyzed
sample. These subperiods, endogenously selected based on rules predicting low returns in a
training sample, are defined as times where implied model-based risk premia are too high.
Findings suggest that such conditional model-based implied risk premia are off by striking
amounts - at least by 1.3% monthly (15.6% annually) - even after risk adjustments (model
based Sharpe ratios are still higher then actual ones by at least a monthly 0.2). While excessive risk aversion does not seem to explain such results, ruling out Merton (1980)’s type
explanations, two alternative channels are found consistent with the data: either rejected
models are too sensitive to market crash probabilities, which, as in the rare disaster literature, might be pushing the risk premia too high, or rejected models, typically frictionless,
might not be able to account for the high informational and trading frictions characterizing
the rejections. Interestingly, the alternative marginal intermediary-based pricing setup is
found more robust. In these models pricing is performed via a marginal intermediary, not
necessarily a representative agent: the representative model of Adrian et al. (2014) is found
to correctly price assets even during periods where representative pricing is rejected and the
marginal broker/dealer intermediary not to hold the market portfolio in equilibrium.

36

This findings are overall suggestive of marginal intermediary pricing being able to generate
more efficient portfolios (in the sense used for example in Dybvig and Ross (1982)) than the
popular representative agent market portfolio. Further investigation of this claim, as well as
the potential reason why it might be the case, are left for future research.
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Figure 1.1: Main variables
The figure plots the excess market return πt+1 ≡ Rt+1 − Rt,f and the lower bound measure
LBt computed according to (1.3), using linear interpolation and bid quotes.
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Figure 1.2: First 100 models in training sample according to in-sample fit
The figure shows the first 100 models ranked by their adjusted in-sample R2 along with a
third order polynomial fit. Chow (1960) tests using linear, quadratic or cubic specifications
unambiguously identify a brake in correspondence of model 6. The sample is the training
one starting from February 1973 and ending December 1989.
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Figure 1.3: Tackling over-fitting in the design of the rules for the non-parametric test
Panel a of the figure plots the out-of sample ICM MSE on the in-sample counter-part for
the 6 selected forecasting models. Models above and to the left of the 45 degree line passing
through the origin performed better in-sample while those below and to the right performed
better out-of-sample. Panel b reports for each selected model in the training sample starting
in February 1972 and ending in December 1989 the t-statistics associated to β in equation
i
(1.8) with rt+1
≡ πt+1 − π̂t where π̂t is the forecast of πt+1 given one of the six specifications of
model (1.6) performed in the main sample starting in January 1990 and ending in December
2014.
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Figure 1.4: Subsamples originating the non-parametric test rejections
The top graph plots the time series of the six objective rules (subsamples) Itv (Wt , LBt )
against the real GDP growth: in order to make the graph more readable I multiply each
rule by its associated model, i.e. rule for model j is plotted as j × Itv (Wt , LBt ) and assumes
values 0 and j in the rejection periods. The bottom graph shows in green the sample periods
which are systematically detected by all the rejection rules for a total of 35 observations.
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Figure 1.5: Dynamics of uncertainty (F) and illiquidity (ILLIQpi)
The dynamics for the Ludvigson et al. (2016) financial uncertainty index F and the Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) (il)liquidity index are plotted. In bold the periods selected by the
representative rule n.1, Itv,1 , are highlighted in correspondence of each time-series.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics on Main Variables
The table summarizes the main variables: Rt+1 − 1 is the total net return on the Standard and
Poor’s 500, Rt,f − 1 is the 1-month yield to maturity on U.S. Treasuries, πt+1 = Rt+1 − Rt,f is
the excess market return and LBt is the market premium lower bound measure computed through
(1.3) using linear interpolation and bid quotes. Observations are at the monthly frequency (not
annualized). The lower bound and excess market return statistics are computed in the main sample
January 1990 trhough December 2014 while the market and the risk-free return are computed over
the entire sample February 1973 trhough December 2014.

Variable

Mean

Std.Dev.

(Rt+1 − 1) × 100
(Rt,f − 1) × 100
πt+1 × 100
LBt × 100

0.93
0.42
0.61
0.33

4.57
0.29
4.53
0.32

Min

Max

-21.62 17.05
0.000 1.38
-16.62 16.04
0.07
3.48
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N. Obs. Sample
492
492
289
289

All
All
Main
Main

Table 1.2: Pearson correlation matrix for the candidate predictors
The table displays Pearson correlation coefficients for the candidate predictors (instruments) Z,
described in Section 1.3, over the entire sample from February 1973 to December 2014, the overall
average absolute correlation is 0.10.
Corr
F
SII
T AXchg
ILLIQpi
ILLIQts
M DI
U SDg
BM
M 1g
Sent
GIN Ichg

F
1
-0.03
-0.16
0.35
-0.05
0.44
0.00
0.02
0.15
-0.08
-0.13

SII

T AXchg

ILLIQpi

ILLIQts

M DI

U SDg

BM

M 1g

Sent

1
0.03
0.06
0.01
0.04
-0.14
-0.41
-0.03
0.08
-0.01

1
-0.04
0.05
-0.10
0.02
0.05
-0.09
0.23
0.24

1
0.10
0.23
-0.02
0.06
-0.07
-0.15
-0.04

1
-0.04
0.09
0.00
-0.05
0.13
0.06

1
0.10
0.05
0.19
-0.19
-0.10

1
-0.11
-0.05
0.10
-0.03

1
0.20
-0.42
-0.04

1
-0.06
-0.05

1
0.22
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Table 1.3: Best selected models to predict the excess market return
The table describes the characteristics of the first 6 models to predict the excess market return π, ranked by their
adjusted in-sample R2 in the training sample from February 1973 through December 1989.
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W F
1st X
2nd X
3rd X
4th X
5th X
6th X

SII
X
X
X
X

T AXchg
X
X
X
X
X
X

ILLIQpi
X
X
X
X
X
X

ILLIQts M DI
X

X
X

U SDg
X
X
X
X
X
X

BM
X
X
X
X
X
X

M 1g
X
X
X
X
X
X

Sent GIN Ichg
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

f (·)
Int
Quad
Quad
Int
Quad
Quad

Table 1.4: Non-parametric Test
Each row shows the results for the k-th specification of forecasting model (1.6): four different versions of the key
statistic E[yt+1 |Itv,k ] associated with four different rules Itv,k are reported in percentages and at the monthly frequency.
Version (1) reports the outcomes of the unconditional test, version (2) corresponds to the key rule object of this study
(detailed in Section 1.2) and shows the outcomes of the main non-parametric test. Finally versions (3) and (4) replace
¯ or zero: these rules serve
the lower bound series LBt in the key rules of version (2) with its unconditional mean, LB,
the purpose of understanding the actual role played by the lower bound in the main version (2). Stars, which are
inversely related to the intensity of the green color highlighting the figures, represent the usual confidence levels: they
are reported conservatively as the lowest confidence among the two computed from the equivalent test specifications
in eq. (1.4) and (1.5) and the one derived from p-values adjusted for potential small-sample issues. At the bottom
of the table the average number of observations per given rule (a given version), and the ratio of the magnitudes of
figures in version (3) and (4) with respect to the baseline version (2) are reported.
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Table 1.5: Rejection characteristics
Each row corresponds to a different predictor zt ∈ Zt , while different columns identifies rule n.1,
Itv,1 , trhough rule n.6, Itv,6 . The table displays the difference in conditional means of each predictor,
zt , between the rejection subsample and the rest of the sample, E[zt |Itv,1 = 1] − E[zt |Itv,1 = 0]; only
predictors with statistically different means can discriminate, and thus characterize (up to a first
order approximation), the rejection periods.
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Table 1.6: Potential explanations for Representative Agent pricing failures
Panel A plots in blue the conditional mean of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) proxy for timevarying risk aversion, ηt , during rejections and in red the analog conditional mean during the rest of
the sample for the discussed rules, while the table at the bottom of the figure reports the difference
in these means together with their levels of significance. Similarly panel B reports in blue the
conditional mean of the Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) left tail intensities for the Standard and
Poor’s futures, CPt , during rejections and in red the analog conditional mean during the rest of
the sample for the discussed rules, while the table at the bottom of the figure reports the difference
in these means together with their levels of significance.
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Table 1.7: Justifying failures in light of the results of Moreira and Muir (2017)
Panel A shows how the rejections are characterized by higher level of volatility (on average higher
then the median only during rejections), while panel B reports lower Moreira and Muir (2017)
exposures (on average higher then the median only in the rest of the sample but during rejections)
in the subsamples {Itv,k }6k=1 .
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Table 1.8: Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) test for rational expectations
The upper panel reports the correlations between model-based representative agent proxies for
require market returns (the dividend price ratio, DP , the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) consumption
to wealth ratio, CAY , and the negative of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) surplus consumption
ration, −SCR) and proxies for actual market return expectations from survey data (quarterly
Graham-Harvey Survey administered to CEOs of big US company, GH, monthly Gallup Survey
administered to households with at least 10000 dollar invested, Gall, see Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014) for more details) conditioning on no rejections (Itv = 0), while the bottom panel shows
the differential between the conditional correlations of these variables in rejections (Itv = 1) with
respect to no rejections (Itv = 0).
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Table 1.9: The robust intermediary-based setup of Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014)
Panel A displays, across rules (subsamples) and using equally weighted (EV) versus value weighted (VW) test assets
as in Adrian et al. (2014), the pricing delivered by eq. (1.9): a correct pricing should display a positive and significant
coefficient b and should not be rejected by the GMM J-test. Panel B reports the NCC condition of eq. (1.2) translated in
terms of correlations both unconditionally and conditionally upon the rejection rules (the reason why the unconditional
values slightly differ across rules is due to the fact that the correlations have been computed as a second stage using the
b coefficients estimated in Panel A). Finally Panel C reports the unconditional versus conditional correlations between
the market return Rt+1 and a proxy for the Adrian et al. (2014) broker/dealer equilibrium portfolio LevF actort+1 .
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Chapter 2
Mean-Variance Portfolio Rebalancing
with Transaction Costs
2.1

Introduction

Optimal portfolio rebalancing given transaction costs is a complex problem. Even with only
two assets, solving for the optimal strategy in a continuous-time model involves either a primal free boundary problem (see, for example, Davis and Norman (1990), Dumas and Luciano
(1991), H. Liu and Loewenstein (2002), Shreve and Soner (1994) and Taksar, Klass, and Assaf (1988)) or its dual formulation (e.g. Goodman and Ostrov (2010), see Schachermayer
(2017) for a comprehensive summary of this approach). When there are more securities or
time is discrete, models have been solved only in the extreme case of uncorrelated returns
and constant absolute risk aversion (H. Liu (2004)) or with numerical or heuristic approximations (Leland (2000), Balduzzi and Lynch (1999, 2000), Donohue and Yip (2003), Han
(2005), Muthuraman and Kumar (2006), Irle and Prelle (2008), Lynch and Tan (2009),
Myers (2009) or Dumas and Buss (2017)). Furthermore, except for the case of uncorrelated
securities, when solutions are available they only involve two and rarely three risky assets.
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In this paper, we study the single period investment decisions of a mean-variance investor
only using basic calculus and we are able to: (i) derive exact solutions in the presence of many
assets, with generic correlation structure, under proportional and fixed costs, (ii) validate
key characteristics of the optimal solutions only conjectured in previous studies, (iii) uncover
new economic insights behind the optimal strategies, and (iv) provide useful algorithms for
actual large scale problems.
Mean-variance analysis was originated by Markowitz (1952, 1959), who described the basic
formulations and the quadratic programming tools used to solve them. The theory was
further described by Tobin (1958), who focused on macroeconomic implications of the theory.
Early discussions of transaction costs often focused on the intuition that small investors who
face high costs will choose a smaller and less diversified portfolio than will a large investor
with smaller costs. This intuition has been formalized by a constraint on the number of
securities in the portfolio (Jacob (1974)), a fixed cost for each security included in the
portfolio (Brennan (1975), Goldstein (1979), and Mayshar (1979, 1981)) or a study of benefits
of adding securities without modeling the costs (Mao (1970, 1971)). Unfortunately, this
type of assumptions tend to produce a somewhat messy combinatoric problem looking at all
possible subsets to include, and their static perspective does not seem suited to questions
about rebalancing. The current analysis differs in two important ways from the traditional
mean-variance literature on transaction costs. First, the traditional literature considered
the purchase of a portfolio from scratch, while the current analysis considers rebalancing
from any starting portfolio. Second, we also consider variable costs rather than only fixed
costs (both security specific and overall) and their combination (variable costs and other
institutional features were included in choice problems of Pogue (1970), but without any
analysis of the solution).
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The two setups that are closest to our analysis are the continuous time multi-asset models
with constant investment opportunity sets presented in Leland (2000) and H. Liu (2004).
Leland (2000) provides an heuristic approach to minimize proportional transaction costs.
There is no explicit utility maximization and the solution is conjectured to contain a nontrading region with the shape of a parallelogram (or its higher dimensional analogs). Imposing mean-variance preferences in a one-period model, our setup endogenously generates
the same qualitative properties. H. Liu (2004) solves proportional and fixed transaction
costs problems in the presence of many uncorrelated risky assets. His no-trading regions are
rectangles (or higher dimensional analogs) which arise as special cases in our setup when the
covariance matrix of the risky securities is diagonal.
A solution to a portfolio optimization problem can be thought of as the set of all potential
trades (mappings from the initial pre-trades allocations to the final post-trades ones) that are
optimal given the preferences of the hypothetical investor. Absent costs any trade leads to
the same ideal allocation (so that usually in these frameworks a solution is directly defined
as such allocation). When trading involves transaction costs, there exists a set of initial
allocations which are too close to the ideal one to justify any trade, so that it is optimal not
to trade at all. This set is referred to as the no trade region: its shape, as well as the type
of trades which are optimal from initial allocations outside of it, are fully characterized by
the specific structure of the costs.
In the variable cost models, it is optimal to trade only to the closest boundary of the nontrading region, since trading further would incur additional costs that are not justified.50
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Masters (2003) contains a mean-variance-style analysis with a single risky security and variable trading
costs in which it is claimed that it is not optimal to trade to the boundary of the non-trading region. However,
this is because the paper computed the non-trading region incorrectly as the set of portfolios from which it
would be worth trading to the ideal point that would be chosen absent costs. The error is that there are
portfolios from which it pays to trade partway to the ideal portfolio but not all the way.
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With proportional costs, the cost of trading is additive (if all trades are in the same direction)
or less than additive (if the second trade reverses the first trade in some securities). If a
candidate trade does not take us to the no trade region, we could add on the additional trade
we would make from that point and be better off. Or, if a candidate trade takes us beyond
the boundary of the trading region, is better to trade along the line to the boundary because
the part of the trade beyond the boundary is not justified. These arguments do not work for
fixed costs, because they rely implicitly on costs being additive for sequential trade along a
line, and on costs being no more than additive for sequential trade that are not along a line.
In the models with fixed costs, any trade moves to inside the no trade region if it is optimal
to trade at all: this is because fixed costs once triggered become sunk costs. With only an
overall fixed cost, any nonzero trade moves to an ideal portfolio that would be held absent
costs. This ideal portfolio is in the interior of the no trade region because the value of trading
from nearby is too small to cover the fixed cost. With security-specific fixed costs, any trade
will take us to the interior of the no trade region. However, different starting portfolios will
cause us to trade to different target portfolios.
In models featuring both fixed (overall and asset-specific) and proportional costs the no trade
region and the optimal trades look very similar to the ones generated by only proportional
costs for initial allocations enough far away from the ideal allocation. This is because the
impact of proportional over fixed costs increases with the distance from the ideal allocation (and only proportional costs depends on it) so that when the position is far enough
proportional costs are just what matter. For initial positions closer to the ideal one, the
impact of the fixed component(s) become more and more relevant up to a locus of points,
the actual boundaries of the no trade region, where we are indifferent between not trading
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at all or paying the fixed cost(s) and trade further up to where it is optimal according to the
proportional components of the costs.
The analysis in this article can accommodate multiple risky assets, trading of individual
securities or bundles or pairs, and trading futures or swaps as well as stocks. In particular,
while applying our model to trading in futures and its underlying, we show how to improve
over traditional futures overlay strategies when it is possible to take advantage of a superior
return from holding the underlying. We also show how engaging in cheaper bundles trading
makes us better off by squeezing the non-trading region towards the ideal allocation absent
costs.
Our models are obtained by solving and comparing a finite combination of standard, strictly
convex, quadratic programs. Some programs have closed-form solutions while the simple
structure of the remaining ones allows a one-to-one mapping between their first order conditions and linear complementarity representations, for which efficient and fast converging
algorithms exist. This is why we are able to provide algorithms for large scale problems
involving many risky securities.
Even if simple and exact, a mean-variance setup remains a myopic approximation of the
true dynamic strategy, nonetheless optimizing over transaction costs using our algorithms is
very useful in practice. Maurer and Pezzo (2018) show the empirical relevance of applying
our framework in the context of the FX markets: taking into account costs while optimizing
over 29 developed and emerging currencies from 1976 to 2016 leads to an economically large
and statistically significant improvement in the out-of-sample performance with a Sharpe
ratio increment of approximately 30%. They also show how the majority of such increment,
70%, is due to the proper treatment of correlations. In other words, modeling correlations
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is important, a strategy based on a framework like that of H. Liu (2004), where assets are
considered uncorrelated, delivers no significant improvement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the general
framework, in Section 2.3 we provide graphical examples covering all the main features of
our framework including the new insights on futures overlay strategies, bundle tradings and
the impact of a benchmark. Section 2.4 contains the formal characterization of the problem:
we proof the existence and uniqueness of solutions and discusses their structures including
the steps to constructs all the basic examples of Section 2.3 and the comparative statics
analysis. Section 2.5 describes the algorithm to numerically solve our models for a large
number of risky assets. Section 2.6 concludes while the Appendix contains the proof of the
existence and uniqueness of solutions.

2.2

The Mean-Variance Framework

There are n + 1 asset returns which realizes at the end of the period and initial financial
wealth normalized to 1. By default the first asset, asset 0, also referred to as cash, is risk-free
and can be understood as the bank account used to trade in all other risky assets. At the
beginning of the period, starting from an initial allocation for the risky assets (which can be
a vector of zeros), θ0 , the investor has to choose the vector of portfolio weights θ in order to
maximize
κ
λ
U (θ) = r + θ0 (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) − c(θ, θ0 )
2
2
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(2.1)

The first three terms in the utility function are standard for mean-variance optimization.
The first two terms r and θ0 (µ − r1) give the expected return; First the risk-free rate and
then the net change in expected return from holding a nontrivial risky portfolio. The third
term λ2 θ0 Vθ is the utility penalty for taking on variance. The constant λ > 0 is the coefficient
of risk aversion; the larger the value of λ, the more reluctant the investor is to take on risk
in exchange for return, and θ0 Vθ is the portfolio’s variance.
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The fourth term κ2 (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) is a penalty for tracking error. This term is perhaps
controversial because it depends on a benchmark, θB , and not just on the distribution of
returns.52 The dependence on the benchmark would be unnecessary and probably damaging
in an ideal world,53 but does arise in practice and should be very familiar to practitioners.
The last term is the cost function c(θ, θ0 ): trading does not come for free and re-balancing
the initial position θ0 to the new position θ entails resource dissipation. We will model such
costs as proportional (to the size of the trade), fixed (per trade and independent of size) or
a combination of the two as detailed in the following sections.

2.3

Examples

We first provide the reader with the main insights of our framework with a graphical overview:
Example 1 trough 5 illustrate the class of problems analyzed in this paper while Example 6
51
Including 2 in the denominator makes the units the same as absolute risk aversion in a multivariate
normal model with exponential utility, and also cancels when we look at the first-order conditions.
52
If you do not like this term, you can always restrict attention to κ = 0.
53
Indeed Roll (1992) shows how the mean-variance frontier obtained by minimizing the variance of the
tracking error subject to a target expected return over a given benchmark is dominated by the standard
mean-variance frontier.
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trough 8 show interesting applications which exploit the analytical form of our setup. The
formal problem characterization is postponed to the next section.

2.3.1

Example 1: Proportional Costs

A typical case with proportional transaction costs is shown in Figure 2.1. If the initial
allocation θ0 is in the nontrading region, the area of the parallelogram, then there is no
trade whose benefit covers the cost and it is best not to trade. The right boundary of the
nontrading region is part of the line along which we are just indifferent about selling Security
1, s1, and it is optimal to sell Security 1 if we start to the right of this boundary. The left
boundary of the nontrading region is part of the line along which we are just indifferent
about purchasing Security 1, b1, and it is optimal to purchase Security 1 to the left of this
boundary. The boundaries for purchasing and selling are different because the costs put a
wedge between the marginal valuations at market prices and valuation the the prices net of
costs.
Similar to the case of Security 1, we sell Security 2, s2, if we start above the top boundary
and we buy Security 2, b2, if we start below the bottom boundary. If we start in the regions
further away from the corners (not directly to the right, left, top, or bottom of any of the
sides of the nontrading region), then we trade in both securities up to the nearest corner.
It may not be obvious that the correct trades are as shown by the arrows in Figure 2.1. For
example, could there be some points in the region above the top boundary of the nontrading
region from which we trade to the upper right corner of the region? The answer is no,
because if we buy Security 1 at all, we must end up on the corresponding boundary. In this
case, any net purchase of Security 1 must be to the left boundary.
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Absent the positive correlation between the returns on the two securities, the non-trading
region would have been a square (or a rectangle given diverse security-specific costs) with
sides parallel to the axes. With positive correlation, the two securities are substitutes, and
over- or under-weighting in one security is more serious if we have the same over- or underweighting in the other security. This is why the nontrading region is larger along the -45
direction in which the over- and under-weightings cancel than along the 45 direction in which
the over- and under-weightings are reinforced.

2.3.2

Example 2: Overall Fixed Cost

If there is an overall fixed cost, then if we trade the cost is the same whatever trade we make.
Therefore, if we are going to trade, we always trade to the same ideal portfolio.
The overall fixed cost is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The non-trading boundary is bounded by
an ellipse. From outside this region, it is optimal to trade to the ideal point, since it is no
more costly to trade to the ideal portfolio than to trade to a less-preferred portfolio. If the
asset returns were uncorrelated with symmetric covariances, the non-trading region would be
a circle. In this example, everything is symmetric but there is correlation. The correlation
means that the two assets are substitutes and it is not so bad if we have too little of one
asset if we have too much of the other. As in the case of proportional costs, this is why we
are quicker to trade if we are over-weighted in both assets than if we are over-weighted in
one and under-weighted in the other.
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2.3.3

Example 3: Asset-Specific Fixed Costs

What may be more plausible than an overall fixed cost is a fixed cost for each security.
Arguably, a security-specific fixed cost comes from a due diligence requirement to monitor
or document any security in the portfolio.
Figures 2.3 illustrate the inaction region in the presence of asset specific fixed costs. Near
the ideal point in the middle, θ∗ , is the non-trading region. The North-West and South-East
corners lie on an ellipse reminiscent (but in general not equal to) of the no-trading region
of an overall fixed cost problem while the pairs of parallel outer thick black dashed straight
lines and the two intersecting blue and red lines come from the asset-specific component of
the fixed costs. For analogous reasons as those discussed in the overall fixed cost example,
for any initial position inside the region defined by the above mentioned corners and dashed
line it is optimal not to trade at all. Outside of this area we trade as follows: From the
regions in the corners, we trade both securities to the ideal point θ∗ . From the regions on
the right and left, we trade Security 1 but not Security 2 to the thick blue line going through
the ideal point. This would be a vertical line if we had no correlation, but has negative slope
in our case. Similarly, from the regions above and below, we trade only Security 2 to the
thick red line running through the ideal point.

2.3.4

Example 4: Overall Fixed and Asset-Specific Proportional
Costs

Figure 2.4 shows the different (no-)trading regions for the case in which the investor both
pays an overall fixed cost to enter the market as well as asset specific proportional costs
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to (re)balance his portfolio to the desired allocation. The parameters, except for the fixed
cost K = 0.00075, are those of Figure 2.1 and the inner parallelogram is indeed the same:
this is the region where the investor will optimally trade to if the fixed cost of entering the
market is not too big. There is in fact a threshold, pictured as a dash-line, surrounding the
proportional no-trading region; If the initial position θ0 is inside this line the dis-utility from
the fixed cost to enter the market is more than the benefit of trading to the border of the
no-trading region (inner parallelogram) so that it is optimal not to trade at all. Outside of
this line it is optimal to trade up to the border of the no trading region as in the proportional
only case: in particular, there are four corridors and four corners delimited by wavy dashed
lines. Inside each corridor it is optimal to trade (buy or sell) along straight lines only one
asset at a time, while at each corner it is optimal to trade (buy/sell) two assets until the
nearest no-trading region corner is reached.

2.3.5

Example 5: Asset-Specific Fixed and Proportional Costs

A similar but slightly more complex pattern emerges when we look at the the case of assetspecific fixed and proportional costs. Figure 2.5 visualizes of the (no-)trading regions for the
case of both asset specific fixed and proportional costs. The parameters, except for the fixed
cost K = 0.00075, are those of Figure 2.1 and the inner parallelogram is indeed the same:
this is the region where the investor will optimally trade to if the fixed costs are not too
big. Each fixed cost, albeit asset-specific, is taken as identical in the figure. The presence of
asset specific costs rather than an overall fixed cost, on top of the asset specific proportional
components, has similar effects, and an analogous intuition, as those described in Figure
2.4 in the presence of an overall fixed cost in place of the asset-specific fixed ones with two
notable differences: 1 - the corridors inside which only one asset at time is traded up to the
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border of the no trading region are wider pushing the corner regions further away from the
unconstrained optimum. 2 - the thresholds where the investor is indifferent between paying
the fixed costs and trade to the border of the no trading region or do not trade at all are
different with respect to Figure 2.4 and feature a couple of intersections along the 45 degree
line passing through the unconstrained optimum.

2.3.6

Example 6: Futures Overlay

In this example we suggest an improvement over traditional future overlay strategies.
It is increasingly common for plan sponsors to use futures as well as (or instead of) equities
for managing exposure to market risk. One popular example of a transaction-cost-aware
strategy is to use futures as an inexpensive way of keeping effective asset allocation in line
with a benchmark or ideal allocation. For example, if we think the ideal weighting in equities
is 60%, then as the market rises we become over-weighted and as the market falls we become
under-weighted (since the fixed-income part of the portfolio moves less than proportionately
with moves in the equity market). Maintaining a weighting near the ideal weighting by
trading equities is very expensive. A futures overlay might correct for minor deviations from
the ideal weighting by trading in futures, which are highly correlated with equities but much
cheaper to trade.
For a futures strategy, we normally think that the correlation between the equity position
and futures is close to one, so that holding futures and bonds is a close substitute for trading
the underlying equities. We also usually believe that futures are much less expensive to trade
than the underlying, which is why it is appealing to consider substituting futures trades for
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trades in equities. The expected returns (“alphas”) are however not usually discussed much,
but they turn out to be very important.
Generally, we might expect the return on the underlying equities to be higher than the return
on synthetic equity due to the benefits of active management. Or, moving somewhat outside
the model, the extra return on the underlying may be due to the cost of rolling the futures
or the tax-timing advantages to equity. Figure 2.6 illustrates an example in which equities,
Security 1, have a significantly higher expected return than the synthetic equity strategy
using futures, Security 2. In this case, there is a trade-off between transaction costs and
expected return and it is optimal to use futures to substitute for trading in the underlying
only for some trade. In practice, most plan sponsors use a “symmetric” futures overlay
that uses futures to the same extent for correcting over- and under-exposure to the market.
However, the analysis here prescribes an asymmetric strategy that makes good economic
sense. If the market exposure must be reduced, we sell futures,54 which allows us to keep the
extra return on the underlying equities. On the other hand, if the market exposure must be
increased, we buy equities, which have the extra return, rather than futures, which don’t.

2.3.7

Example 7: Bundles

If it is possible to purchase a bundle of securities more cheaply than its constituents, then it
might be possible to shrink the non-trading region and get closer, at least in some directions,
to the unconstrained optimum.
In the presence of proportional costs only Figure 2.7 illustrates an example identical to that
in Figure 2.1 except the additional opportunity of buying or selling a 50-50 mix of the two
54

This is the normal situation but extreme cases may be different. For example, in Figure 2.6 we would
sell equities rather than futures if we found ourselves 210% long equities and 140% short futures.
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securities with a transaction cost of 0.0025. The dashed red lines represents the no trading
region in the absence of the bundle, while the solid lines are the new region boundaries.
Adjacent the region in which we sell the bundle, there are regions where we sell the bundle
and one of the securities. Similarly, adjacent the region in which we buy the bundle, there are
regions where we buy the bundle and one of the securities. To keep the graph simple, we have
considered a case with only two underlying securities, but bundles trading would obviously
be more useful and more interesting with many securities. For example, trading a bundle
might be a cost-effective way of aligning market or sector exposures with a target. With
many securities in the bundle, the trading pattern could be more complex, for example, with
simultaneous buys and sells of different individual securities to compensate for imbalances
caused by trading the bundle.
In the presence of fixed costs we can reach a similar conclusion: Figure 2.8 compares the
inaction regions of Example 2.4 (red) and 2.5 (blue). Even if no explicit bundle of assets is
available, for situations in which it is optimal to simultaneously trade both assets (in case
of negative correlation the no trade regions stretches more along the 45 line) one can think
of the overall cost as the fixed cost for accessing the bundle consisting of asset 1 and 2 thus
coming closer to the unconstrained optimum.

2.3.8

Example 8: Following a Benchmark with Proportional and
Fixed Costs

This last application confirms and generalizes the i.i.d. approximate framework of Leland
(2000): found managers’ performances are usually evaluated relative to a benchmark, θB ,
and price fluctuations generate an additional trade-off. While previous examples show that
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for positions that are not too distant from the ideal portfolio it is optimal not to trade, if managers’ performance are evaluated against a benchmark portfolio there might be additional
incentives to trade sooner to keep the strategy relatively near the benchmark. Leland (2000)
studies this situation in a dynamic setting where returns are i.i.d, in the presence of proportional costs only and in the absence of standard preferences. Our one-period framework is
able to put such analysis in the context of (explicit) mean-variance preferences and a more
general cost function (featuring a fixed component on top of the asset-specific proportional
costs).
Figure 2.9 shows two typical such situations: with proportional and an overall fixed cost
(upper plot) and with proportional and asset specific costs (bottom plot). By comparing
these graphs with the equivalent formulations in the absence of a benchmark, Figure 2.4
and 2.5 respectively, we notice how the trade-off works: the presence of the benchmark θB
shrinks and shift the no trading regions towards the benchmark.

2.4

Analytical Characterizations

In this section we formally analyze the different models introduced earlier. The following are
the set of weak technical assumptions that our framework requires in order to be well-defined:

A1: the variance-covariance matrix, V , of risky returns net of any liquidation costs is positive
definite55
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This assumption might be relaxed in an even more flexible setup able to handle all the modeling situations
that require perfect positive or negative correlation between assets. Important examples include the design
of a model to study the closed-end fund puzzle or the more applied need to model situations in which the
same asset is traded in different exchanges (e.g. as an ordinary stock in Country X and as an A.D.R. in the
U.S.). This objective is left for future research.
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A2: the risk and tracking error aversion parameters λ and κ are non-negative and at least
one of them is strictly positive
A3: the cost function c(θ, θ0 ) ≡ c(P, S, θ0 ) is




P 0 C P + S 0 C S with C P > 0, C S > 0 if costs are proportional








1[θ6=θ0 ] k with k > 0 if cost is overall fixed




Pn
c(P, S, θ0 ) =
i 1[θi 6=θi0 ] ki with ki > 0 if costs are asset-specific fixed





P 0 C P + S 0 C S + 1 0 k if costs are proportional and overall fixed


[θ6=θ ]





P

P 0 C P + S 0 C S + ni 1[θi 6=θ0 ] ki if costs are proportional and asset-specific fixed
i
where P ≥ 0 is the n-dimensional vector of risky assets’ purchases, S ≥ 0 is the
n-dimensional vector of risky assets’ sales, C P is the n-dimensional vector of proportional purchase costs and C S is the n-dimensional vector of proportional sale costs.

The cost function detailed in A3 covers the typical cost structures used in the literature.
Note that such cost function is defined in terms of P and S rather then asset weights θ, as
part of the proof of Theorem 2 below we show that a necessary condition for any solution θ
is that c(P, S, θ0 ) = c(θ, θ0 ). That is, the cost function can equivalently be represented as a
(piece-wise linear) function of the n-dimensional vector of risky weights θ.
Under these assumptions we can proof the existence of a solution θ∗ for the class of models
having objective function defined by (2.1)

Theorem 2 Given A1 − A3 the problem

maxn U (θ)
θ∈R
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has solution θ∗ = {θP C , θ\P C }. θP C is the unique solution if costs are only proportional,
for all other cases the solution, θ\P C , is still unique for initial positions outside or inside
the no trading region. For initial positions exactly on the borders of the no-trading region
the investor will choose θ\P C , depending on the actual costs composition, as either θ̂P C (the
solution to a proportional costs problem in which trades are allowed only for a subset of the
assets) or
θu =

V −1
(µ − r1 + κV θB )
κ+λ

(2.2)

which is the unique optimum in the absence of costs. Furthermore the solution θ∗ is such
that U (θ∗ ) ≤ J(θu ) where
λ
κ
J(θ) = r + θ0 (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB )
2
2

(2.3)

is the hypothetical utility function in the absence of costs.

Proof. See Appendix B.1
The proof, in conjunction with the algorithm described in section 2.5, gives the recipe to numerically solve the class of problems covered in this paper. Computationally our framework
scale up nicely with the number n of risky assets for which a solution is computationally
feasible. In contrast with the literature, in which solutions are available only up to 2 or
3 risky assets, our one-period setup accommodates large number of assets, especially when
costs are not asset-specific fixed.56
56

In this case, since the solution is found by enumerating the potential alternative investments resulting
from any possible combination of the available assets, the number of sub-problems to solve grows at a rate
of 2n with the number n of risky assets, limiting the applicability to a number n of the order of 20.
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The rest of this section covers the in-depth characterization of the solutions for the different
class of proposed models.

2.4.1

Proportional Costs

The Problem

The cost function is defined as c(θ, θ0 ) ≡ P 0 C P + S 0 C S . The investor has to choose for
each risky asset by how much to increase or decrease the initial position θ0 : the n chosen
increments are stored in the vector of risky purchases, P , while the n chosen decrements
are stored in the vector of risky sales, S. Incrementing the assets’ positions by P entails
a cost, expressed in return units, of P 0 C P : i.e. each long trade of risky asset i with size
Pi is taxed at a rate of CiP . Analogously decreasing the assets’ positions by S entails a
cost of S 0 C S : each short trade of risky asset i with size Si is taxed at a rate of CiS . Thus,
different assets can have different costs for purchasing and selling, which are paid at end-ofperiod (or equivalently are measured in future value units). Since utility is also measured in
end-of-period return units, marginal utilities and costs are in identical units.
The problem can be formally described as

Problem 3
λ
κ
max U (θ) = r + θ0 (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) − P 0 C P − S 0 C S
P,S
2
2
subject to
θ = θ0 + P − S
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P ≥0
S≥0
where we use the following notation:
θ0 : n × 1 vector of initial risky asset weights
P : vector of risky assets’ purchases
S : vector of risky assets’ sales
r: risk-free rate of interest
µ: n × 1 vector of expected risky asset rates net of any liquidation costs
λ: risk aversion parameter
κ: tracking error parameter
V: n × n covariance matrix of risky rates net of any liquidation costs
θB : n × 1 vector of benchmark portfolio weights
C P : n × 1 vector of proportional transaction costs for purchases
C S : n × 1 vector of proportional transaction costs for sales.

Characterization of the solution

This subsection derive by construction the unique solution, θ, in the space of asset weights.
The utility function U (θ) and the constraint vector θ = θ0 + P − S, which yield the endof-period portfolio weights, θ, as a function of the chosen sales S and purchases P , define a
quadratic programming which is easy to solve and in which any candidate solution (P, S) has
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to satisfy the First Order Conditions (FOCs) of Problem 3.57 We are assuming that transaction costs are the only source of market frictions. In practice, we could add nonnegativity
constraints for portfolio positions, no-borrowing constraints or constraints on proportions in
individual stocks or industries, and the problem would still be easy to solve, but including
such considerations here would only be a distraction from our main message.
If we substitute in Problem 3 the constraints into the objective function we can write the
Lagrangian as
L(P, S, λP , λS ) = U (θ) + λ0P P + λ0S S
then the Khun-Tucker (KT) conditions are given by
∂U (θ)
∂L(P, S, λP , λS )
=
+ λP = 0
∂P
∂P

(2.4)

∂U (θ)
∂L(P, S, λP , λS )
=
+ λS = 0
∂S
∂S

(2.5)

with the complementarity slackness conditions

λ0P P = 0

(2.6)

λ0S S = 0

(2.7)

57

In the proof of Theorem 2, Problem 3 is rewritten in the equivalent standard quadratic programming
form of
1
max Ũ (x) = a0 x + x0 Qx
x
2
subject to
x≥0
and the Hessian Q is shown to be Semi-Positive Definite implying that any candidate x satisfying the first
order conditions is a solution of the problem.
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and the Lagrange multipliers
λP ≥ 0
λS ≥ 0
In particular, due to the nonegativity of the Lagrange multipliers, equations (2.4) and (2.5)
imply
∂U (θ)
≤0
∂P
∂U (θ)
≤0
∂S
once we substitute the actual partial derivatives we obtain

m ≡ µ − r − λVθ − κV(θ − θB )

satisfying for each risky asset i with i = 1, ..., n

mi ∈ [−CiS , CiP ]

(2.8)

the term mi defines the marginal utility of holding asset i in the absence of transaction costs
(therefore the marginal utility of shorting asset i is given by −mi ). At the unconstrained
optimum such marginal utility should equal zero for any asset, however in the presence
of proportional transaction costs equation (2.8) shows that for each asset it lies in in the
compact interval [−CiS , CiP ] around zero instead. Remember that in our framework no trade
in any risky asset i occurs without paying either CiS or CiP , thus mi tells us that is optimal
not to trade asset i if the marginal utility mi lies in [−CiS , CiP ].
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If we now substitute the definition of marginal utility in equations (2.4) and (2.5), solve
for the Lagrange multipliers and plug them into equations (2.6) and (2.7), we obtain the
revisited complementarity slackness conditions for each asset i

(mi − CiP )Pi = 0

(2.9)

(−mi − CiS )Si = 0

(2.10)

let’s focus our attention on equation (2.9): from equation (2.8) when mi − CiP ≤ 0 the
marginal utility of holding an extra unit of asset i is smaller or equal to the marginal cost
and we then know that Pi = 0 is optimal. On the other hand, when mi − CiP > 0 we are
outside of the no trading region, equation (2.8) is violated meaning we are not at optimum
and there exist a choice of either Si > 0 or Pi > 0 or both for some Si and Pi such that the
investor is better off. In particular mi − CiP > 0 implies −mi − CiS < 0 thus equation (10)
implies Si = 0. We infer that the only choice available to increase utility is to buy more of
asset i, i.e. set Pi > 0. Note from the definition of mi that it is continuous and decreasing
in Pi , so that the investor has to keep on buying more and more of asset i until mi = CiP
and condition (2.8) is satisfied. Thus equation (2.9) says that if we are not inside the no
trading region because we are not holding enough of asset i we should buy more of it to the
point in which the marginal benefit equal the marginal cost and we are on the border of the
no-trading region. Similarly the other complementary condition (2.10) says that if we are
not inside the no trading region because we are holding too much of asset i we should keep
selling it to the point in which the marginal benefit of shorting, −mi , equal the marginal
cost CiS and again we are exactly on the border of the no-trading region.
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The two conditions together imply that it is never optimal to buy and sell any asset i at the
same time, i.e. either Si > 0 or Pi > 0 but not both. Thus there exist only one combination
(P, S) ∈ Rn+ × Rn+ satisfying the FOCs of Problem 2.4.1 and the constraint θ = θ0 + P − S:
if this combination is feasible then θ ∈ Rn would be the unique solution of Problem 2.4.1 in
the space of asset weights. The only reason why (P, S) might not be feasible is if there exists
at least one asset i for which setting Pi or Si to +∞ is optimal. By contradiction suppose
there exist such an asset i: because limPi →+∞ θ0 V θ = limSi →+∞ θ0 V θ = +∞, it follows that
U (θ) = −∞. Thus Pi = +∞ or Si = +∞ is never optimal.

The no-trading region and the optimal policy

Absent costs, a standard mean-variance problem with a nonsingular covariance matrix and
strictly concave preferences over mean and standard deviation has a unique optimal portfolio
θu and it is optimal to trade directly to the optimum whatever the initial portfolio θ0 . As
a result, there is only a single starting point, the unique optimum θu , from which the agent
would not trade. With transaction costs, however, there is a whole set of portfolios θ,
including θu , from which there would be no trade. Although possibly not at the ideal
portfolio θu , any trade from this region would generate a benefit too small to cover the
transaction costs.
As shown above any optimal portfolio θ in Rn for which there is no trade has to satisfy the
first order conditions: that is it has to be inside the interval defined by (2.8) for each i and
in case it is outside for some component j (asset j) the complementary slackness conditions
(2.6) and (2.7) tell us it needs to be pushed back at the boundary of the interval of asset j
by either buying or selling more of asset j but not both. Thus any optimal portfolio θ satisfy
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condition (2.8) for any asset i suitably re-arranged:

Vi θ ≥

1
(κVi θB + (µi − r − CiP ))
κ+λ

(2.11)

Vi θ ≤

1
(κVi θB + (µi − r + CiS ))
κ+λ

(2.12)

where Vi is the i-th row of V . The set of portfolios given by (2.11) defines a half-space such
that it is always optimal not to buy asset i (it may be optimal in some part to actually sell
asset i); this is because (2.11) is equivalent to the statement mi ≤ CiP . Similarly equation
(2.12) defines a half-space in Rn such that it is never optimal to sell asset i (in some part
is actually optimal to buy asset i). The intersection of these half-spaces for all asset i
characterizes the no trading region. Thus, in contrast to other studies58 that assume linear
edges for the no trading region in the presence of proportional transaction costs, the linearity
of the inaction region boundaries endogenously arises in our setup.
The no trading region is an n dimensional object, with each dimension associated to a risky
asset i for i = 1, ..., n. Figure 2.10 illustrates the no trading region for the case of 2 and
3 risky assets. More generally, there are 2 ×n half-spaces, a pair for each asset i. Note
that for a given asset i, conditions (2.11) and (2.12) with equality defines a pair of n − 1
dimensional hyperplanes which, together with the inequalities’ signs, fully characterize the
respective half-spaces. In particular, the half-spaces are of the form Vi θ + bPi ≥ 0 and
Vi θ + bSi ≤ 0 with scalars bPi and bSi being the negative of the RHS of (2.11) and (2.12).
Written in this standard way it is easy to see that Vi defines the hyperplanes’ orientations
while the b coefficients characterize their directions in the space. Because the orientation is
the same, the hyperplanes are parallel to each other and their relative distance is given by
S
|bP
i −bi |
;
||Vi ||

58

simple algebra shows that bPi −bC
i =

CiP +CiS
κ+λ

e.g. H. Liu (2004) and Leland (2000)
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which is strictly grater than zero given A2

and at least one between CiP and CiP strictly positive, meaning that the hyperplanes do not
overlap. Therefore, the opposite signs in (2.11) and (2.12) reveal that the non-overlapping
hyperplanes define overlapping half-spaces pointing in opposite directions covering a nonempty corridor in Rn . The convex hull generated by the intersection of this n corridors
defines the boundaries of the no-trading region. The existence of such convex hull is due to
the fact that the covariance matrix V is positive definite, assumption A1, and thus full rank.
This way each of its row, Vi , is linearly independent and thus each hyperplane pair, and
thus corridor, has a unique orientation implying that there will always be 2 ×n intersections
originated from the n pairs of parallel half-spaces and 2n intersections where n half-planes
meet. The 2 ×n intersections represent the no-trading region edges, while the 2n intersections
are the region’s corners. Finally, each of the 2 ×n half-spaces portions delimited by the 2
×n edges originates the 2 ×n faces of the region.
We can also say more about the shape of this region: the 2 ×n edges are intersections of
parallel hyperplanes thus are linear and symmetric. This also implies that the 2 ×n faces,
being portions of the original half-spaces delimited by the edges, are linear too. Thus the
no-trading region is a parallelogram in the presence of two risky assets and its analogous in
higher dimensions.
In terms of trading rules (optimal policy) by carefully inspecting (2.11) and (2.12) we notice
that each pair of parallel faces (edges excluded) is a function of a single asset only. The
trading rule with respect to asset i, for each initial allocation lying outside the interior of
such faces along the hyperplanes’ normal vector, is to either buy or sell exclusively asset i
until the new allocation lies on the nearest of the two faces; this is by far the most common
trading that can ever occur since the faces of the no-trading region represent the majority
of the entire region. On the other extreme, for allocations lying in the portion of Rn outside
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a region corner defined by the intersection of the n hyperplanes forming that corner, a trade
would entail either buying or selling (but not both at the same time) each of the n risky
asset; this type of trade is the least common among all since the probability of being in the
portion of Rn outside one of the 2n corners is low. Finally, in-between the two extremes,
are the situations in which the initial allocation is outside the trading region in the space
generated by the intersections of up to n − 1 hyperplanes, the ones defining the region’s
edges (corners exuded). In these cases the trading rules entail either buying or selling (but
not both at the same time) up to n − 1 risky assets, each asset associated with one of the
intersecting hyperplanes.
In summary, the FOCs completely characterize the optimal trading rule: equation (2.8) for
all assets n defines the no-trading region while conditions (2.6) and (2.7) tell us the optimal
directions, along straight lines, in which the trades should occur in order to approach the
boundaries of the no trading region.

How the shape of the no-trading region changes as the number of asset increases

Davis and Norman (1990) show how the no trading region for the case of only one asset is
an interval on the real line. Our framework, via (2.11) and (2.12), formally confirms the
linearity of its boundaries for the case of any arbitrary number of risky assets. In particular,
as we saw in Figure 2.10, going from 1 to 3 assets makes the interval first to become a
parallelogram and then a parallelepiped. In sharp contrast with H. Liu (2004), Figure 2.11
reminds us that, as long as the correlation among assets is not zero, we cannot reduce the
dimensionality of a problem involving n assets to a problem involving n − k assets and a
problem involving k assets; in light blue is the slice of the no trading region evaluated in
correspondence of the optimal unconstrained allocation for asset 3 while in red is the optimal
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inaction region for the same problem only involving asset 1 and asset 2. In the H. Liu (2004)
world, in the absence of correlation, the two parallelogram would become two rectangles
(squares) perfectly overlapped (a claim we verified in our framework as well). Thus Figure
2.11 illustrates the inseparability of the problem once the correlations among assets are taken
into account: this is because, as (2.11) and (2.12) show, the weight of any asset is a function
of the covariance with itself and any other (risky) asset.

2.4.2

Fixed Costs

We consider two different models with fixed costs. In one case, there is a fixed cost for any
change in position. In the other case, there is a cost for each risky security traded.

Overall fixed cost: The Problem

The assumption of an overall fixed cost, k, is that we incur a fixed cost of “going to the
market”. The cost function is defined as c(θ, θ0 ) ≡ 1[θ6=θ0 ] k and the choice problem is

Problem 4
κ
λ
maxn U (θ) = r + θ0 (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) − 1[θ6=θ0 ] k
θ∈R
2
2

Overall fixed cost: Characterization of the Solution

Although Problem 4 is a nonconvex problem, there are only two cases to consider and its
solution is simple. If there is a trade, it is to the same ideal point, θu described in equation
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(2.2), whatever the initial position. Therefore, the no-trade region can be computed as the
set of points, portfolios such that θ = θ0 , where the improvement in value from going to
the ideal point does not exceed the fixed cost. This set of portfolios is characterized by the
equation
κ
λ
r + θ0 (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) ≥
2
2
κ
λ
r + θu0 (µ − r1) − θu0 Vθu − (θu − θB )0 V(θu − θB ) − K
2
2
and it is the area inside an ellipse (As we showed in Example 2) or its analogous counterpart
when we deal with more than 2 risky assets.

Asset-specific fixed Costs: The Problem

What may be more plausible than an overall fixed cost is a fixed cost for each security.
Arguably, a security-specific fixed cost comes from a due diligence requirement to monitor
or document any security in the portfolio, although a serious consideration of this motivation probably leads us to informational or strategic considerations outside the current
framework.59
The cost function is defined as c(θ, θ0 ) ≡

Pn

i+1

1[θi 6=θi0 ] ki and the choice problem is

Problem 5
n

X
λ
κ
max U (θ) = r + θ (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) −
1[θi 6=θi0 ] ki
θ
2
2
i+1
0

59

For example, why would we have to monitor a position unless new information arrival is possible and
subsequent trade is possible? Perhaps a regulator requires documentation of the trade and a due diligence
study of the firm issuing each share of stock we hold, even though we know we are not going to learn anything
from the exercise. Another question is why we don’t have to do monitoring or due diligence on a stock we
already hold and choose not to sell. Or, it may be that our broker offers to make any trade in a single
maturity, whatever the size, for the same fixed price. It seems much easier to make an argument for why
there are variable costs.
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where ki is the fixed cost incurred to trade (risky) security i

Asset-specific fixed Costs: Characterization of the solution

The solution to Problem 5 is more of a combinatoric problem, since each possible set of
included portfolios gives a different piece of the overall nonconcave objective function. The
existence theorem and the algorithm of Section 2.5 enable us to numerically solve this problem for n > 2 risky assets. However, in a particular small example we can analytically and
graphically (Figure 2.12 shows the “architecture” behind Example 3) construct the solution,
since the set of boundary points where two subsets are equally preferred is a conic section.
Next we characterize the solution for the case of n = 2 risky assets. There are four basic
regions (which can also be subdivided by the direction of trade):

Region a: no trade
Region b: trade security 1 but not security 2
Region c: trade security 2 but not security 1
Region d: trade both securities

For all the cases, it simplifies the algebra to write the objective function in terms of deviations
from the ideal portfolio θu as we do in the proof of Theorem 2 and, in order to convey the
main intuition, set κ = 0 as well. Let γ = θ − θu (and γ 0 = θ0 − θu ), then we can rewrite
the objective of Problem 5 as
n

X
λ
1[γi 6=γi0 ] ki
U (γ) = U − γ 0 Vγ −
2
i+1
u
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where
Uu ≡ r +

1
(µ − r1)0 V −1 (µ − r1)
2λ

(2.13)

In region a, there is no trade so the cost is zero, and the value is the value of the initial
position θ0 :
λ 0
Ua = U u − γ 0 Vγ 0
2
this is a strictly concave quadratic function of γ with a maximum of U u achieved at γ = 0.
In region b, we trade security 1, incurring a cost k1 , and the value is
λ
λ
Ub = max{U − (V11 γ12 + 2V12 γ1 γ20 + V22 γ22 ) − k1 } = U u −
γ1
2
2
u



V122
2
V22 −
γ20 − k1
V11

where γ1 = −(V12 /V11 )γ2 achieves the maximum. In this case, the value function is strictly
concave in γ2 and constant in γ1 . It achieves a maximum of U u = −k1 on the line γ2 = 0.
Region c is symmetric to Region b but with the securities swapped, so we have
λ
Uc = U −
2
u



V122
2
V11 −
γ10 − k2
V22

In region d, we go to the ideal point and incur both costs k1 and k2 , and the value is
Ud = U u − k1 − k2

the value is constant independent of the starting position γ 0 .
Having computed the values in each region, it is straightforward to compute the candidate
boundaries, where Ua = Ub , Ua = Uc , etc. For the example in Figure 2.12, all these candidate
81

boundaries are lines except the locus Ua = Ud which is an ellipse. (In general, even in
many dimensions, the boundary solves a quadratic or linear equation.) Near the ideal point
(marked as a red point), not trading is optimal so we mark these regions with a. If we start
in a region a and cross a boundary not involving a (say Ub = Uc ), we remain in region a.
However, if we cross a boundary involving a (say Ua = Ud ), then we switch regions (in this
case to d). (In principle, there could be a degenerate case in which two regions are equal on
the boundary but the same is better on both sides. However, this does not happen in our
current example.) Going through this exercise confirms the regions in Figure 2.3.

2.4.3

Fixed and Proportional Costs

We now combine the previous analysis to characterize two types of more complex, (perhaps)
more realistic, settings. One in which there is an overall fixed cost on top of asset-specific
proportional costs and another where also the fixed component becomes asset-specific. We
start by analyzing the asset-specific framework in that the overall fixed setup is a special
case and, while discussing the latter, we make a comparison between the two frameworks.

Asset-Specific fixed and Proportional Costs: The Problem

The cost function is defined as c(θ, θ0 ) ≡ P 0 C P + S 0 C S +

Pn

i+1

1[θi 6=θi0 ] ki and the choice

problem is

Problem 6
n

X
κ
λ
1[θi 6=θi0 ] ki
max U (θ) = r + θ (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) − P 0 C P − S 0 C S −
P,S
2
2
i+1
0
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subject to
θ = θ0 + P − S
P ≥0
S≥0

Asset-Specific fixed and Proportional Costs: Characterization of the solution

As in the case of Problem 5, the presence of asset-specific fixed costs makes Problem 6 more
of a combinatorial problem. The existence theorem and the algorithm of Section 2.5 enable
us to numerically solve this problem for n > 2 risky assets. Nonetheless, in order to convey
the main intuition, it is useful to analytically and graphically solve the problem for the case
of n = 2 risky assets.
For the ease of exposition we set κ to 060 and rewrite the problem in positions γ = θ − θu
relative to the unconstrained optimum θu defined in (2.2) as
n

X
λ
U = U − γ 0 Vγ − P 0 C P − S 0 C S −
1[γi 6=γi0 ] ki
2
i+1
u

where U u is defined as in (2.13).
Analogously to Figure 2.12, Figure 2.13, shows the steps to construct Example 5 (i.e. Figure
2.5). Each asset i now have a fixed and a proportional component; The fixed part is the sunk
cost the investor has to pay to be allowed to trade that asset while the proportional part is
60

The steps for solving the problem with κ > 0 are the same and yield a smaller no trading region with
the same shape only shifted towards the target portfolio θB . This is because the optimization takes now into
account, in the spirit of Leland (2000), the trade off between trading costs (a smaller no trade region) and
tracking error benefits (a post-trade position closer to the target θB ). This is what we discussed in Example
8 and shown in bottom graph of Figure 2.9.
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the constant rate61 charged to the trade that moves the initial position of asset i, θi0 , to the
post-trade position θi . The longer the distance the higher the impact of the proportional
component. Thus from any initial position θ0 enough far away from the unconstrained
optimum, the red dot in Figure 2.13, the fixed component of any asset is negligible with
respect to the proportional one. This tells us that from any such initial position we are just
solving a proportional asset specific problem. As a matter of fact the FOCs of Problem 6 are
identical to those of Problem 3 and define the inner parallelogram around the unconstrained
optimum in Figure 2.13. We therefore know that, for any given asset i trade, it is optimal
either to buy or to sell but not both, trades outside the inner parallelogram edges are straight
lines up to the closest edge involving only one asset at a time and trades outside of corners
involve two assets at a time and always end up at the closest corner.
As we move to initial positions θ0 closer to the unconstrained optimum, the impact of fixed
over proportional costs increase up to the point where the investor is indifferent between
paying the fixed costs and trade to the closest boundary of the inner parallelogram or do
not trade.
Suppose the initial position θ0 is somewhere outside the left edge of the inner no trading
region, let U P1 be the investor utility of paying the fixed cost k1 and buy additional units of
asset 1 only (γ2 = γ20 ) up to the left edge, i.e.

U P1

 
λ
γ1 
≡ max{U u − [γ1 , γ20 ]V   − (γ1 − γ10 )C1P − k1 }
γ1
2
γ20
V122 P 0
(C1P )2
V122
λ
0 2
P 0
)(γ ) +
C γ + C1 γ1 +
= U − (V11 −
2
V11 2
V11 1 2
2λV11
u

61

CiS for a sell trade and CiP for a buy trade.
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where we used the fact that either S1 > 0 or P1 > 0 but not both and θ1 = θ10 + P1 − S1 .
Recall that, exactly as in Problem 5, the utility of not trading is
λ 0
U N T = U u − γ 0 Vγ 0
2
The locus of points θ0 where the investor is indifferent between paying the fixed cost k1 and
trade to left inner edge or do not trade is given by U P1 (γ0 ) = U N T (γ0 ). (which can be written
as a function of θ0 via θ0 = γ0 + θu ) This corresponds to the leftmost dashed blue line in
Figure 2.13. To the left of this line the investor is better off trading up to the parallel thick
blue line to the immediate right, which defines the left edge of the inner parallelogram. For
initial positions θ0 to the right of the leftmost dashed blue line, the fixed cost k1 is too high
to enter any trade so that the investor does not move.62
Suppose now the initial position θ0 is somewhere outside the right edge of the inner no
trading region, let U S1 be the investor utility of paying the fixed cost k1 and sell additional
units of asset 1 only (γ2 = γ20 ) up to the right edge, i.e.

U S1

 
λ
γ1 
≡ max{U u − [γ1 , γ20 ]V   − (γ10 − γ1 )C1S − k1 }
γ1
2
γ20

where we used the fact that either S1 > 0 or P1 > 0 but not both and θ1 = θ10 + P1 − S1 . The
locus of points θ0 where the investor is indifferent between paying the fixed cost k1 and trade
to right inner edge or do not trade is given by U S1 (γ0 ) = U N T (γ0 ). (which can be written
as a function of θ0 via θ0 = γ0 + θu ) This corresponds to the rightmost dashed blue line in
Figure 2.13. To the right of this line the investor is better off trading up to the inner bold
62

The fact that to the left we trade up to the inner edge and to the right we do not move and not the
other way around follows from the fact that the utility increases from every direction as we move closer to
the unconstrained optimum.
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blue line defining the right inner edge. For initial positions θ0 to the left of the rightmost
dashed blue line, the fixed cost k1 is too high to enter any trade so that the investor does
not move.63
The loci of points θ0 where the investor is indifferent between paying the fixed cost k2 and buy
additional units of asset 2 up to the South inner edge or do nothing, U P2 (γ0 ) = U N T (γ0 ),
and where the investor is indifferent between paying the fixed cost k2 and sell additional
units of asset 2 up to the North inner edge or do nothing, U S2 (γ0 ) = U N T (γ0 ) are derived
in a symmetric fashion with the two securities swapped and are shown by the two parallel
dashed red lines in figure 2.13. Analogous arguments as above show that outside this lines
the investor is better off trading up to the closest thick inner red border while in the corridors
between the two dashed red lines is better not to trade at all.
What happens at and outside corners is what is still left to complete the picture. Each corner
is characterized by three elements: (i) the locus of points θ0 where the investor is indifferent
between trading in the two assets simultaneously (e.g. the North-West corner involve the
additional purchase of asset 1 and the additional sale of asset 2) and go to the nearest inner
corner (one of the intersection of the solid blue and red lines) or do not trade, which is an
ellipse, and (ii) and (iii), the horizontal and vertical black dashed lines defining the loci of
points θ0 where the investor is indifferent between trading the two assets to the nearest inner
corner or trade only one asset to the nearest inner edge.
Let us focus on the North-West corner first: define U P1 ,S2 as the investor’s utility of trading
from any (feasible) initial position θ0 to the inner North-West corner (the intersection of the
63

A similar argument to that of the previous note proof that this is indeed the right thing to do.
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left solid blue line with the upper thick red line), θΓ
λ
U P1 ,S2 (γ0 ) ≡ U u − γ Γ0 Vγ Γ − (γ1Γ − γ10 )C1P − (γ20 − γ2Γ )C2S − k1 − k2
2
the locus of points θ0 where the investor is indifferent between trading in the two assets
simultaneously (additional purchases in asset 1 and additional sales in asset 2) and go to θΓ
or do not trade is U P1 ,S2 (γ0 ) = U N T (γ0 ) (written as a function of θ0 via θ0 = γ0 + θu ) which
corresponds to the North-West ellipse in Figure 2.13. Inside the ellipse the investor is better
off not to trade while outside it is optimal to trade up to θΓ . The uppermost horizontal
dashed black line is the locus of points such that the investor is indifferent between trading
asset 1 and 2 to θΓ or buy additional units of asset 1 until the inner left solid blue line, i.e.
U P1 ,S2 (γ0 ) = U P1 (γ0 ) (written as a function of θ0 via θ0 = γ0 + θu ). Below this line it is
better to only buy asset 1 up to the inner left bold blue line while above the best option is
to buy more of asset 1 and sell more of asset 2 and go to θΓ . Note that this line marks the
end of the inner left bold solid blue line as well as the outer left bold dashed blue line.
Similarly the leftmost vertical dashed black line is the locus of points such that the investor
is indifferent between trading asset 1 and 2 to θΓ or sell additional units of asset 2 until
the inner North solid red line, i.e. U P1 ,S2 (γ0 ) = U S2 (γ0 ) (written as a function of θ0 via
θ0 = γ0 + θu ). To the right of this line it is better to only sell asset 2 up to the inner North
bold red line while to the left the best option is to buy more of asset 1 and sell more of asset
2 and go to θΓ . Note that this line marks the end of the inner North bold solid red line as
well as the outer North bold dashed red line.
The piece of North-West ellipse in-between the above mentioned vertical and horizontal lines
as well as the part of the horizontal line to the left of the ellipse and the part of the vertical
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line above the ellipse define the North-West corner and are marked in bold dashed black.
From any point θ0 further North-West it is optimal to buy asset 1 and sell asset 2 up to θΓ ,
(the North-West corner of the inner parallelogram) from any point θ0 below the horizontal
black bold dashed portion it is optimal to trade up to the left inner bold blue line, from any
point θ0 to the right of the vertical black bold dashed portion it is optimal to trade up to the
inner North bold red line; Finally, from any point θ0 in the approximately triangular region
delimited by the intersection of the horizontal and vertical black dashed lines and the piece
of ellipse between these two lines is better not to trade.64
A symmetrical analysis where the two securities are swapped analogously describe the SouthEast corner of Figure 2.13.
Next, let us focus on the South-West corner: due to the positive correlation of asset 1 and
asset 2, the second lowermost horizontal black line (the thick one defined by U P1 ,P2 (γ0 ) =
U P1 (γ0 )) and the second leftmost black vertical line (the thick one defined by U P1 ,P2 (γ0 ) =
U P2 (γ0 )) intersects outside65 the South-West ellipse (implicitly defined by U P1 ,P2 (γ0 ) =
U N T (γ0 )). This is also a feature of the North-East corner and it is in opposition with what
happens at the other two corners. If the correlation where negative the opposite would have
occurred. As in other corners note how the horizontal dashed black line marks the South end
of the inner left solid blue line as well as the South end of the outer left solid dashed bold
blue line, while the vertical line marks the left end of the inner South solid red line as well
as the left end of the outer South dashed bold red line. This time the corner is defined by a
64

The reader might wonder why the corner includes the piece of ellipse in-between the two bold dashed
black lines rather than the portion of the outer left dashed blue line up to the intersection with the outer
North dashed red line and that red line up to the intersection with the ellipse: the reason why this is not
the case is because the region above the horizontal dashed line and to the left of the vertical dashed line is
where it is optimal to trade both assets while the outer left dashed blue line or the outer North dashed red
line only involve one asset at a time.
65
Not inside as in the respective cases of the North-West and and South-East corners.
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dashed bold upside down reflected L. For any point θ0 more South-East it is optimal to both
buy more of asset 1 and asset 2 and go to the South-East corner of the inner parallelogram
(defined by the intersection of the inner left solid bold blue line and the inner South solid
bold red line), θL , for any point θ0 above the bold portion of the horizontal dashed line it
is optimal to only buy asset 1 until the inner left bold solid blue line is reached, for any
point θ0 to the right of the bold portion of the vertical dashed line is optimal to buy more of
asset 2 until the inner South bold solid red line. Finally, for any point in the quadrilateral
region formed by the intersection of the horizontal and vertical dashed lines, the vertical line
and the outer South dashed red line, the outer South dashed red line and the the outer left
dashed blue line, and the outer left dashed blue line with the horizontal dashed black line,
it is optimal not to trade.
A symmetrical analysis where the two securities are both sold instead of bought analogously
describes the North-East corner of Figure 2.13.
This analysis verified the optimal policy graphically described in Figure 2.5.

Overall fixed and Proportional Costs: The Problem

The cost function is defined as c(θ, θ0 ) ≡ P 0 C P + S 0 C S + 1[θ6=θ0 ] k and the choice problem is

Problem 7
κ
λ
max U (θ) = r + θ0 (µ − r1) − θ0 Vθ − (θ − θB )0 V(θ − θB ) − P 0 C P − S 0 C S − 1[θ6=θ0 ] k
P,S
2
2
subject to
θ = θ0 + P − S
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P ≥0
S≥0

Overall fixed and Proportional Costs: Characterization of the solution

The existence theorem and the algorithm of Section 2.5 enable us to numerically solve this
problem for n > 2 risky assets. Nonetheless, in order to convey the main intuition, it is
useful to analytically and graphically solve the problem for the case of n = 2 risky assets.
For the ease of exposition we set κ to 066 and rewrite the problem in positions γ = θ − θu
relative to the unconstrained optimum θu defined in (2.2) as
λ
U = U u − γ 0 Vγ − P 0 C P − S 0 C S − 1[γ6=γ 0 ] k
2
where U u is defined as in (2.13). In light of the previous subsection, solving this problem is
easy and a graphical representation is provided in Figure 2.14 (which provides the structure
behind Example 4 - i.e. Figure 2.4) for the case of positive correlation between asset 1 and
2.
The steps and the intuition are exactly the same as those of the previous section; The inner
parallelogram and the trades properties are the same since the FOCs are the same and we
still have a locus of points θ0 such that the investor is indifferent between paying the fixed
cost to enter the market and trade up to the closest boundary of the inner parallelogram or
do not trade. What is a bit different is the geometry of this locus of points.
66

The steps for solving the problem with κ > 0 are the same and, for the same reasons discussed in the
asset-specific case, yield a smaller no trading region with the same shape only shifted towards the target
portfolio θB as discussed in Example 8 and shown in the upper graph of Figure 2.9.
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While the utility of not trading is always the same, for any trade from initial positions θ0
entailing only one asset at a time the investor’s utility of paying the fixed cost k and going
to the closest edge of the inner parallelogram, U Ti with T ∈ {P, S}, is the same as the assetspecific fixed costs except the fact that k replaces ki . For any trade from initial positions θ0
involving both assets the investor’s utility of paying the fixed cost k and going to the closest
corner of the inner parallelogram, U Ti ,Rj with T, R ∈ {P, S} and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, is the same as
Problem 5 except the fact that k replaces k1 + k2 .
It follows that the locus of points θ0 such that U P1 = U N T and that implied by U S1 = U N T
are the two parallel outer blue dashed lines while the locus of points θ0 such that U P2 = U N T
and that implied by U S2 = U N T are the two parallel outer red dashed lines. Outside of the
bold dashed portion of the corridors formed by each pair of parallel lines it is optimal to
trade up to the closest inner parallelogram edge, while inside those corridors the investor is
better off not trading.
With respect to corners the situation for the North-West and South-East is analogous to that
of Problem 6, while that concerning the South-West and North-East corner is a bit different.
What is different is that all the intersections of the horizontal and vertical dashed lines that
implicitly define the loci of points such that the investor is indifferent between trading one
or two assets are exactly at the corners of the inner parallelogram as in Problem 3 rather
than outside as in Problem 6. The fact that such intersections are inside the North-West
and South-East ellipses defining the loci of initial positions θ0 where U P1 ,S2 = U N T and
U S1 ,P2 = U N T is consistent with the asset specific fixed costs case and result in qualitatively
similar corners’ shapes. The latter fact is nonetheless in contrast with what happens in the
South-West and North-East corners where the intersections of the horizontal and vertical
lines also occurs outside of the South-West and North-East ellipses in the present setup.
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Another remarkable difference is given by the fact that the area covered by the ellipses at
corners is now much wider with respect to the one covered by the regions where it is optimal
to trade only one asset at a time. In relative terms the present structure of the costs favors
the trades in both assets because the investor only need to pay the fixed cost once. This last
important point is made even clearer in Figure 2.15 panel (a).
Panel (a) of Figure 2.15 simultaneously plots the inaction regions for the asset specific fixed
and proportional cost (in blue) and for the overall fixed and asset-specific proportional costs
(in red) where all the fixed costs are set to 0.00075. The fact the the red region is contained
in the blue one67 reinforces our intuition.
Thus, as expected, given all fixed cost are the same, in the presence of asset specific fixed
costs rather than an overall fixed one the investor can only do worse except in the overlapping
portion of regions entailing trades in only one asset at a time. Interestingly, as graphed in
panel (b) of Figure 2.15, the exact opposite occurs if the investor has the chance of trading
the same assets for half of the overall fixed cost; In this case the investor, regardless the
correlation68 is always better off trading each asset with a specific fixed cost which is half
of the overall fixed one and is indifferent in the overlapping portion of corners involving the
simultaneous additional purchases of one asset and additional sales of the other if the correlation is positive or the simultaneous additional purchases or sales of both if the correlation
is negative. When the correlation is zero the investor is indifferent only at corners (a zero
probability event).
We conclude this subsection with a last comparison between the overall and asset specific
fixed costs in the presence of proportional cost. Panel (c) of Figure 2.15 shows a situation
67

A result which is independent from the correlation structure. (analogous comparisons in the case of zero
and negative correlations give the same result.)
68
Analogous comparisons in the case of zero and negative correlations give the same result.
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which is in-between those illustrated in the two previous panels: we compare the no trading
regions when the fixed cost of asset 1, k1 , and asset 2, k2 , are 75% of the overall fixed cost.
This time there is no scenario which dominates, it is better to have a lower asset specific cost
when it is optimal only to trade one asset while it is better to have the higher overall fixed
cost when it is optimal either to simultaneously buy and sell the two assets if the correlation
is positive, or simultaneously buy or sell both assets if the correlation is negative. When
the correlation is zero it always better to have the higher overall fixed cost while trading
simultaneously the two assets.
As we discussed in Example 7, the benefits described in the first and last situation here are
similar to those described in the presence of proportional costs only when cheaper bundles
of assets are available in that one can think of the overall cost as the fixed cost for accessing
the bundle consisting of asset 1 and 2.

2.4.4

Comparative statics

Comparative statics for the case of n assets and proportional costs are readily available from
conditions (2.11) and (2.12).
Recall that these conditions with equality define a pair of n − 1 dimensional hyperplanes
and if we let scalars bPi and bSi be the negative of the RHS of (2.11) and (2.12) we can
write each pair as Vi θ + bPi ≥ 0 and Vi θ + bSi ≤ 0.69 The i-th pair define a corridor in Rn
outside of which it is optimal to trade asset i only up to the closest of the two planes and
the intersection of the n corridors forms the no trading region which is a parallelogram (or
its higher dimensional analog).
69

Also recall that Vi corresponds to the i-th row of V .
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Each pair of planes share the same orientation Vi θ and a different constant (bPi or bSi respectively), thus the planes are parallel and any change in the correlation structure as well
as in the assets variances primarily affects the orientation of each pair of corridors in Rn .
Specifically, changes in the correlations affects simultaneously all the corridors while changes
in the variance of asset i only affect the orientation of the i-th corridor.
Changes in any other parameter, i.e. λ, κ, r, µi , CiP , CiS and θB , will not affect the shape of
the no trading region, rather will make it shrink/expand and/or shift. This is because any
such parameters enter each pairs of hyperplanes defined by (2.11) and (2.12) only trhough
their intercepts bPi and bSi . In particular higher (lower) proportional costs CiP and/or CiS
increase (decrease) the width of the i-th corridor while higher (lower) risk aversion λ and/or
tracking error aversion κ70 will shrink (expand) the no trading region as a whole: this is
because the i-th corridor width is given by

S
|bP
i −bi |
||Vi ||

and bPi − bC
i =

CiP +CiS
.
κ+λ

Changes in the i-th

mean of asset i, µi , will cause a parallel shift of the i-th corridor only. Finally changes in the
composition of the benchmark θB will simultaneously cause the no trading region to shift
and shrink/expand according to the new directions represented by the modified benchmark
θB .
From the analysis of this entire section we also know that adding a fixed cost (overall or
asset specific) creates a surface which surrounds the no-trading region where the investor is
indifferent between paying the additional fixed cost and trade to the closest boundary of the
no-trading region or do not trade at all. Not considering corners, this amounts to imposing
the surface of an outer parallelogram (or its higher dimension analog) which has at its center
the proportional cost only inaction region. Because the latter object is proportional to the
former, the comparative statics for all parameters except the just discussed fixed (asset
70

Positive (negative) changes in κ will also make the no trading region move closer (further) from θB .
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specific or overall) cost component remain the same as those for the proportional costs only
framework.
We also learned that corners are always formed by the intersections of a locus where the
investor is indifferent between trading in all n assets or not trade at all which is an ellipse
(or its higher dimension analog) and n loci where the investor is indifferent among trading
in n − 1 assets or the remaining one which are hyperplanes parallel and perpendicular to the
Cartesian axes.

2.5

Algorithm

In this section we introduce a powerful algorithm to solve problems of the form
1
max Ũ (x) = a0 x + x0 Qx
x
2
subject to
x≥0
where Q is semi-positive definite and symmetric. As we show in the proof of Theorem 1, for
any finite number of risky assets n the building blocks of our solution strategy for the class
of problems having objective function (2.1), can all be re-written in that form.
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As shown in Cottle, Pang, and Stone (1992), the first order conditions from the above
quadratic program can be expressed via the system




x≥0




a + Qx ≥ 0






x0 (a + Qx) = 0

(2.14)

Finding a vector x ≥ 0 satisfying the above system is referred to as the linear complementarity problem LCP (a, Q). The attractiveness of the LCP framework is the availability of
efficient iterative schemes converging to the solution(s) of the problem which are essentially
based upon the characteristics of the matrix M .
Given a decomposition of the matrix Q as Q = B + C it is easy to verify71 that LCP (a, Q)
can be re-expressed as LCP (ax , B) defined as




x≥0





az + Bx ≥ 0






x0 (az + Bx) = 0
with az ≡ a + Cx and that a solution x to LCP (a, Q) is a fixed point for LCP (ax , B). The
algorithm that solves the above quadratic program, which is given next, is nothing more
than an iterative scheme to find the fixed point x of LCP (ax , B).
In order to solve the original quadratic program of this section we exploit the following
theorem
71

See Chapter 1 of Cottle et al. (1992).

96

Theorem 8 Let Q = B + C be positive semi-definite such that B and B − M are positivedefinite and B is a diagonal matrix, if a is such that LCP (a, Q) admits solutions, then the
following algorithm produces a sequence {xv } which converges to some solution of LCP (a, Q)

Step 1: Set arbitrary xv ≥ 0, with v = 0
Step 2: Given xv compute the new vector xv+1 as

xv+1 = max(0, xv − B −1 (a + Qxv ))

Step 3: Given a pre-determined tolerance  ≥ 0 stop, otherwise go back to Step 1

Proof. See Theorem 5.6.1., Algorithm 5.2.1 and section 5.10 in Cottle et al. (1992).
It is important to notice that Theorem 8 perfectly fits our needs. Q is positive semi-definite,
exploiting the notion of diagonally dominant matrix it is straightforward to use Q to construct a diagonal positive definite matrix B such that B − M is also positive-definite.72
Remember that LCP (a, Q) are just the FOCs for the quadratic program; Such program
when applied to the building blocks of Theorem 2 it is showed to have a unique and feasible
solution, thus as long as A1 − A3 hold a is such that LCP (a, Q) admits solutions. Then the
above algorithm produces a sequence {xv } which converges to some solution of LCP (a, Q),
but we also know from Theorem 2 that such solution is unique so that the algorithm generates
an iterative scheme that uniquely solves the quadratic program of interest.
72

P
A square matrix A is (strictly) diagonally dominant if |aii |(>) ≥
j6=i |aij | for all i and any such
matrix is positive
semi-definite
(definite).
It
is
thus
enough
to
define
the
typical
diagonal element of B as
P
Bii > Mii + j6=i |Mij |.
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2.6

Conclusion

We have used a mean-variance analysis of portfolio rebalancing given transaction costs to
illustrate a number of important economic features in a context that is simple to understand
and solved completely. The single-period case is suggestive of good strategies in more realistic
cases, and is a useful benchmark for comparisons.
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Figure 2.1: Mean-Variance Problem with Proportional Transaction Costs
With proportional costs, the non-trading region is the area of a parallelogram. Outside the
non-trading region, it is optimal to trade (along the arrows) to the boundary of the nontrading region. If returns were uncorrelated, then the non-trading region would be a square
with sides parallel to the axes. In this example, returns are correlated and the two securities
are substitutes and over-weighting in one security is less likely to result in a trade if we are
under-weighted in the other security.
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Figure 2.2: Mean-Variance Problem with an Overall Fixed Transaction Cost
With an overall fixed cost, either there is trade immediately to the ideal point or it is not
worth trading at all. The nontrading region is the area of an ellipse. As with proportional
costs, correlation between the assets implies that it is more damaging (and more likely to do
trade) when both asset positions are out of line in the same direction.
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Figure 2.3: Mean-Variance Problem with Asset-Specific Fixed Transaction Costs
Near the ideal point in the middle, θ∗ , is the non-trading region. The North-West and
South-East corners lie on an ellipse reminiscent of the no-trading region of an overall fixed
cost problem while the pairs of parallel outer thick black dashed straight lines and the two
intersecting blue and red lines come from the asset-specific component of the fixed costs. For
analogous reasons as those discussed in the overall fixed cost example, for any initial position
inside the region defined by the above mentioned corners and dashed line it is optimal not
to trade at all. Outside of this area we trade as follows: from the regions in the corners, we
trade both securities to the ideal point θ∗ . From the regions on the right and left, we trade
Security 1 but not Security 2 to the thick blue line going through the ideal point. This would
be a vertical line if we had no correlation, but has negative slope in our case. Similarly, from
the regions above and below, we trade only Security 2 to the thick red line running through
the ideal point.
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Figure 2.4: Mean-Variance Problem with Overall Fixed and Asset-Specific Proportional
Costs
The figure shows the different (no-)trading regions for the case in which the investor both
pays an overall fixed cost to enter the market as well as asset specific proportional costs
to (re)balance his portfolio to the desired allocation. The parameters, except for the fixed
cost K = 0.00075, are those of Figure 2.1 and the inner parallelogram is indeed the same:
this is the region where the investor will optimally trade to if the fixed cost of entering the
market is not too big. There is in fact a threshold, pictured as a dash-line, surrounding the
proportional no-trading region; If the initial position θ0 is inside this line the dis-utility from
the fixed cost to enter the market is more than the benefit of trading to the border of the
no-trading region (inner parallelogram) so that it is optimal not to trade at all. Outside of
this line it is optimal to trade up to the border of the no trading region as in the proportional
only case: in particular, there are four corridors and four corners delimited by wavy dashed
lines. Inside each corridor it is optimal to trade (buy or sell) along straight lines only one
asset at a time, while at each corner it is optimal to trade (buy/sell) two assets until the
nearest no-trading region corner is reached.
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Figure 2.5: Mean-Variance Problem with Asset-Specific Fixed and Proportional Costs
Parameters, except for the fixed cost K = 0.00075, are those of Figure 2.1 and the inner
parallelogram is indeed the same: this is the region where the investor will optimally trade to
if the fixed costs are not too big. Each fixed cost, albeit asset-specific, is taken as identical
in the figure. The presence of asset specific costs rather than an overall fixed cost, on top of
the asset specific proportional components, has similar effects, and an analogous intuition,
as those described in Figure 2.4 with two notable differences: 1 - the corridors inside which,
only one asset at time is traded up to the border of the no trading region, are wider pushing
the corner regions further away from the unconstrained optimum. 2 - the thresholds where
the investor is indifferent between paying the fixed costs and trade to the border of the no
trading region or do not trade at all are different, featuring a couple of intersections along
the 45 degree line passing through the unconstrained optimum.
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Figure 2.6: Asymmetric Futures Overlay Strategies
Security 1, the equities, has a significantly higher expected return (“alpha”) than Security 2,
futures. The optimal strategy is an asymmetric “futures overlay” strategy typically selling
futures to correct for overexposure to market risk but buying underlying equities to correct
for underexposure to market risk. This asymmetry is due to the fact that selling futures
allows us to keep the alpha on the exposure we are eliminating, while buying equities allows
us to gain alpha on the exposure we are taking on.
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Figure 2.7: Bundles Trading
With bundle trading it is possible to shrink the no-trading region to get closer, at least in
some directions, to the unconstrained optimum. The new region have additional sides. This
is the same case as in Figure 2.1 but with an additional opportunity to trade a 50-50 portfolio
of the two assets at a cost of 0.0025.
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Figure 2.8: Shrinking the No Trade Region: Overall vs. Asset-Specific Fixed Costs
The figure compares the inaction regions of Example 2.4 (red) and 2.5 (blue). Even if no
explicit bundle of assets is available, for situations in which it is optimal to simultaneously
trade both assets (in case of negative correlation the no trade regions stretches more along
the 45 line) one can think of the overall cost as the fixed cost for accessing the bundle
consisting of asset 1 and 2 thus coming closer to the unconstrained optimum.
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Figure 2.9: Optimal Trading in the Presence of a Benchmark
Trades with proportional and an overall fixed cost (top) and with proportional and asset
specific costs (bottom). Benchmark θB shrinks and shift the no trading regions towards it
(Compare with Figure 2.4 and 2.5).
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Figure 2.10: No Trade Region with Proportional Costs: Case of 2 and 3 Risky Securities
The no trading regions with proportional transaction costs for two typical cases with 2 and
3 positively correlated assets.
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Figure 2.11: Indivisibility of the Mean-Variance Problem with Transaction Costs
In contrast to the H. Liu (2004) framework, in the presence of nonzero correlations among
assets it is not possible to separately solve n different sub-problems involving the allocation
between a risky asset and the risk free. In light blue it is plotted the slice of the optimal
no trading region (the parallelepiped of Figure 2.10) evaluated at the optimal level of asset
3 together with the no trading region of a problem only involving asset 1 and asset 2. If
the assets where uncorrelated the two plotted parallelograms would be perfectly overlapped
squares as in H. Liu (2004) but in general they are different.
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Figure 2.12: Architecture Behind the Asset-Specific Fixed No Trade Region
This figure illustrates the construction of the different trading regions for the case of securityspecific fixed costs and it shows the “architecture” behind Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.13: Architecture Behind the Asset-Specific Fixed and Proportional No Trade Region
This figure illustrates the construction of the different trading regions for the case of securityspecific fixed and proportional costs and it shows the “architecture” behind Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.14: Architecture Behind the Overall Fixed and Proportional No Trade Region
This figure illustrates the construction of the different trading regions for the case of assetspecific proportional costs with an overall fixed costs and it shows the “architecture” behind
Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.15: No Trade Region Under Different Types of Fixed Costs
This figure compares the optimal trading in the presence of asset specific proportional costs
and an overall fixed cost versus asset specific proportional and fixed costs for different fixed
costs. In panel (a) all fixed cost are equal to 0.00075, in panel (b) the asset specific fixed
costs k1 and k2 are half the overall fixed cost k, while in panel (c) the asset specific fixed
costs k1 and k2 are 0.75 the overall fixed cost k.
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Chapter 3
Importance of Transaction Costs for
Asset Allocations in FX Markets
3.1

Introduction

A large body of theoretical research studies the implications of transaction costs on the
optimal portfolio choice. However, it is unclear whether accounting for transaction costs
when optimizing a portfolio is empirically relevant. Even though a portfolio optimized over
transaction costs is theoretically different from a portfolio that ignores costs, the out-ofsample performance of these two portfolios may or may not be significantly different.
Using foreign exchange (FX) market returns of 29 developed and emerging currencies from
1976 to 2016, we show that taking transaction costs into account in a mean-variance portfolio
optimization leads to an economically large and statistically significant improvement in the
out-of-sample performance. We document that the out-of-sample Sharpe ratio after costs is
0.7 for a mean-variance efficient portfolio which ignores transaction costs (M V ), while the
Sharpe ratio is 0.9 for a portfolio which takes costs into account in the optimization (M VT C ).
Other moments of the return distributions and in particular the crash risk exposures are
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similar across the two strategies. To our knowledge we are the first to empirically quantify
the substantial out-of-sample benefit of accounting for transaction costs in the construction
of mean-variance optimized portfolios. This is an important contribution to the literature
and has interesting implications for practitioners.
We employ the algorithm proposed by Dybvig and Pezzo (2018) to construct M VT C . They
characterize the theoretical shape of the no trading region for multiple risky assets and
explain how it depends on the cost structure in a single period mean-variance framework.
We quantify and assess the empirical importance of four theoretical predictions.
First, we expect M V to outperform M VT C if the performance is measured in returns before
transaction costs.73 This first prediction is empirically irrelevant in FX markets. The Sharpe
ratios before transaction costs are almost identical, i.e., 0.99 for M V and 1 for M VT C .
Second, we expect transaction costs to be larger for M V than for M VT C . This second
prediction is empirically important. M VT C pays 1.28% of the portfolio value per year in
transaction costs which is substantially lower than the 3.71% paid by M V .
Third, we expect M VT C to outperform M V after transaction costs. Moreover, the outperformance is expected to depend on the size of the no trading region of M VT C , which
in turn, is expected to be increasing in the size of transaction costs and in the correlation
between assets. This third prediction is important in the data. M VT C has a Sharpe ratio
after transaction costs of 0.9, while the Sharpe ratio of M V is only 0.7. This is driven
by the significant reduction of unnecessary trading, which substantially lowers the turnover
and transaction costs and increases the performance after costs of M VT C compared to M V .
Therefore, optimizing over transaction costs is particularly important if costs are large.
73

This is because theoretically M V is the mean-variance portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio.
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Fourth, if assets are positively correlated, then we expect the no trading region of M VT C to
be larger than the one of M VT C\Corr , a strategy which accounts for transaction costs in the
optimization but for simplicity assumes that assets are uncorrelated when constructing the
no trading region. Thus, transaction costs of M VT C are expected to be lower than the costs
of M VT C\Corr , and we expect M VT C to outperform M VT C\Corr . This fourth prediction is also
empirically relevant. The no trading region of M VT C is larger than the one of M VT C\Corr .
Transaction costs paid by M VT C\Corr are 2.56% per year and its Sharpe ratio after costs is
only 0.76, which is inferior to its counter-part in M VT C . Thus, accounting for correlations between assets is important for the superior performance of M VT C . In contrast, the M VT C\Corr
does not significantly outperform M V . This result has important theoretical implications:
it invalidates the setup of H. Liu (2004), based on the assumption of uncorrelated assets.
Unfortunately, this is the only framework that, so far, can solve continuous-time portfolio
optimizations in the presence of transaction costs with more than two or three risky assets.
Figure 3.1 further illustrates that our mean-variance efficient portfolios dominate other popular currency strategies (DOL, DDOL, HM L, M OM , V AL) in terms of out-of-sample
Sharpe ratios before and after transaction costs. DOL invests equally in all bilateral carry
trades. DDOL takes a long position in DOL if the median exchange rate forward discount
is positive, and a short position otherwise. HM L sorts bilateral carry trades according to
the forward discount into quintiles and short sells the bottom and invests in the top quintile. M OM sorts bilateral carry trades according to their past 12 month performance into
quintiles and short sells the bottom and invests in the top quintile. V AL sorts bilateral
carry trades according to the power purchase parity adjusted exchange rate into quintiles
and short sells the top quintile (overvalued currencies with high real exchange rates) and
invests in the bottom quintile (undervalued currencies with low real exchange rates).
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An empirical challenge when constructing mean-variance efficient portfolios is that we need
sensible estimates of conditional expected returns and the covariance matrix. If estimation
errors are large, then a mean-variance optimization often leads to extreme portfolio weights
and a poor out-of-sample performance (Brandt (2005)). For instance, DeMiguel, Garlappi,
and Uppal (2009) show that in US stock markets an equally weighted portfolio outperforms
optimized portfolios out-of-sample. Fortunately, estimation errors are less severe in FX
markets. The set of excess returns is described by bilateral carry trades, i.e., uncovered
positions in forward exchange rates. First, forward discounts are good proxies for conditional
expected excess returns of carry trades because exchange rate growths are well-described by
a random walk (Meese and Rogoff (1983)). Second, there is a strong factor structure to
describe the covariance matrix (Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011)). This is helpful
to reduce estimation errors. These properties are exploited in several recent papers and
mean-variance optimized portfolios in FX markets are shown to be very profitable out-ofsample (Baz, Breedon, Naik, and Peress (2001), Della Corte, Sarno, and Tsiakas (2009),
Daniel, Hodrick, and Lu (2017), Ackermann, Pohl, and Schmedders (2016), Maurer, To, and
Tran (2018)). We follow this literature and construct mean-variance optimized portfolios in
FX markets to determine the importance of transaction costs.
FX markets are more liquid and have a higher trading volume than stock markets. Moreover, carry trade strategies are known to outperform stock markets over the past 4 decades.
Therefore, FX markets do not only provide a useful environment to study mean-variance
efficient portfolios but they are also among the most important asset markets to investors.
Our results have important practical implications. First, accounting for costs when optimizing a portfolio is beneficial and improves the out-of-sample performance. Second, transaction
costs are declining over time, and thus, traders who specialize in developed currencies may
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be tempted to ignore transaction costs when constructing mean-variance efficient portfolios. However, even if transaction costs are low during normal times, they substantially
increase during crises and become relevant (Karnaukh, Ranaldo, and Soederlind (2015)).
Third, many currency traders have shifted their focus to emerging and frontier markets because exchange rate forward discounts among developed currencies are close to zero for the
past decade. Transaction costs in emerging and frontier markets are generally larger than
the costs considered in our analysis, and thus, the implications of transaction costs on the
optimal portfolio choice are even more important for these traders.
Our paper is related to the literature on portfolio optimization in the presence of transaction
costs. Due to the complexity of the problem most of the literature solves frameworks with
only two assets, either directly (Taksar et al. (1988), Davis and Norman (1990), Dumas and
Luciano (1991), Shreve and Soner (1994), Balduzzi and Lynch (1999, 2000), H. Liu and
Loewenstein (2002), Dumas and Buss (2017)) or through the indirect martingale approach
(e.g. Goodman and Ostrov (2010), see Schachermayer (2017) for a comprehensive summary
of this approach). H. Liu (2004) solves a multi-asset model but requires the simplifying assumption that assets are uncorrelated and preferences exponential. Leland (2000), Donohue
and Yip (2003), Muthuraman and Kumar (2006), Irle and Prelle (2008), Myers (2009) and
Lynch and Tan (2009) propose numerical or heuristic approximations. However, except for
the case of uncorrelated assets, these numerical solutions are only feasible for a maximum
of two and in rare cases three risky assets. Dybvig and Pezzo (2018) provide an algorithm
to solve a general multi-asset model with correlated assets restricting to a single period
mean-variance framework.
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3.2

Theory framework

We quantify the empirical importance of transaction costs in a mean-variance portfolio optimization. Therefore, we implement a generalized version of the algorithm proposed by
Dybvig and Pezzo (2018) to construct optimal portfolios using FX market returns of 29 developed and emerging currencies from 1976 to 2016. We use bid-ask spreads as a proxy for
proportional transaction costs and assume that there are no fixed costs to trade. We denote
the mean-variance efficient strategy without optimizing over transaction costs by M V , and
the strategy that takes transaction costs into account in the optimization problem by M VT C .
The investment opportunity set at time t consists of one risk-free asset with risk-free rate of
return rf,t and N risky assets with conditional expected excess returns over the risk-free rate
(or risk premia) µet and conditional covariance matrix Vt . If there are no transaction costs,
then an investor with mean-variance preferences with risk aversion λ selects the N -vector

of risky asset portfolio weights θtMV = arg max{θt ∈RN } θt 0 µet − λ2 θt 0 Vt θt to maximize her
utility. The optimal investment in the N risky assets is θtMV = λ1 Vt −1 µet and the investment
MV
in the risk-free asset is θ0,t
= 1 − 10{N ×1} θtMV , where 1{N ×1} is a N -vector with all elements

equal to 1 Ma1952. We denote this strategy by M V .
Next, we describe the optimization problem if the investor takes into account transaction
costs and we denote this strategy by M VT C . Let θt0 be the N -vector of “initial” weights before
trading at time t. The initial weights are equal to the portfolio chosen at time t − 1 and held
until time t. Further, let θt0+ = max {θt0 , 0} describe the initial long and θt0− = min {θt0 , 0}
the initial short positions74 . The investor has to choose by how much to increase (∆P+
≥ 0)
t
or decrease (∆S+
≥ 0) her long positions, and by how much to increase (∆S−
≥ 0) or
t
t
Note that θt0− ≤ 0 and a large absolute value (i.e. a small value) means that there are many short
positions.
74

119

decrease (∆P−
≥ 0) her short positions. The allocation after trading at time t is given by
t
the weights vector θt = θt+ + θt− where θt+ = θt0+ + ∆P+
− ∆S+
and θt− = θt0− + ∆P−
− ∆S−
t
t
t
t
describe the long and short positions. Element i of N -vector CP+
denotes the cost of an
t
increase in the long position of asset i per dollar at time t. Similarly, vector CS+
describes
t
the per dollar cost of closing long positions, and CS−
respectively CP−
the per dollar costs
t
t
to open respectively close short positions. Costs are proportional, asset specific and depend
on whether we open or close a long or a short position. We assume there are no fixed
S+
P−
transaction costs. Therefore, the trades ∆P+
and ∆S−
reduce the portfolio
t , ∆t , ∆t
t
0

0

0

0

S−
S−
S+
+ ∆S+
CP−
+ ∆P−
CP+
return by ∆P+
t Ct + ∆t Ct . Our setting is a straightforward
t
t
t
t

extension of the case studied by (Dybvig & Pezzo, 2018) where costs to adjust long and short
positions are identical, i.e., CP+
= CP−
and CS+
= CS−
t
t
t
t . The optimization problem is:

Problem 9 (Strategy M VT C )


λ 0
0 e
P+ 0 P+
P− 0 P−
S+ 0 S+
S− 0 S−
max
θt µt − θt Vt θt − ∆t Ct − ∆t Ct − ∆t Ct − ∆t Ct
P−
S+
S−
2
{∆P+
t ≥0,∆t ≥0,∆t ≥0,∆t ≥0}
s.t.

θt

= θt+ + θt−


P+
θt+ = θt0+ + ∆P+
− ∆S+
≥ 0, ∆S+
≤ θt0+ , θt0+ = max θt0 , 0
t
t , ∆t
t

P−
θt− = θt0− + ∆P−
− ∆S−
≤ −θt0− , ∆S−
≥ 0, θt0− = min θt0 , 0 .
t
t , ∆t
t

We provide an algorithm to solve Problem 9 in Appendix C.1.2.
The mean-variance setup without transaction costs (CP+
= CP−
= CS+
= CS−
= 0) is a
t
t
t
t
special case of Problem 9. The portfolio of strategy M V is independent of the initial position
θt0 , and it is always optimal to trade all the way to θtMV . In contrast, if there are transaction
costs (CP+
> 0, CP−
> 0, CS+
> 0, or CS−
> 0), then θtMVTC crucially depends on the
t
t
t
t
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origin θt0 . Intuitively, there is a trade-off between paying transaction costs (which are linear
in portfolio weight changes) and utility gains (which are convex) when moving towards θtMV .
If the initial allocation θt0 is close enough to θtMV , it is optimal not to trade at all since
the marginal cost required to move towards θtMV is higher than the marginal utility gain.
Thus, there is a no trading region. If the initial allocation θt0 is far enough from θtMV , then
it is optimal to move towards θtMV but only until θtMVTC which lies on the boundary of the
no trading region. This is because the marginal utility gain from moving towards θtMV is
decreasing while the marginal transaction cost is constant.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the optimal solution to Problem 9 in a setting with two risky assets (and
one risk-free asset) and CP+
= CP−
= CS+
= CS−
> 0. The horizontal axis describes the
t
t
t
t
weight placed on asset 1 and the vertical axis the weight on asset 2. The weight on the riskfree asset is 1 minus the sum of the weights on the two risky assets. The blue dot labeled
θtMV is the optimal portfolio if there were no transaction costs. The blue parallelogram
surrounding θtMV defines the no trading region when the two assets are positively correlated.
If the initial allocation θt0 is inside the no trading region (i.e., within the blue parallelogram),
then there is no trade and θtMVTC = θt0 , because the marginal cost to trade towards θtMV
exceeds the marginal utility gain.
If the initial portfolio θt0 lies outside of the no trading region, then the investor wants to move
towards θtMV but stops trading once she reaches the boundary of the no trading region. The
arrows indicate the direction of trade and the arrow heads show how far to trade. Suppose
the initial portfolio θt0 lies in the bottom, right corner of the figure (anywhere below and to
the right of the bottom, right corner of the blue parallelogram). Then, the arrows indicate
that the investor sells asset 1 (∆S1,t > 0) until she reaches the vertical line (extending from
the bottom, right corner of the parallelogram) and buys asset 2 (∆P
2,t > 0) until she reaches
121

the horizontal line (extending from the bottom, right corner of the parallelogram).75 Thus,
the optimal portfolio θtMVTC is exactly on the bottom, right corner of the no trading region
parallelogram.
Next, suppose that the initial portfolio θt0 lies below the no trading region and between
the two vertical lines extending downward from the bottom, left and right corners of the
parallelogram. Then, the arrows indicate that the investor does not change her position
in asset 1 but only buys asset 2 and θtMVTC lies on the boundary of the no trading region
parallelogram vertically above θt0 .
Analogous arguments apply for initial portfolios θt0 farther to the left or above the no trading
region. Thus, if the initial portfolio θt0 lies outside of the no trading region, the optimal
portfolio θtMVTC always lies on an edge (and often exactly in one of the corners) of the no
trading region parallelogram.
Finally, if we change the setting to two uncorrelated assets, then the no trading region reduces
to the red checkered square. For instance, H. Liu (2004) assumes uncorrelated assets, which
simplifies the optimization problem, to derive a solution for the optimal trading strategy.76
We denote this approximate solution by M VT C\Corr and provide details about the solution
algorithm in Appendix C.1.2.
75

Note that we do not distinguish between opening long and closing short positions and closing long and
opening short position in our illustration because the costs of both actions are identical in this example. For
a more general example where the costs are not identical we refer to Appendix C.1.1.
76
Constructing optimal trading strategies in the presence of transaction costs and non-zero correlations is
complex. Dynamic optimization models can only be solved heuristically or using numerical approximations
for two or three risky assets (Balduzzi and Lynch (1999, 2000), Leland (2000), Donohue and Yip (2003),
Han (2005), Muthuraman and Kumar (2006), Irle and Prelle (2008), Lynch and Tan (2009), Myers (2009)).
Assuming uncorrelated assets greatly simplifies the problem because the original problem can then be split
into independent sub-problems, each one handling one asset at a time.
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If the two assets are positively correlated, then the no trading region of M VT C is larger along
the −45◦ line than the one of M VT C\Corr . This is because the two assets are substitutes if
they are positively correlated, while they are not substitutable if they are uncorrelated. Note
that if the two assets were perfect substitutes (i.e. a correlation equal to 1), then selling
asset 1 would be identical (in terms of risk exposure) to buying asset 2. In the same spirit,
if the two assets are (imperfect) substitutes (i.e. correlation between 0 and 1), then there
is less benefit in selling one and at the same time buying the other asset than if they are
not substitutable at all (i.e. correlation equal to 0). Since an initial position θt0 close to the
−45◦ line requires the investor to buy one and sell the other asset, the marginal utility gain
from trading towards θtMV is smaller and the no trading region larger if the two assets are
positively correlated than if they are uncorrelated. Conversely, a similar argument can be
applied to the case of a negative correlation, and the no trading region of M VT C is larger
along the 45◦ line but smaller than the one of M VT C\Corr (see Appendix C.1.1 for more
details).
In summary, constructing a portfolio without taking into account transaction costs in the
optimization leads to more trading and higher costs than what is optimal. Second, if assets
are positively correlated but an investor assumes that assets are uncorrelated (to simplify the
optimization problem and obtain an approximate solution for the optimal trading strategy),
then the constructed portfolio also leads to more trading and higher transaction costs than
what is optimal. In the following we show that taking into account transaction costs in the
optimal trading strategy is quantitatively important in FX markets.
We obtain four theoretical predictions. First, we expect M V to outperform M VT C if the
performance is measured in returns before transaction costs. This is because, by definition,
M V is the optimal portfolio when evaluated before transaction costs. Second, we expect
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transaction costs to be larger for M V than for M VT C . Third, we expect M VT C to outperform
M V after transaction costs. Moreover, the size of these differences between M V and M VT C
are expected to depend on the size of the no trading region of M VT C . In turn, the no trading
region is expected to be increasing in the size of transaction costs and in the correlation
between assets. Fourth, if assets are positively correlated, then we expect the no trading
region of M VT C to be larger than the one of M VT C\Corr . Thus, transaction costs of M VT C
are expected to be lower than the costs of M VT C\Corr , and we expect M VT C to outperform
M VT C\Corr . In the following we quantify and assess the empirical importance of these four
predictions.

3.3

FX Markets

The investment strategies M V (ignoring transaction costs in the optimization), M VT C (taking into account costs in the optimization) and M VT C\Corr (taking into account costs in the
optimization but assuming assets are uncorrelated) are based on a mean-variance optimization (see Section 3.2 for details). In order to construct mean-variance efficient portfolios that
perform well out-of-sample, we need sensible estimates of conditional expected returns and
the covariance matrix. Estimation errors are a well-known problem in the portfolio optimization literature and can lead to a bad out-of-sample performance of optimized portfolios
(Brandt (2005)). For instance, DeMiguel et al. (2009) show that in the US stock market an
equally weighted portfolio outperforms mean-variance optimized portfolios out-of-sample due
to estimation errors. FX markets are special because exchange rate changes are hard to predict (Meese and Rogoff (1983)), and current exchange rate forward discounts (in the forward
exchange rate market) are good proxies of conditionally expected excess returns of bilateral
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carry trades (i.e. the excess returns of uncovered positions in forward exchange rates). This
fact has been exploited in several recent papers and mean-variance efficient portfolios in FX
markets are shown to be very profitable out-of-sample (Baz et al. (2001), Della Corte et
al. (2009), Daniel et al. (2017), Ackermann et al. (2016), Maurer et al. (2018)). We follow
this literature and implement M V , M VT C and M VT C\Corr in FX markets to quantify the
importance of accounting for transaction costs in the construction of optimized portfolios.

3.3.1

Investment Opportunity Set in FX Markets

We denote spot and 1-month forward exchange rates as USD (US-dollar) per unit of currency
i at time t by Xi,t and Fi,t . Following the literature, we define the 1-month realized bilateral
carry trade return between currency i and the USD (denominated in USD) by

CTi,t+1 ≡ ln

where f di,t = ln



Xi,t
Fi,t



Xi,t+1
Fi,t


= f di,t + ∆xi,t+1 ,

(known at time t) is the forward discount, and ∆xi,t+1 = ln



Xi,t+1
Xi,t



(realized at time t+1) is the exchange rate growth. CTi,t+1 is the excess return (over the riskfree rate in USD) of entering an uncovered long position in the 1-month forward exchange
rate contract.77
We use the bilateral carry trade returns for N currencies (against the USD) as our universe
of N risky assets. Due to data availability the number of currencies N changes through
77

Under the premise of the
 covered
 interest rate parity (CIP), the forward discount is equal to the interest

rate differential f di,t = ln

Ri,t
RU S,t

where RU S,t (= erf,t ) and Ri,t are 1-month risk-free interest rates in the

USD and currency i, and the carry trade return is equivalent to borrow RU1S,t USD and lend RU S,t1 Xi,t units
of currency i. Note that we do not require the CIP to hold for the construction of our portfolios or the
out-of-sample performance analysis. We implement all carry trade returns using forward and spot exchange
rates and do not need information about interest rates.
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time; for notational simplicity, we drop the time subscript for N . The excess returns from
0
0
θtMVTC and
θtMV , CTt+1
time t to t + 1 of strategies M V , M VT C and M VT C\Corr are CTt+1
MVTC\Corr

0
θt
CTt+1

, where CTt+1 is the vector of excess returns of all N bilateral carry trades.

The constructions of M V , M VT C and M VT C\Corr require estimates of conditional expected
excess returns µet and the covariance matrix Vt . We follow the literature and use the current
forward discount f di,t as a proxy for conditional expected excess return µei,t (Baz et al. (2001),
Della Corte et al. (2009), Daniel et al. (2017), Ackermann et al. (2016), Maurer et al. (2018)).
This is motivated by the empirical finding that exchange rate changes are difficult to predict
over a short horizon, i.e., Et [∆xi,t+1 ] ≈ 0 (Meese and Rogoff (1983)).
To estimate the conditional covariance matrix Vt we follow the literature on portfolio optimization under parameter uncertainty and use the shrinkage method of Ledoit and Wolf
(2003). In particular, our estimate of Vt is a convex combination of the sample covariance
matrix of daily exchange rate growths and the covariance matrix implied by a single index
model with the first principal component of daily exchange rate growths as the factor. Both
the sample covariance matrix and the principal component analysis use daily exchange rate
growths within a 9 month window preceding month t such that our estimate uses only information available prior to t and the subsequent portfolio construction is out-of-sample.
The first principal component is well-known to capture most of the time-series variation in
exchange rate growths (Lustig et al. (2011)), and thus, using it as the target in the shrinkage
estimation is a natural choice.
Using shrinkage to estimate Vt is similar to the estimation by Maurer et al. (2018) based on
principal component analysis and removing components which capture only a small fraction
of the common variation in exchange rate growths. Both approaches mitigate estimation
errors and avoid the presence of near-arbitrage opportunities in the underlying model (Ross
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(1976), Kozak, Nagel, and Santosh (2015)). Moreover, trading strategies based on either approach are very profitable out-of-sample. We choose shrinkage over the principal component
analysis based approach because a positive definite covariance matrix red is required in our
algorithm to solve Problem 9 (see Appendix C.1.2 for details).
The constructions of M VT C and M VT C\Corr further require estimates of transaction costs.
We compute carry trade returns before and after transaction costs. We use mid exchange
rate quotes for Xi,t and Fi,t to compute returns before transaction costs. To account for
transaction costs we use bid-ask quotes, indicated by superscripts b and a . Since it is relatively
cheap to roll a contract over from month to month, the literature typically assumes no rollover fees and only accounts for transaction costs if there is a change in a position (Menkhoff,
Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012), Della Corte, Ramadorai, and Sarno (2016), Maurer
et al. (2018)). Alternatively, we could quantify full round-trip costs (i.e. assume that a
position is completely closed and re-opened every month), which would lead to substantially
larger transaction costs and a quantitatively larger effect in our analysis. Full round-trip
costs are considered too conservative and larger than the trading costs paid in practice. Our
estimates of the per dollar transaction costs to open new long positions (CP+
i,t ), close existing
S−
long positions (CS+
i,t ), open new short positions (Ci,t ) and close existing short positions

(CP−
i,t ) are
CP+
i,t


 a
Fi,t
Xi,t+1
− ln
=
ln
ln
a
Fi,t
Fi,t
!
!


b
Xi,t
Xi,t
Xi,t
ln
− ln
= ln
b
Fi,t−1
Fi,t−1
Xi,t
!
!


Xi,t+1
Xi,t+1
Fi,t
− ln
= ln
+ ln
b
b
Fi,t
Fi,t
Fi,t


 a 
 a
Xi,t
Xi,t
Xi,t
− ln
+ ln
= ln
.
Fi,t−1
Fi,t−1
Xi,t


≡

CS+
≡
i,t
≡
CS−
i,t
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≡
i,t

Xi,t+t
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Figure 3.3 plots the time-series of the cross-sectional average of annualized costs (cents per
dollar trade) for a set of 29 developed and emerging currencies (green solid line), a subsets
of 14 emerging currencies (red dashed line), and a subset of 15 developed currencies (black
dotted line).78 As expected, transaction costs to trade emerging currencies are substantially
larger than developed currencies. Transaction costs generally decrease over time, except
during FX market crises, which do not necessarily coincide with NBER recessions (grey
shaded areas). The costs reach low levels between 0.04 and 0.06 cents per dollar trade in the
final year of our sample. Notice, however, that these low numbers do not necessarily imply
that transaction costs are unimportant nowadays. Since forward discounts in FX markets
of developed and many emerging currencies have approached zero in the past decade, carry
traders have often started to shift their focus towards carry trades in frontier markets, which
feature substantially higher transaction costs.
Notice that all strategies (M V , M VT C , M VT C\Corr ) use information (i.e. estimates for µet ,
Vt , and Czi,t ∀z ∈ {P +, S+, P −, S−}) available at the end of month t to construct a
portfolio which we then hold until the end of the subsequent month t + 1. Thus, all returns
are out-of-sample and none of the trading strategies suffers from a look-ahead bias.

3.3.2

Data

We collect daily spot and 1-month forward bid, ask and mid exchange rates from Barclays
Bank International and Reuters via Datastream. We use quotes of the last day of the month
to compute monthly returns CTi,t+1 . A concern with currencies of emerging countries is
that there are capital controls and major trading frictions. Menkhoff et al. (2012) and

PN  P
P−
S+
S−
1
The cross-sectional average of costs is computed as 4×N
i=1 Ci,t + Ci,t + Ci,t + Ci,t , where N is
the number of exchange rates for which we have data available at time t.
78
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Della Corte et al. (2016) suggest to exclude countries with a negative score on the capital
account openness index of Chinn and Ito (2006).79 Following this literature, we include
currencies of 29 countries in our analysis. According to Lustig et al. (2011) 15 of them are
classified as “developed”, while the remaining 14 are “emerging” countries. The 15 developed
countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Euro Area, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. The 14
emerging countries are: Brazil, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico,
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan. The Euro was
introduced in January 1999 and we exclude all countries which have joined the Euro after
that date and only keep the Euro as a currency.
Exchange rates of all 29 currencies are quoted against the USD for the sample starting on
October 11th, 1983 and ending on March 2nd, 2016. We are able to extend our sample
further back to January 2nd, 1976 for the following subset of 14 countries with exchange
rates quoted against the GBP (Great British Pound): Austria, Canada, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA. For
the period from January 2nd, 1976 to October 11th, 1983 we convert all data to exchange
rates quoted against the USD using mid exchange rate quotes of USD/GBP.
79

We further exclude a currency at time t if more than 20% of its daily exchange rate growths are missing
over the past 9 months, or if the absolute value of the annualized forward discount 12 × |f di,t | is larger than
25%. Forward discounts of more than 25% are rare and we believe that such large values likely indicate
non-tradable outliers in the data, the presence of severe trading frictions, sizable sovereign default risk or an
extraordinary large expected currency devaluation. Under these conditions, a currency trader is likely not
able or willing to consider a currency as part of the investment opportunity set.
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3.4

Results

Our main result is that the out-of-sample performance after transaction costs of meanvariance efficient portfolios substantially improves if transaction costs are taken into account
in the optimization. We document a statistically significant and economically large outperformance (after transaction costs) of M VT C over M V . Moreover, we quantify the empirical
importance of the four theoretical predictions discussed in Section 3.2.

3.4.1

Performance Before Transaction Costs

Prediction 1: M V is expected to outperform M VT C if the performance is measured in
returns before transaction costs.
Table 3.1 quantifies the difference between M V and M VT C and summarizes the monthly
out-of-sample excess returns of both strategies for our full set of 29 currencies (columns 1
and 2) and the subset of 15 developed currencies (columns 3 and 4) from January 1976 to
February 2016. The first panel of Table 3.1 reports the Sharpe ratios (SR) and average
excess returns (Mean) before transaction costs. The annualized Sharpe ratios of M V and
M VT C are almost identical: 0.99 and 1.00 for the set of all 29 currencies, and 0.87 and 0.82
for the set of 15 developed currencies. The difference in Sharpe ratios between M V and
M VT C is not significant (neither in the set of all 29 nor the 15 developed currencies). The
average annual return before transaction costs of M VT C is about 1.5% lower than the average
return of M V (denoted by ∆Mean in Table 3.1), but the volatility (Vol) of M VT C is also
proportionally lower, which implies almost identical Sharpe ratios across the two strategies.
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The top panel of Figure 3.4 displays the cumulative returns of M V (black dashed line) and
M VT C (red solid line) before transaction costs for our full set of 29 currencies. The two
time-series closely track each other and the returns of the two strategies are almost identical
at every point in time. We highlight two crash periods: (i) the 1992 European Monetary
System (ERM) crisis, which led to a temporary suspension of the Italian Lira and the UK
Sterling from the ERM, and (ii) the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 1998 default of Russia.
In both periods the before transaction cost returns of M V and M VT C are almost identical,
i.e., our results are not affected by these extreme events. In Section 3.5 we provide results
from a robustness analysis where we exclude these crises.
To conclude, we do not find a significant difference in the performance before transaction
costs between M V and M VT C . Although M VT C trades less actively than M V due to the
no trading region and generally holds an ex-ante sub-optimal position80 , the ex-post performance before transaction costs is almost identical. That is, while it is theoretically true that
M VT C is sub-optimal in terms of a before transaction costs evaluation, this first theoretical
prediction is empirically irrelevant.

3.4.2

Transaction Costs

Prediction 2: Transaction costs paid by M V are expected to be higher than by M VT C .
The second panel in Table 3.1 reports the average transaction costs paid per year as a
percentage of the portfolio value (or alternatively as a reduction in the portfolio return).
The costs paid by M V are substantial, i.e., 3.71% for the set of 29 currencies and 1.97%
for the set of 15 developed currencies. That is, 20%-30% of M V ’s expected return is lost to
80

Sub-optimal if there are no transaction costs.
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transaction costs. The costs paid by M VT C are less than half the size of the costs paid by
M V , i.e., 1.28% for the set of 29 currencies and 0.8% for the set of 15 developed currencies.
These savings in transaction costs are economically large. Moreover, the difference in costs
between M V and M VT C is highly statistically significant for both the set of 29 currencies
and the subset of 15 developed currencies.
Figure 3.5 visualizes this striking result by plotting the time-series of cumulative transaction
costs (top panel) and the monthly costs (bottom panel) paid by M V (black dashed line) and
M VT C (red solid line) for our full set of 29 currencies. The spread between the cumulative
costs of M V and M VT C is steadily increasing, while the monthly costs incurred by M V
are without exception always larger than the costs of M VT C . Therefore, our second theoretical prediction that M V is subject to larger transaction costs than M VT C is empirically
important.

3.4.3

Performance After Transaction Costs

Prediction 3: M VT C is expected to outperform M V after transaction costs. Moreover, the
outperformance is expected to be more substantial if transaction costs are large.
The third panel in Table 3.1 compares returns after transaction costs. The Sharpe ratios after
transaction costs are highlighted in boldface. For the full set of 29 currencies, the annualized
Sharpe ratio of M V is 0.7 and the one of M VT C is 0.9. The difference of ∆SR = 0.19 is
economically meaningful. M VT C is compensated by an almost 2% higher annual expected
return than M V per 10% return volatility (which is roughly equal to the unconditional
volatility of a typical carry trade strategy). We further find that this difference is statistically
significant with a p-value of 0.007. We employ the test proposed by Ledoit and Wolf (2008),
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which uses block bootstrapping and is robust to heteroskedasticity and cross- and autocorrelation.81 The bottom panel in Figure 3.4 illustrates this striking dominance of M VT C
by plotting cumulative returns after transaction costs. The spread in cumulative returns after
costs is steadily opening. Neither the aforementioned crises have a noteworthy effect nor are
our result driven by outliers.82 This result suggests that our third theoretical prediction is
empirically important. Optimizing over transaction costs when constructing mean-variance
efficient portfolios substantially improves the out-of-sample performance.
For the set of 15 developed currencies, we also find that M VT C outperforms M V after
transaction costs. The Sharpe ratios are 0.75 for M VT C and 0.7 for M V . While the difference
in Sharpe ratios ∆SR = 0.05 is smaller than in the case of the full set of 29 countries,
it is still economically important. Per 10% volatility, M VT C earns 0.5% more per year
than M V . The difference in Sharpe ratios is not statistically significant with a p-value of
0.385. This may be due to the low power, i.e., transaction costs are relatively small among
the developed currencies and thus, we would need a lot of data to identify a statistically
significant difference. The finding that ∆SR is larger for the full set of 29 currencies is
consistent with the fact that transaction costs are larger among emerging than developed
currencies. Indeed, we expect that the implications of transaction costs are more important
if average costs and the no trading region of M VT C are large.
In addition to the Sharpe ratio analysis, we investigate the (ex-post) utility gain when
switching from M V to M VT C . The last four rows of Table 3.1 report the annualized return
or certainty equivalent CEλ a mean-variance investor with risk aversion λ ∈ {1, 5, 10, 50} is
81

We choose a block size of 10 observations for the block bootstrapping. This is a conservative value and
our results are stronger if we use smaller block sizes which are closer to what Ledoit and Wolf (2008) suggest
in their illustrations.
82
As a robustness we repeat our analysis excluding the two crises and find similar results. The robustness
results are in Section 3.5.
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willing to give up in order to switch from M V to M VT C . In parenthesis next to CEλ we
report the percentage of months with a certainty equivalent larger than 0 (% of CEλ > 0),
or equivalently the months in which the investor with risk aversion λ (ex-post) prefers M VT C
over M V . The monthly certainty equivalent at time t is calculated using the realized return
in month t as a proxy for the conditional expected return and the daily returns within the
month to estimate the conditional variance. For our set of 29 currencies, a log investor
(λ = 1) is willing to give up 1.16% to switch from M V to M VT C , and CEλ > 0 in 75% of
all months. For an investor with λ equal to 5, 10 or 50, CEλ increases to 1.89%, 2.8% or
10.1% and the percentage of monthly observations with CEλ > 0 increases to 80%, 82% or
83%. For the set of 15 developed currencies, the certainty equivalents are smaller, i.e., for
λ ∈ {1, 5, 10, 50}, CEλ ∈ {−0.31%, 0.22%, 0.87%, 6.11%} and the percentage of CEλ > 0 are
50%, 63%, 66% and 72%. The monotonically increasing relation highlights that more risk
averse investors have a stronger desire to manage transaction costs efficiently.
We further investigate how much less M VT C is trading compared to M V due to the no
P
trading region. Therefore, we plot the time-series of the turnover i kθi,t − θi,t−1 k of M V
(black dashed line) and M VT C (red solid line) in the top panel in Figure 3.6 for our full
set of 29 currencies. The turnover of M V is on average 2.5 times larger than the turnover
of M VT C . In the bottom panel of Figure 3.6, we report the average portfolio holdings and
1-standard deviation error bars of M V (downward pointing triangles and thin black lines)
and M VT C (upward pointing triangles and thick red lines). The average portfolio holdings
are similar across the two strategies but the standard deviation is substantially larger for
M V , which indicates more trading activity.

134

All other moments of returns after transaction costs are comparable across M V and M VT C .
Table 3.1 lists the monthly return skewness (Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), the percentage of positive monthly returns (% Positive), the maximum draw down (MDD), which measures the
maximum loss from peak to trough of the strategy in the entire sample, and the autocorrelation (AC). If anything the skewness and the MDD of M VT C are more favorable than
the ones of M V , suggesting that M VT C has less crash risk exposure than M V .
Finally, we plot the time-series of the notional value or total dollar exposure

P

i

kθi,t k of

M V (black dashed line) and M VT C (red solid line) for our full set of 29 currencies in Figure
3.7. The notional value is slightly smaller for M VT C than for M V and almost always below
15. Only during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1998 default of Russia the notional
value spiked to levels of around 35. Margin requirements in FX derivatives markets are low
and implementing a strategy with a notional value of 35 is typically unproblematic.
To sum up, we recall that the performance before transaction costs of M V and M VT C are
almost identical, which implies that our first theoretical prediction is empirically irrelevant.
However, M V faces substantially larger transaction costs than M VT C , and in turn, M VT C
substantially outperforms M V after transaction costs. Thus, the second and third theoretical
predictions are empirically important. The results are driven by the significant reduction
of unnecessary trading, which substantially lowers the turnover and transaction costs and
increases the performance after transaction costs of M VT C compared to M V . Accounting
for transaction costs in the portfolio optimization is particularly important if costs are large.
These results have important practical implications. First, accounting for costs when optimizing a portfolio is beneficial and improves the out-of-sample performance. Second, transaction costs are declining over time, and thus, traders who specialize in developed currencies
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may be tempted to ignore transaction costs when constructing mean-variance efficient portfolios. However, even if transaction costs are low during normal times, they substantially
increase during crises and become relevant (Karnaukh et al. (2015)). Third, many currency
traders have shifted their focus to emerging and frontier markets because exchange rate forward discounts among developed currencies are close to zero for the past decade. Transaction
costs in emerging and frontier markets are generally larger than the costs considered in our
analysis, and thus, the implications of transaction costs on the optimal portfolio choice are
even more important for these traders.

3.4.4

Importance of Correlations between Assets

Prediction 4: If assets are positively correlated, then the no trading region of M VT C is
expected to be larger than the one of M VT C\Corr .83 Moreover, transaction costs of M VT C are
expected be lower than the costs of M VT C\Corr , and we expect M VT C to outperform M VT C\Corr
after costs.
Figure 3.8 shows the time-series of the average conditional correlation of each exchange rate
P −1
growth i with all other exchange rate growths, ρi,t = N1−1 N
j=1 Corrt (∆xi,t , ∆xj,t ) for our
full set of 29 currencies. To estimate the conditional correlation Corrt (∆xi,t , ∆xj,t ) between
exchange rate growths i and j in month t we use daily exchange rate growths within the
P
month. The bold black line is the average of all correlations ρt = N1−1 N
i=1 ρi,t in month
t. Correlations ρi,t are almost always positive and on average close to 0.5. The average
correlation ρt is always between 0.1 and 0.8.
83
Recall that M VT C\Corr is the strategy which optimizes over transaction costs similar to M VT C but
assumes that assets are uncorrelated to simplify the construction of the no trading region and obtain an
approximate solution.
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Table 3.2 summarizes the monthly excess returns of M V , M VT C\Corr and M VT C for our
full set of 29 currencies from 1976 to 2016.84 Note that M V and M VT C are also described
above and in Table 3.1. Consistent with the previous finding, the average returns and Sharpe
ratios before transaction costs are almost identical across the three strategies. M VT C\Corr
has transaction costs of 2.56% per year, which is a 1.14% saving in costs compared to M V
but 1.24% larger than the costs incurred by M VT C . After transaction costs, the Sharpe
ratio of M VT C\Corr is 0.76, which is 0.06 higher than the ratio of M V but 0.14 lower than
the ratio of M VT C . The difference in Sharpe ratios between M V and M VT C\Corr is not
statistically significant (p-value of 0.428) but the difference between M VT C\Corr and M VT C
is significant (p-value of 0.084). Therefore, accounting for correlations in the optimization is
important to significantly increase the Sharpe ratio when optimizing over transaction costs.
Employing the approximate solution M VT C\Corr to optimize over transaction costs adds not
much benefit.
The certainty equivalent CEλ an investor with risk aversion λ ∈ {1, 5, 10, 50} is willing to pay
to switch from M VT C\Corr to M V is mostly slightly negative (i.e., M VT C\Corr is preferred to
M V ), but when λ = 50, it is positive (i.e., M V is preferred to M VT C\Corr ). The percentages
of months where M V is preferred to M VT C\Corr are 29%, 32%, 35% and 44% when λ is 1,
5, 10 and 50. In contrast, the certainty equivalent is substantially larger for a switch from
M VT C\Corr to M VT C , and it is increasing in the risk aversion λ of the investor. The CEλ
to switch from M VT C\Corr to M VT C are 0.26%, 1.15%, 2.27% and 11.19% when λ is 1,5,10
and 50. The corresponding percentages of months when M VT C is preferred to M VT C\Corr
are 57%, 68%, 72% and 78%.
84

We focus on our full set of 29 currencies and do not report the the results for our subset of 15 developed
currencies. Latter results are available on request.
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We conclude that the no trading regions of M VT C\Corr and M VT C are not only theoretically
but also quantitatively very different. Accounting for correlations in the optimization over
transaction costs is empirically important and the out-of-sample outperformance of M VT C
over M VT C\Corr is economically and statistically significant. On the other hand, the outperformance of M VT C\Corr over M V is empirically small. Therefore, it is not beneficial
to account for transaction costs in the portfolio optimization while imposing the simplifying assumption that assets are uncorrelated when constructing the no trading region. This
empirical finding is an important contribution to the literature: it invalidates the general
usefulness of the continuous time framework of H. Liu (2004), where assets are considered uncorrelated. This is unfortunate since H. Liu (2004)’s setup provides so far the only available
model able to deliver a solution in dynamic portfolio optimization settings in the presence
of transaction costs with many risky assets.

3.4.5

Size of the No Trading Region and Trade Aggressiveness

In our theoretical discussion in Section 3.2 we establish that if the investor optimizes over
transaction costs (i.e. M VT C or M VT C\Corr ), she trades from her initial position θt0 towards
θtMV but stops at the boundary of the no trading region. We measure the size of the no


trading region by 1 − T A θtS , where the trade aggressiveness T A θtS of strategy S ∈
{M VT C , M VT C\Corr } is defined as the ratio of the turnover of strategy S and M V ,

S

T A θt

P S
0
kθi,t − θi,t
k
= P i MV
∈ [0, 1] .
0
i kθi,t − θi,t k

The turnover as a distance measure is suitable because we want to quantify the total amount
of trade. Normalizing by the turnover of M V helps to put this distance into perspective.
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A large T A(θtS ) indicates that the investor trades aggressively and chooses a position θtS
close to θtMV , which in turn implies that the no trading region is small. In the extreme case
where T A(θtS ) = 1, θtS = θtMV and there does not exist a no trading region. In contrast, a
small value indicates that the investor does not trade aggressively and θtS is far away from
θtMV , which in turn means that the no trading region is large. In the extreme case where
T A(θtS ) = 0, strategy S does not trade at all, θtS = θt0 , and the initial position lies within

the no trading region. Thus, T A θtS measures how aggressive an investor trades from the

initial position θt0 towards the optimum without transaction costs θtM V , and 1 − T A θtS
quantifies the size of the no trading region of strategy S.
In the one period model discussed in Section 3.2 we choose the initial position θt0 exogenously.
However, in our empirical implementation the initial position in month t is equal to the
S
,
portfolio allocation chosen in month t − 1. Thus, the initial position for strategy S is θt−1
MV
for strategy M V . These initial positions are generally not identical, and
while it is θt−1
P
S
S

i kθi,t −θi,t−1 k
S
S
P
therefore, our actual trade aggressiveness measure T A(θt ) =
T
A
θ
is
≈
MV
MV
t
kθ
−θ
k
i

i,t

i,t−1

not anymore bounded above by 1.
Table 3.3 summarizes the monthly realizations of T A θtS



for strategies S ∈ {M VT C ,

M VT C\Corr } for our full set of 29 currencies from 1976 to 2016.85 On average the trade
aggressiveness of strategy M VT C is 0.41. That is, the investor reduces trading by 59% compared to M V . Moreover, the 5- and 95-percentiles of the trade aggressiveness of M VT C
are 0.14 and 0.74, which means that the trading activity of M VT C is most of the time substantially lower compared to M V . An investor, who follows strategy M VT C\Corr on average
has a trade aggressiveness of 0.98, i.e., reduces trading by only 2% compared to M V . The
5- and 95-percentiles are 0.69 and 1.39. The value larger than 1 indicates that M VT C\Corr
85

We focus on our full set of 29 currencies and do not report the the results for our subset of 15 developed
currencies. Latter results are available on request.
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sometimes trades even more than M V . As explained above, this is possible because the
initial position of M VT C\Corr can be quite different from the initial position of M V . Our
empirical measure is not bounded above by 1 as it is in the single period setting where both
strategies have the same initial position.
 MV


The difference between the two measures, ∆TA = T A θt TC\Corr − T A θtMVTC , is of
particular interest. It measures how much more aggressively an investor, who implements
M VT C\Corr , trades compared to an investor, who invests in M VT C . We expect ∆TA > 0
if correlations between assets are (predominantly) positive, and ∆TA < 0 if correlations
between assets are (predominantly) negative. This is because the no trading region of M VT C
is larger (smaller) than the one of M VT C\Corr when correlations are positive (negative) (the
intuition is that when assets are positively correlated they act as substitutes while if they are
negatively correlated they function as complements, see the discussion in Section 3.2). We
find that ∆TA is on average 0.57 and statistically significantly different from 0 (top panel in
Table 3.3). The median of ∆TA is 0.54 and the 5- and 95-percentiles are 0.2 and 1.03. This
implies that the no trading region of M VT C is generally larger than the one of M VT C\Corr ,
which is consistent with the fact that correlations between exchange rates are on average
positive (Figure 3.8).
Figure 3.9 further analyzes the time series of ∆TA (solid line). The horizontal dashed line
highlights its sample median. The gray shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. Although
M VT C generally trades less aggressive than M VT C\Corr , there are a couple of monthly observations where the opposite is true. Finally, we highlight the Asian financial crisis in 1997,
when ∆TA spikes. The striking increase is not surprising since correlations typically sharply
increase during crises.
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3.4.6

Heuristic Adjustment of Static Solution to Approximate the
Dynamic Problem

M VT C is the optimal solution in a single period but not necessarily in a multi-period framework. Suppose we extend our model to T periods. The investor trades in every period t
hP
i
T
τ −t
and her utility at time t is Ut = Et
β
u
τ where Et [.] is the conditional expectation
τ =t
operator, β ∈ [0, 1] is a subjective time discount factor of future period τ mean-variance
0

0

0

0

S+
S−
utility uτ = θτ 0 µeτ − λ2 θτ 0 Vτ θτ − ∆P+
CP+
− ∆P−
CP−
− ∆S+
− ∆S−
τ
τ
τ
τ
τ Cτ
τ Cτ . More-

over, suppose the investment opportunity set is constant, i.e., µeτ = µe , Vτ = V, Czτ = Cz
∀z ∈ {P +, S+, P −, S−}. If there are no transaction costs (CP+ = CS+ = CP− = CS− = 0),
then it is well-known that the optimal solution in every period t is the same as the solution in
T

the single period model, θtMV = θMV = λ1 V−1 µe , where the superscript T indicates that the
portfolio is the solution to the T-period setting. In contrast, if there are positive transaction
costs (CP+ > 0, CS+ > 0, CP− > 0, CS− > 0), then in general the optimal solution is not
T
MVTC

equal to the single period solution, θt

6= θMVTC .

Unfortunately, we do not have reliable algorithms to solve the multi-period model in the
presence of many assets.86 Dybvig and Pezzo (2018) only provide a solution to the single period model. Intuitively, we expect the no trading region of the multi-period strategy
M VTTC to be smaller than for the single period strategy M VT C . The marginal utility gain
from moving towards θMV should be larger in the multi-period than in the single period
model because the benefit of being close to θMV can be reaped for multiple periods instead
86

Our results show how important it is to properly account for correlations among assets: a fact that
empirically invalidate the H. Liu (2004)’ setup, based on the assumption of no correlation among the available
assets. H. Liu (2004)’s model is the only framework that so far has been able to deliver solutions for dynamic
portfolio optimizations in the presence of transaction costs with many assets. Due to the complexity of the
general problem, the current literature on transaction costs only provide heuristic/approximate solutions
when dealing with two and in rare cases three risky assets.
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of only once. This intuition carries over to settings with stochastic changes in the investment
opportunity set (though there is an additional level of complexity due to hedging demands).
In particular, we expect the size of the no trading region to depend inversely on the persistence in the state variables. Two extreme cases are (i) independent shocks to the investment
opportunity set where the no trading region is expected to be large, and (ii) the constant
investment opportunity set where we expect a relatively small no trading region.
Following our intuition, we propose the following heuristic solution to the multi-period model.
 µe 
, where ρ(xt ) is the first autoWe define the cost multiplier Mi (c, a) = c + a × ρ σi,t
2
i,t

correlation operator of the time-series xt and

2
σi,t

is the ith diagonal element of Vt , and

the adjusted transaction costs associated with asset i are Czi,t (c, a) = Mi (c, a)Czi,t ∀z ∈
M

{P +, S+, P −, S−}. We conjecture that the solution θMVTC (c, a) of Problem 9 with the
T
MVTC

adjusted transaction costs approximates the true solution θt
M

in the multi-period model.

M

Notice that θMVTC (c=1,a=0) = θMVTC and θMVTC (c=0,a=0) = θMV nests the single period
model solutions with and without transaction costs.
We empirically assess the importance of our proposed approximate solution of the multiM

period model for our full set of 29 currencies from 1976 to 2016.87 We construct θMVTC (c,a)
for c ∈ [0, +∞) and a ∈ (−∞, +∞) and compute out-of-sample returns. Figure 3.10 plots
the annualized out-of-sample Sharpe ratios against parameters (c, a) ∈ [0, 2] × [0, 1], which
represent the neighborhood of the global optimum. The point highlighted by a blue arrow
indicates M VT C with a Sharpe ratio of 0.90. The point highlighted by a red arrow indicates M VTMC (c = 0.7, a = 0.8) with a Sharpe ratio of 0.92. This portfolio yields the highest
Sharpe ratio for any combination of (c, a). The point highlighted by a black arrow indicates
M VTMC (c = 1.3, a = 0) with a Sharpe ratio of 0.91. This portfolio yields the highest Sharpe
87

We focus on our full set of 29 currencies and do not report the the results for our subset of 15 developed
currencies. Latter results are available on request.
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ratio for any value c and a = 0. Points indicated by blue crosses are portfolios M VTMC (c, a)
with Sharpe ratios which are statistically significantly different from the Sharpe ratio of
M VT C (using the test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) and a p-value of 0.05). Figure 3.10 suggests that the Sharpe ratio is not sensitive to changes in parameters c and a within a large
neighborhood around the maximum with (c, a) = (0.7, 0.8), including strategy M VT C with
(c, a) = (1, 0). Thus, our proposed heuristic approximation of the multi-period model solution does not improve the out-of-sample performance over the single period model solution
M VT C .88
A potential reason for the just discussed heuristic approximation not to find significant reT

sults is the lack of consideration of any mean-reversion effects in the optimal weights θMVTC .
Under the assumption of a constant investment opportunity set there exists a true (but
unobservable) stationary optimum θMV , which can be thought of as the vector of long run
mean weights absent costs. We take the average of the optimal weights {θtMV }t in our sample
from January 1976 to February 2016 as such a proxy. By construction, the actual time-series
of θtMV hoovers around it, more or less closely (depending on the width of the no-trading
region) followed by the time series of θtMVTC . In a dynamic setting at generic date t we
T
MVTC

should expect any re-balancing decision θt
T
MVTC

inherited position θt−1

to be sub-optimal if it does not bring the

any closer to our proxy for the true long-run optimum θMV . We

therefore expect two different multipliers of the form M(c1 , a1 ) and M(c2 , a2 ) to be respectively smaller and bigger than the vector of ones 1{N ×N } when they push θtMVTC towards
respectively away from θMVTC . Accordingly, we construct the new approximate solution
by designing costs of the form Czi,t (c1 , a1 , c2 , a2 ) = [αi,t Mi (c1 , a1 ) + (1 − αi,t )Mi (c2 , a2 )] Czi,t
88
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the true solution of the multi-period model outperforms
M VT C in out-of-sample tests, because we do not know how different our conjectured approximate solution
is from the true solution.
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MVTC
MVTC
pushes θi,t−1
∀z ∈ {P +, S+, P −, S−} where αi,t is an indicator that turns on when θi,t

towards θiMVTC .
Again, we empirically assess the importance of the new approximate dynamic solution for
ci ∈ [0, +∞) and ai ∈ (−∞, +∞) with i ∈ {1, 2} in terms of the out-of-sample returns for
our full set of 29 currencies from 1976 to 2016.89 The new maximal Sharpe ratio is 0.92,
the same generated by the former heuristic, and it is not statistically different from the 0.90
Sharpe ratio of our M VT C strategy.
Overall, based on the insights from our heuristic analysis, we expect the myopic M VT C
strategy not to be very far from the true optimal dynamic strategy.

3.5

Robustness

Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 provide robustness results of our main findings in Table 3.1. Our
focus is on our full set of 29 developed and emerging currencies because transaction costs
are generally larger and more relevant than in the subset of 15 developed currencies (see
discussion in Section 3.4 for details). Results for our subset of 15 developed currencies are
available on request.

3.5.1

Sample without Crises, 1976-2016

The first two columns of Table 3.4 report the out-of-sample performance of M V and M VT C
for our full set of 29 currencies from 1976 to 2016 but excluding observations during the 1992
89

We focus on our full set of 29 currencies and do not report the the results for our subset of 15 developed
currencies. Latter results are available on request.
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ERM crisis, the 1997 Asian Financial crisis and 1998 Russian default. These portfolios are
not actually traded since we would not have been able to predict these crises in real time.
However, the analysis is still useful to understand whether any of our results are driven by
these periods.
Not surprisingly the performance of both strategies improves when we remove the observations during the crises. The Sharpe ratios before transaction costs of M V and M VT C increase
from 0.99 and 1.00 to 1.15 and 1.17. The Sharpe ratios before transaction costs across the
two strategies are almost identical. On the other hand, the excluded crises do not impact the
costs: the implementation of M V costs 3.63% per year and M VT C 1.22% (including crises
3.71% and 1.28% respectively). M VT C saves a significant amount compared to M V and the
difference in costs between M V and M VT C is highly statistically significant. The Sharpe
ratios after transaction costs are higher in the sample without crises than in the full sample.
M V earns a Sharpe ratio of 0.81 and M VT C 1.04. The difference between the strategies is
0.23 and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.005, which is similar to the result from
full sample. To sum up, the first theoretical prediction is empirically irrelevant while the
second and third predictions are economically large and statistically significant. Therefore,
our conclusions drawn from our sample without crises are the same as the conclusions in
Section 3.4.

3.5.2

Sample from November 1983 to February 2016

Our main analysis uses the sample from January 2nd, 1976 to March 2nd, 2016. The data
before October 11th, 1983 is quoted against the Great British Pound (GBP), and we convert
all data to exchange rates quoted against the USD (using mid quotes between the USD and
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GBP). The data quoted against the GBP are less reliable compared to the later sample
quoted against the USD. Moreover, the bid and ask quotes after converting the 1976-1983
data to quotes against the USD do not exactly reflect the true bid and ask quotes against
the USD, i.e., they are the bid and ask quotes against the GBP converted by the mid quote
between USD and GBP. We show that our results are robust independent of whether we use
the full sample from 1976 to 2016 or the shorter sample from 1983 to 2016.
Columns 3-4 of Table 3.4 summarize the out-of-sample excess returns of M V and M VT C
for our full set of 29 currencies from November 1983 to February 2016. The Sharpe ratios
before transaction costs of M V and M VT C are 0.87 and 0.88, which is 0.12 lower than in the
full sample from 1976 to 2016. The costs paid by M V and M VT C are 2.80% and 1.08% per
year. These numbers are lower than in the full sample, which is consistent with the fact that
average transaction costs are decreasing over time (Figure 3.3). M VT C costs less than 40%
of M V to implement. The difference in costs between M V and M VT C is highly statistically
significant. The Sharpe ratios after transaction costs are also lower in the sample starting
in 1983 than in the full sample. The Sharpe ratio of M V is 0.66 and the one of M VT C
is 0.79. The difference between the strategies is 0.14 and statistically significant with a pvalue of 0.025. Therefore, consistent with our main results, the first theoretical prediction is
empirically irrelevant while the second and third predictions are important.

3.5.3

NBER Recessions

Next we investigate the impact of recessions. We confirm our results in both NBER recessions
and non-recession periods. Table 3.5 summarizes the monthly excess returns of M V and
M VT C during NBER recessions (columns 1-2) and during non-recession periods (columns
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3-4) for our full set fo 29 currencies from 1976 to 2016. Sharpe ratios before transaction
costs are twice in non-recession periods than during recessions. This difference is driven by
a large difference in average returns while volatilities are almost constant across recession
and non-recession periods. The difference in Sharpe ratios before transaction costs between
M V and M VT C are close to zero in recession and non-recession periods. Transaction costs
in and out of recessions are identical. M VT C saves on average 2.4% in costs compared to
M V . The difference in costs between M V and M VT C is highly statistically significant.
M VT C outperforms M V and the difference in Sharpe ratios is 0.22 in recessions and 0.19
during non-recession periods. This difference in Sharpe ratios after transaction costs is only
significant in non-recession periods (p-value of 0.006), while the p-value during recessions is
0.366. The p-value in recession periods is relatively large because we only have 56 monthly
observations during recessions and the power of the test is low. However, the economic
magnitude of our result is identical in and out of recessions. We conclude, that our findings
in Section 3.4 are present both in and out of recession periods.

3.5.4

Subsamples before and after the Introduction of the Euro

The introduction of the Euro non-trivially affected the investment opportunity set in FX
markets. Our results from Section 3.4 are present in the subsamples before and after the
introduction of the Euro. The results are stronger in the earlier subsample, which is mostly
due to the general decline in average transaction costs over time (Figure 3.3).
Table 3.6 summarizes the monthly excess returns of M V and M VT C for our full set of
29 currencies before (columns 1-2) and after (columns 3-4) the introduction of the Euro on
January 2nd, 1999. In both samples, there is no difference in Sharpe ratios before transaction
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costs between M V and M VT C . Sharpe ratios are slightly larger in the sample after the
introduction of the Euro. Transaction costs are substantially larger in the pre-Euro sample.
Costs incurred by M V and M VT C are 5.58% and 1.19% per year (a difference of 3.67%)
in the pre-Euro, and 1.18% and 0.44% per year (a difference of 0.74%) in the post-Euro
sample. The difference in costs between M V and M VT C is highly statistically significant
in both pre- and post-Euro samples. The Sharpe ratios after transaction costs of M V and
M VT C are 0.69 and 0.91 in the pre-Euro and 0.95 and 1.09 in the post-Euro sample. The
difference of 0.22 in the pre-Euro sample is economically and statistically significant with a
p-value of 0.004. The difference of 0.14 in the post-Euro sample is economically large but
not statistically significant (p-value of 0.307). The decline in the difference in Sharpe ratios
after costs between M VT C and M V from the pre- to the post-Euro sample is mostly due to
the strong decline in average transaction costs. However, this does not mean that optimizing
over transaction costs is useless in the post-Euro era. The superior performance of M VT C
over M V is steady over the entire period. The cumulative returns after costs of M VT C are
always above those of M V and the spread is monotonically increasing. To conclude, the main
results of Section 3.4 are confirmed in both subsamples before and after the introduction of
the Euro.

3.6

Conclusion

Using foreign exchange (FX) market returns for 29 developed and emerging currencies from
1976 to 2016, we show that taking transaction costs into account in a mean-variance portfolio
optimization leads to an economically large and statistically significant improvement in the
out-of-sample performance.
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We present four main findings. First, we document that the out-of-sample Sharpe ratios
before transaction costs of M V (which is the mean-variance efficient portfolio which ignores
transaction costs in the optimization) and M VT C (which takes costs into account in the
optimization) are identical and equal to 1. Second, M VT C pays 1.28% of the portfolio value
per year in transaction costs which is substantially lower than the 3.71% paid by M V . Third,
M VT C has an out-of-sample Sharpe ratio after transaction costs of 0.9, while the Sharpe
ratio of M V is only 0.7. Other moments of the return distribution are similar across the
two strategies. Thus, taking costs into account in the optimization significantly improves
the out-of-sample performance after transaction costs. Fourth, transaction costs paid by
M VT C\Corr (the strategy which accounts for transaction costs in the optimization but for
simplicity assumes that assets are uncorrelated when constructing the no trading region) are
2.56% per year and its Sharpe ratio after costs is only 0.76, which is significantly inferior to
its counter-part in M VT C . Thus, accounting for correlations between assets is important for
the superior performance of M VT C . In contrast, the approximate solution M VT C\Corr has
no benefit. This result invalidates the insights coming from the continuous-time model of
H. Liu (2004), the only setup so far able, by assuming independence across assets, to deliver
solutions to large scale dynamic portfolio optimizations in the presence of transaction costs.
Our results have important practical implications. First, accounting for costs when optimizing a portfolio is beneficial and improves the out-of-sample performance. Second, transaction
costs are declining over time, and thus, traders who specialize in developed currencies may
be tempted to ignore transaction costs when constructing mean-variance efficient portfolios.
However, even if transaction costs are low during normal times, they substantially increase
during crises and become relevant (Karnaukh et al. (2015)). Third, many currency traders
have shifted their focus to emerging and frontier markets because exchange rate forward
discounts among developed currencies are close to zero for the past decade. Transaction
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costs in emerging and frontier markets are generally larger than the costs considered in our
analysis, and thus, the implications of transaction costs on the optimal portfolio choice are
even more important for these traders.
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Figure 3.1: Importance of Transaction Costs in FX Markets
Annualized out-of-sample Sharpe ratios before (blue bars to the left) and after (green bars in the middle)
transaction costs of various currency trading strategies and transaction costs (yellow bar to the right) paid
by them. M V is the mean-variance optimized portfolio without taking into account transaction costs in the
optimization. M VT C\Corr is the mean-variance optimized portfolio which optimizes over transaction costs
but makes the simplifying assumption that assets are uncorrelated. M VT C is the mean-variance optimized
portfolio which optimizes over transaction costs. DOL invests equally in all bilateral carry trades. DDOL
takes a long position in DOL if the median exchange rate forward discount is positive, and a short position
otherwise. HM L sorts bilateral carry trades according to the forward discount into quintiles and shorts
the bottom and invests in the top quintile. M OM sorts bilateral carry trades according to their past 12
month performance into quintiles and shorts the bottom and invests in the top quintile. V AL sorts bilateral
carry trades according to the power purchase parity adjusted exchange rate into quintiles and shorts the top
quintile (overvalued currencies with high real exchange rates) and invests in the bottom quintile (undervalued
currencies with low real exchange rates). The data are monthly returns for our full set of 29 currencies from
January 1976 to February 2016.
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Figure 3.2: Mean-Variance Problem with TC: Case of 2 Risky Assets
The investment opportunity set consists of two risky assets which are positively correlated. The horizontal
axis measures the weight a portfolio places on asset 1, and the vertical axis the weight on asset 2. The point
labeled θMV is the optimal portfolio if there were no transaction costs. The blue parallelogram illustrates
the no trading region of M VT C , which optimizes over transaction costs. The red checkered square (within
the blue parallelogram) determines the no trading region of M VT C\Corr , which optimizes over transaction
costs but assumes that the two assets are uncorrelated. If the initial position is within the no trading region,
then the investor does not trade. If it is outside, then the investor trades along vertical and horizontal
lines (indicated by black arrows) towards θMV until to the boundary of the no trading region. ∆P
i > 0
S
respecively ∆i > 0 indicate the regions where the investor increases respectively decreases her position in
asset i ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Figure 3.3: Average Annualized Transaction Costs
Average (across currencies) annualized costs (in percentage points) to change a position in a bilateral carry
trade for the the full set of 29 currencies (green solid line), the subset of 15 developed currencies (black
dotted line), and the subset of 14 emerging currencies (red dashed line) from January 1976 to February
2016. Grey shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative Returns of M V and M VT C
Time series of cumulative returns of M V (black dashed line) and M VT C (red solid line) for our set of 29
currencies from January 1976 to February 2016. Returns before transaction costs are shown in the top panel,
and returns after transaction costs in the bottom panel. Grey shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
Cumulative Returns Before Transaction Costs:

Cumulative Returns After Transaction Costs:
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Figure 3.5: Transaction Costs of M V and M VT C
Time series of transaction costs of M V (black dashed line) and M VT C (red solid line) for our set of 29
currencies from January 1976 to February 2016. Cumulative costs are shown in the top panel, and monthly
costs in the bottom panel. Grey shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
Cumulative Transaction Costs:

Monthly Transaction Costs:
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Figure 3.6: Trading Activity of M V and M VT C
P
Top panel: Time series of the turnover i kθi,t − θi,t−1 k of M V (black dashed line) and M VT C (red solid
line) for our set of 29 currencies from January 1976 to February 2016. Grey shaded areas indicate NBER
recessions. Bottom panel: Average portfolio weights and 1-standard deviation error bars of M V (downward
pointing triangle and thin black line) and M VT C (upward pointing triangle and thick red line).
Turnover:

Average Portfolio Weights and Standard Deviation Bars:
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Figure 3.7: Notional Value of M V and M VT C
P
Time series of the notional value or total dollar exposure i kθi,t k of M V (black dashed line) and M VT C
(red solid line) for our set of 29 currencies from January 1976 to February 2016. Grey shaded areas indicate
NBER recessions.
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Figure 3.8: Average Correlations
Time-series of the average conditional correlation of each exchange rate growth i with all other exchange rate
PN −1
growths for our full set of N = 29 currencies, ρi,t = N 1−1 j=1 Corrt (∆xi,t , ∆xj,t ) estimated using daily
data within each month from January 1976 to February 2016. The bold black line captures the time-series
PN
of the cross-sectional average across all correlations, ρt = N 1−1 i=1 ρi,t . Grey shaded areas indicate NBER
recessions.
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Figure 3.9: Difference in Trade Aggressiveness (∆TA)
Time-series of the difference in trade aggressiveness between M VT C\Corr and M VT C , ∆TA

TA θMVTC\Corr − θMVTC (solid line), where the trade aggressiveness is defined as T A(θtS )
P
S
S
kθi,t
−θi,t−1
k
P i MV
.
MV
−θ
kθ
i
i,t−1 k
i,t

=
=

The horizontal black dashed line is the sample median of ∆TA. The gray shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. The data refers to our full set of 29 currencies from January 1976 to February
2016. Reported values are in percentage points.
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Figure 3.10: Sharpe Ratios of Approximate Solutions in Multi-Period Model
M

Annualized out-of-sample Sharpe ratios of θMVTC (c, a) for (c, a) ∈ [0, 2]×[0, 1] for our full set of 29 currencies
from 1976 to 2016 (see details in Section 3.4.6). The point highlighted by a blue arrow indicates M VT C
M
with a Sharpe ratio of 0.90. The point highlighted by a red arrow indicates θMVTC (c = 0.7, a = 0.8) with a
Sharpe ratio of 0.92, which is the highest Sharpe ratio for any combination of (c, a). The point highlighted
M
by a black arrow indicates θMVTC (c = 1.3, a = 0) with a Sharpe ratio of 0.91, which is the highest Sharpe
M
ratio for any value c and a = 0. Points indicated by blue crosses are portfolios θMVTC (c, a) with Sharpe
ratios which are statistically significantly different from the Sharpe ratio of θMVTC (using the test of Ledoit
and Wolf (2008) and a p-value of 0.05).
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Table 3.1: Mean-Variance Strategies: M V vs. M VT C
Summary statistics of monthly excess returns of M V and M VT C , described in Section 3.2. First two
columns report results for all 29 currencies, last two columns for 15 developed currencies. The sample period
is 1976-2016. SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio, Mean the annualized average return (in percentage points),
Mean Costs the average annualized transaction costs measured in percentage of the portfolio value, Vol the
annualized standard deviation (in percentage points), Skew the skewness, Kurt the kurtosis, % Positive the
percentage of positive monthly returns, MDD the Maximum Draw Down, AC the autocorrelation, CEλ the
annualized rate of return (Certainty Equivalent) an investor with mean-variance preferences and risk aversion
λ is willing to give up in order to switch from strategy M V to strategy M VT C . % of CEλ > 0 indicates
the percentage of months with positive CEλ . ∆Mean, ∆Mean Costs, ∆SR are the differences in the Mean,
Mean Costs, SR between M VT C and M V . Standard errors of ∆SR are estimated using block bootstrapping
with block sizes of 10 observations to account for heteroskedasticity, cross- and auto-correlation (Ledoit and
Wolf (2008)). Standard errors of ∆Mean Costs are estimated using Newey and West (1987) to account for
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level
of ∆SR and ∆Mean Costs. We only report the p-value for ∆SR after costs.
All 29 Currencies

15 Developed Currencies

MV

M VT C

MV

M VT C

0.99
12.26
-

1.00
10.81
-1.45

0.87
9.09
-

0.82
7.49
-1.60

3.71
-

1.28
-2.42∗∗∗

1.97
-

0.80
-1.17∗∗∗

SR
∆SR
(p-value)

0.70
-

0.90
0.19∗∗∗
(0.007)

0.70
-

0.75
0.05
(0.385)

Mean
Vol
Skew
Kurt
% Positive
MDD
AC

8.55
12.15
-1.20
28.58
66.38
-54.10
-0.07

9.53
10.62
-0.65
30.73
67.87
-43.47
-0.05

7.13
10.23
2.96
82.53
66.60
-43.57
-0.03

6.69
8.93
4.22
100.15
67.02
-29.43
-0.03

-

1.16 (75%)
1.89 (80%)
2.80 (82%)
10.10 (83%)

-

-0.31 (50%)
0.22 (63%)
0.87 (66%)
6.11 (72%)

Before Transaction Costs:
SR
Mean
∆Mean
Transaction Costs:
Mean Costs
∆Mean Costs
After Transaction Costs:

CEλ=1 (% of CEλ=1 > 0)
CEλ=5 (% of CEλ=5 > 0)
CEλ=10 (% of CEλ=10 > 0)
CEλ=50 (% of CEλ=50 > 0)
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Table 3.2: Mean-Variance Strategies: Importance of Correlations
Summary statistics of monthly excess returns of M V , M VT C and M VT C\Corr (described in Section 3.2) for
all 29 currencies from 1976 to 2016. SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio, Mean the annualized average return
(in percentage points), Mean Costs the average annualized transaction costs measured in percentage of the
portfolio value, Vol the annualized standard deviation (in percentage points), Skew the skewness, Kurt the
kurtosis, % Positive the percentage of positive monthly returns, MDD the Maximum Draw Down, AC the
autocorrelation. CEλ is the annualized rate of return (Certainty Equivalent) an investor with mean-variance
preferences and risk aversion λ is willing to give up in order to switch from strategy M VT C\Corr to strategy
M V or M VT C . % of CEλ > 0 indicates the percentage of months with positive CEλ . ∆Mean, ∆Mean Costs,
∆SR are the differences in the Mean, Mean Costs, SR between M VT C and M V . Standard errors of ∆SR are
estimated using block bootstrapping with block sizes of 10 observations to account for heteroskedasticity,
cross- and auto-correlation (Ledoit and Wolf (2008)). Standard errors of ∆Mean Costs are estimated using
Newey and West (1987) to account for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ indicate a statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of ∆SR and ∆Mean Costs. We only report the p-value for ∆SR after
costs.
MV

M VT C\Corr

M VT C

0.99
12.26
0.21

0.95
12.05
-

1.00
10.81
-1.24

3.71
1.14∗∗∗

2.56
-

1.28
-1.28∗∗∗

SR
∆SR
(p-value)

0.70
-0.06
(0.428)

0.76
-

0.90
0.14∗
(0.084)

Mean
Vol
Skew
Kurt
% Positive
MDD
AC

8.55
12.15
-1.20
28.58
66.38
-54.10
-0.07

9.49
12.50
-0.10
28.06
66.81
-50.00
-0.06

9.53
10.62
-0.65
30.73
67.87
-43.47
-0.05

-0.90 (29%)
-0.73 (32%)
-0.53 (35%)
1.09 (44%)

-

0.26 (57%)
1.15 (68%)
2.27 (72%)
11.19 (78%)

Before Transaction Costs:
SR
Mean
∆Mean
Transaction Costs:
Mean Costs
∆Mean Costs
After Transaction Costs:

CEλ=1 (% of CEλ=1 > 0)
CEλ=5 (% of CEλ=5 > 0)
CEλ=10 (% of CEλ=10 > 0)
CEλ=50 (% of CEλ=50 > 0)
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Table 3.3: Trade Aggressiveness (TA)
Summary statistics of monthly trade aggressiveness T A(θtS ) =

P
S
S
kθi,t
−θi,t−1
k
P i MV
MV
kθ
−θ
i
i,t
i,t−1 k

for strategies S ∈

{M V T C, M VT C\Corr }. Strategies M V, M V T C and M VT C\Corr are described in Section 3.2. Mean TA
reports the time-series average of monthly T A(θtS ). In parenthesis below we report p-values, which are calculated using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation (Newey and West (1987)).
Median TA reports the median of monthly T A(θtS ). 5-%ile and 95-%ile report the 5 and 95 percentiles of
the monthly T A(θtS ) distribution. The data is our full set of 29 currencies from January 1976 to February
2016. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
M VT C

M VT C\Corr

∆TA

Mean TA

0.41∗∗∗

0.98∗∗∗

0.57∗∗∗

(p-value)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

95-%ile

0.74

1.39

1.03

Median TA

0.40

0.96

0.54

5-%ile

0.14

0.69

0.20
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Table 3.4: Mean-Variance Strategies: 1976-2016 without Crises & 1983-2016
Summary statistics of monthly excess returns of M V and M VT C for all 29 currencies. First two columns
report results for the sample 1976-2016 excluding the 1992 ERM crisis and the 1997 Asian financial and
1998 Russian crisis, last two columns report results for 1983-2016. SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio,
Mean the annualized average return (in percentage points), Mean Costs the average annualized transaction
costs measured in percentage of the portfolio value, Vol the annualized standard deviation (in percentage
points), Skew the skewness, Kurt the kurtosis, % Positive the percentage of positive monthly returns, MDD
the Maximum Draw Down, AC the autocorrelation, CEλ the annualized Certainty Equivalent an investor
with mean-variance preferences and risk aversion λ is willing to give up in order to switch from strategy
M V to strategy M VT C . % of CEλ > 0 indicates the percentage of months with positive CEλ . ∆Mean,
∆Mean Costs, ∆SR are the differences in the Mean, Mean Costs, SR between M VT C and M V . Standard
errors of ∆SR are estimated using block bootstrapping with block sizes of 10 observations to account for
heteroskedasticity, cross- and auto-correlation (Ledoit and Wolf (2008)). Standard errors of ∆Mean Costs
are estimated using Newey and West (1987) to account for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ ,
∗
indicate a statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of ∆SR and ∆Mean Costs.
1976-2016 without Crises

1983-2016

MV

M VT C

MV

M VT C

SR

1.15

1.17

0.87

0.88

Mean
∆Mean

11.96
-

10.50
-1.47

10.91
-

9.73
-1.18

3.63
-

1.22
-2.41∗∗∗

2.80
-

1.08
-1.72∗∗∗

SR
∆SR
(p-value)

0.81
-

1.04
0.23∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.66
-

0.79
0.14∗∗
(0.025)

Mean
Vol
Skew
Kurt
Positive
MDD
AC

8.33
10.31
-1.20
14.81
66.17
-51.42
0.01

9.28
8.92
-1.86
15.21
67.87
-43.47
0.05

8.11
12.36
-1.76
31.75
65.81
-54.10
-0.06

8.65
10.94
-0.69
32.96
66.58
-43.47
-0.04

Before Transaction Costs:

Transaction Costs:
Mean Costs
∆Mean Costs
After Transaction Costs:

CEλ=1 (% of CEλ=1 > 0)
CEλ=5 (% of CEλ=5 > 0)
CEλ=10 (% of CEλ=10 > 0)
CEλ=50 (% of CEλ=50 > 0)

-

1.09
1.66
2.37
8.09
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(75%)
(80%)
(82%)
(83%)

-

0.71
1.39
2.23
9.00

(72%)
(77%)
(80%)
(81%)

Table 3.5: Mean-Variance Strategies: NBER Recessions vs. Non-Recessions
Summary statistics of monthly excess returns of M V and M VT C for all 29 currencies for the sample 19762016. First two columns report results for NBER recession periods, last two columns report results for
non-recession periods. SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio, Mean the annualized average return (in percentage
points), Mean Costs the average annualized transaction costs measured in percentage of the portfolio value,
Vol the annualized standard deviation (in percentage points), Skew the skewness, Kurt the kurtosis, % Positive the percentage of positive monthly returns, MDD the Maximum Draw Down, AC the autocorrelation,
CEλ the annualized rate of return (Certainty Equivalent) an investor with mean-variance preferences and
risk aversion λ is willing to give up in order to switch from strategy M V to strategy M VT C . % of CEλ > 0
indicates the percentage of months with positive CEλ . ∆Mean, ∆Mean Costs, ∆SR are the differences in the
Mean, Mean Costs, SR between M VT C and M V . Standard errors of ∆SR are estimated using block bootstrapping with block sizes of 10 observations to account for heteroskedasticity, cross- and auto-correlation
(Ledoit and Wolf (2008)). Standard errors of ∆Mean Costs are estimated using Newey and West (1987) to
account for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, 10% level of ∆SR and ∆Mean Costs. We only report the p-value for ∆SR after costs.
NBER Recessions

Non-Recessions

MV

M VT C

MV

M VT C

SR

0.47

0.51

1.07

1.07

Mean
∆Mean

5.83
-

5.54
-0.29

13.10
-

11.50
-1.60

3.96
-

1.60
-2.36∗∗∗

3.67
-

1.24
-2.43∗∗∗

SR
∆SR
(p-value)

0.14
-

0.37
0.22
(0.366)

0.78
-

0.97
0.19∗∗∗
(0.006)

Mean
Vol
Skew
Kurt
Positive
MDD
AC

1.87
12.98
-0.55
6.71
55.36
-17.29
-0.15

3.94
10.81
-0.14
6.37
55.36
-17.38
-0.06

9.43
12.03
-1.30
32.47
67.87
-54.10
-0.06

10.26
10.59
-0.72
34.28
69.57
-43.47
-0.06

-

2.28 (70%)
3.10 (75%)
4.13 (77%)
12.37 (82%)

-

Before Transaction Costs:

Transaction Costs:
Mean Costs
∆Mean Costs
After Transaction Costs:

CEλ=1 (% of CEλ=1 > 0)
CEλ=5 (% of CEλ=5 > 0)
CEλ=10 (% of CEλ=10 > 0)
CEλ=50 (% of CEλ=50 > 0)
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1.01
1.73
2.62
9.79

(76%)
(80%)
(83%)
(83%)

Table 3.6: Mean-Variance Strategies: Pre- vs. Post-Euro
Summary statistics of monthly excess returns of M V and M VT C for all 29 currencies. First two columns
report results for pre-Euro period (1976-1999), last two columns report results for post-Euro period (19992016). SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio, Mean the annualized average return (in percentage points),
Mean Costs the average annualized transaction costs measured in percentage of the portfolio value, Vol the
annualized standard deviation (in percentage points), Skew the skewness, Kurt the kurtosis, % Positive the
percentage of positive monthly returns, MDD the Maximum Draw Down, AC the autocorrelation, CEλ the
annualized rate of return (Certainty Equivalent) an investor with mean-variance preferences and risk aversion
λ is willing to give up in order to switch from strategy M V to strategy M VT C . % of CEλ > 0 indicates
the percentage of months with positive CEλ . ∆Mean, ∆Mean Costs, ∆SR are the differences in the Mean,
Mean Costs, SR between M VT C and M V . Standard errors of ∆SR are estimated using block bootstrapping
with block sizes of 10 observations to account for heteroskedasticity, cross- and auto-correlation (Ledoit and
Wolf (2008)). Standard errors of ∆Mean Costs are estimated using (Newey & West, 1987) to account for
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level
of ∆SR and ∆Mean Costs. We only report the p-value for ∆SR after costs.
Pre-Euro

Post-Euro

MV

M VT C

MV

M VT C

SR

1.05

1.05

1.14

1.16

Mean
∆Mean

15.98
-

13.82
-2.16

7.25
-

6.75
-0.50

5.58
-

1.91
-3.67∗∗∗

1.18
-

0.44
-0.74∗∗∗

SR
∆SR
(p-value)

0.69
-

0.91
0.22∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.95
-

1.09
0.14
(0.307)

Mean
Vol
Skew
Kurt
Positive
MDD
AC

10.40
15.06
-1.17
21.11
67.17
-54.10
-0.11

11.91
13.07
-0.70
23.27
70.94
-43.47
-0.11

6.07
6.37
-0.28
5.09
65.37
-17.76
0.21

6.32
5.80
-0.55
6.72
63.90
-20.75
0.31

-

1.81 (80%)
2.97 (85%)
4.41 (88%)
16.00 (87%)

-

Before Transaction Costs:

Transaction Costs:
Mean Costs
∆Mean Costs
After Transaction Costs:

CEλ=1 (% of CEλ=1 > 0)
CEλ=5 (% of CEλ=5 > 0)
CEλ=10 (% of CEλ=10 > 0)
CEλ=50 (% of CEλ=50 > 0)
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0.29
0.41
0.58
1.89

(69%)
(72%)
(75%)
(78%)

References
Ackermann, F., Pohl, W., & Schmedders, K. (2016). Optimal and Naive Diversification in
Currency Markets. Management Science.
Adrian, T., & Boyarchenko, N. (2012). Intermediary leverage cycles and financial stability.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 567 .
Adrian, T., Etula, E., & Muir, T. (2014). Can time-varying risk of rare disasters explain
aggregate stock market volatility? The Journal of Finance, 69 (6), 2557–2596.
Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects.
Journal of Financial Markets, 5 (1), 31–56.
Amromin, G., & Sharpe, S. A. (2013). From the horse’s mouth: Economic conditions and
investor expectations of risk and return. Management Science, 60 (4), 845–866.
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2006). Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns.
The Journal of Finance, 61 (4), 1645–1680.
Balduzzi, P., & Lynch, A. W. (1999). Transaction costs and predictability: some utility cost
calculations. Journal of Financial Economics, 52 (1), 47–78.
Balduzzi, P., & Lynch, A. W. (2000). Predictability and transaction costs: The impact on
rebalancing rules and behavior. The Journal of Finance, 55 (5), 2285–2309.
Bansal, R., Kiku, D., Shaliastovich, I., & Yaron, A. (2014). Volatility, the macroeconomy,
and asset prices. The Journal of Finance, 69 (6), 2471–2511.
Bansal, R., Kiku, D., & Yaron, A. (2011). An empirical evaluation of the long-run risks model
for asset prices. Working Paper, Duke University and University of Pennsylvania.
Bansal, R., & Yaron, A. (2004). Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset
pricing puzzles. The Journal of Finance, 59 (4), 1481–1509.
Barro, R. J. (2006). Rare disasters and asset markets in the twentieth century. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121 (3), 823–866.
Basak, S. (2005). Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs. Journal of Banking and Finance,
29 (11), 2849–2881.
Baz, J., Breedon, F., Naik, V., & Peress, J. (2001). Optimal Portfolios of Foreign Currencies.
The Journal of Portfolio Management, 28 (1), 102-111.
Bertaut, C., & Judson, R. (2014). Estimating u.s. cross-border securities positions: New data
and new methods. Board of Governors pf the Federal Reserve System, International
Finance Discussion Paper N. 113 .
Bhamra, H. S., & Uppal, R. (2013). Asset prices with heterogeneity in preferences and
beliefs. Working paper .
Black, F. (1972). Capital market equilibrium with restricted borrowing. The Journal of
Business, 45 (3), 444–455.
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. The Journal
of Political Economy, 81 (3), 637–654.
Bollerslev, T., Tauchen, G., & Zhou, H. (2009). Expected stock returns and variance risk
premia. The Review of Financial Studies, 22 , 4463–4492.
167

Bollerslev, T., & Todorov, V. (2011). Tails, fears, and risk premia. The Journal of Finance,
66 (6), 2165–2211.
Brandt, M. W. (2005). Portfolio choice problems. In Handbook of financial econometrics
(p. 269-336). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Brennan, M. (1975). The optimal number of securities in a risky asset portfolio when there
are fixed costs of transacting: Theory and some empirical results. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 10 , 483–496.
Brunnermeier, M., & Pedersen, L. (2009). Market liquidity and funding liquidity. Review of
Financial Studies, 22 , 2201–2238.
Campbell, J. Y., & Cochrane, L. H. (1999). By force of habit: A consumption-based
explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. The Journal of Political Economy,
107 (2), 205–251.
Campbell, J. Y., Giglio, S., Polk, C., & Turley, R. (2017). An intertemporal capm with
stochastic volatility. Forthcoming, Journal of Financial Economics.
Campbell, J. Y., & Viceria, L. M. (1999). Consumption and portfolio decisions when
expected returns are time-varying. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (2), 433–
495.
Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2006). What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls,
Institutions, and Interactions. Journal of Development Economics, 81 (1), 163-192.
Chow, G. C. (1960). Tests of equality between sets of coefficients in two linear regressions.
Econometrica, 28 (3), 591–605.
Christie, S. (2005). Is the sharpe ratio useful in asset allocations? MAFC Research Paper
No. 31, Applied Finance Centre, Macquarie University.
Cottle, R. W., Pang, J.-S., & Stone, R. E. (1992). The linear complementarity problem. In
The linear complementarity problem (p. 761).
Cox, J. C., Ingersoll, J. E., & Ross, S. A. (1985). A theory of the term structure of interest
rates. Econometrica, 53 , 385–407.
Crucini, M. J., & Shintani, M. (2008). Persistence of the law of one price deviations: evidence
from micro-data. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55 , 629–644.
Daniel, K., Hodrick, R. J., & Lu, Z. (2017). The Carry Trade: Risks and Drawdowns.
Critical Finance Review , 6 (2), 211-262.
Davis, M. H. A., & Norman, A. R. (1990). Portfolio selection with transaction costs.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 15 (4), 676–713.
Della Corte, P., Sarno, L., & Tsiakas, I. (2009). An Economic Evaluation of Empirical
Exchange Rate Models. Review of Financial Studies, 22 (9), 3491-3530.
Della Corte, P., Ramadorai, T., & Sarno, L. (2016). Volatility Risk Premia and Exchange
Rate Predictability. Journal of Financial Economics, 120 , 21-40.
DeMiguel, V., Garlappi, L., & Uppal, R. (2009). Optimal versus naive diversification: How
inefficient is the 1/N portfolio strategy? Review of Financial Studies, 22 , 1915-1953.
Diebold, F. X., & Mariano, R. S. (1995). Comparing predictive accuracy. Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics, 13 , 253–253.
168

Donohue, C., & Yip, K. (2003). Optimal portfolio rebalancing with transaction costs: Improving on calendar- or volatility-based strategies. Journal of Portfolio Management,
29 , 49–63.
Drechsler, I., & Yaron, A. (2011). What’s vol got to do with it. The Review of Financial
Studies, 24 , 1–45.
Dumas, B., & Buss, A. (2017). The dynamic properties of financial-market equilibrium with
trading fees. Working Paper .
Dumas, B., & Luciano, E. (1991). An exact solution to a dynamic portfolio choice problem
under transaction costs. The Journal of Finance, 46 , 577–595.
Dybvig, P. H., & Pezzo, L. (2018). Mean-Variance Porfolio Rebalancing with Transaction
Costs (Working paper). Washington University.
Dybvig, P. H., & Ross, S. A. (1982). Portfolio efficient sets. Econometrica, 50 (6), 1125–1546.
Dybvig, P. H., & Ross, S. A. (1987). Arbitrage. In New palgrave, a dictionary of economics
(pp. 100–106).
Epstein, L. G., & Zin, S. E. (1989). Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior
of consumption and asset returns: A theoretical framework. Econometrica, 57 (4),
937–969.
Epstein, L. G., & Zin, S. E. (1991). Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior
of consumption and asset returns: An empirical analysis. The Journal of Political
Economy, 99 (2), 263–286.
Gallant, A., & Tauchen, G. (1989). Seminonparametric estimation of conditionally constrained heterogeneous processes: Asset pricing applications. Econometrica, 57 (5),
1091–1120.
Goldstein, A. (1979). A model of capital asset pricing with transaction costs (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). Yale University.
Goodman, J., & Ostrov, D. N. (2010). Balancing small transaction costs with loss of optimal
allocation in dynamic stock trading strategies. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics,
70 (6), 1977–1998.
Goyal, A., & Welch, I. (2008). A comprehensive look at the empirical performance of equity
premium prediction. Review of Financial Studies, 21 (4), 1455–1508.
Greenwood, R., & Shleifer, A. (2014). Expectations of returns and expected returns. Review
of Financial Studies, 27 (3), 714–746.
Grossman, S. J., & Stigliz, J. E. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient
markets. The American Economic Review , 70 (3), 393–408.
Han, J. (2005). Dynamic portfolio management: An approximate linear programming approach (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Stanford University.
Hansen, L. P., & Singleton, K. J. (1982). Generalized instrumental variables estimation of
nonlinear rational expectations models. Econometrica, 50 (5), 1269–1286.
Hansen, L. P., & Singleton, K. J. (1983). Stochastic consumption, risk aversion, and the
temporal behavior of asset returns. The Journal of Political Economy, 91 (2), 249–265.
Harrison, J., & Kreps, D. (1979). Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets.
169

Journal of Economic Theory, 20 , 381–408.
He, Z., & Krishnamurthy, A. (2013). Intermediary asset pricing. American Economic
Review , 103 , 732–770.
Horvth, J., Rtfai, A., & Dome, B. (2008). The border effect in small open economies.
Economic Systems, 32 , 33–45.
Hou, K., & Moskowitz, J., Tobias. (2005). Rare disasters and asset markets in the twentieth
century. The Review of Financial Studies, 18 (3), 981–1020.
Irle, A., & Prelle, C. (2008). A renewal theoretic result in portfolio theory under transaction
costs with multiple risky assets. Working Paper .
Jacob, N. L. (1974). A limited-diversification portfolio selection model for the small investor.
The Journal of Finance, 29 , 874–856.
Karnaukh, N., Ranaldo, A., & Soederlind, P. (2015). Understanding FX Liquidity. The
Review of Financial Studies, 28 (11), 3073-3108.
Kozak, S., Nagel, S., & Santosh, S. (2015). Interpreting Factor Models (Working paper).
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53 (6), 1315–
1335.
Ledoit, O., & Wolf, M. (2003). Improved estimation of the covariance matrix of stock returns
with an application to portfolio selection. Journal of Empirical Finance, 10 , 603-621.
Ledoit, O., & Wolf, M. (2008). Robust Performance Hypothesis Testing with the Sharpe
Ratio. Journal of Empirical Finance, 15 , 850-859.
Leland, H. (2000). Optimal portfolio implementation with transaction costs and capital gain
taxes. Working Paper .
Lettau, M., & Ludvigson, S. (2001). Consumption, aggregate wealth, and expected stock
returns. The Journal of Finance, 56 (3).
Lin, H., Wu, C., & Zhou, G. (2016). From the horse’s mouth: Economic conditions and
investor expectations of risk and return. Management Science, forthcoming.
Liu, H. (2004). Optimal consumption and investment with transaction costs and multiple
risky assets. The Journal of Finance, 59 , 289–338.
Liu, H., & Loewenstein, M. (2002). Optimal portfolio selection with transaction costs and
finite horizons. Review of Financial Studies, 15 , 805–835.
Liu, W. (2006). A liquidity-augmented capitl asset pricing model. Journal of Financial
Economics, 82 , 631–671.
Lo, A. W. (2002). Statistics of sharpe ratio. Financial Analysis Journal , 58 , 36–52.
Ludvigson, S. C., Ma, S., & Ng, S. (2016). Uncertainty and business cycles: Exogenous
impulse or endogenous response? Working Paper, NYU .
Lustig, H., Roussanov, N., & Verdelhan, A. (2011). Common Risk Factors in Currency
Returns. Review of Financial Studies, 24 (11), 3731-3777.
Lynch, A., & Tan, S. (2009). Multiple risky assets, transaction costs and return predictability: Allocation rules implications for u.s. investors. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 45 , 1015–1053.

170

Mao, J. C. T. (1970). Essentials of portfolio diversification strategy. The Journal of Finance,
25 , 1109–1121.
Mao, J. C. T. (1971). Security pricing in an imperfect capital market. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 6 , 1105–1116.
Markowitz, H. M. (1952). Portfolio selection. The Journal of Finance, 7 (1), 77–91.
Markowitz, H. M. (1959). Portfolio selection. In Portfolio selection.
Martin, I. (2017). What is the expected return on the market? The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 132 (1), 367–433.
Masters, S. J. (2003). Rebalancing: Establishing a consistent framework. Journal of Portfolio
Management, 29 , 52–57.
Maurer, T. A., & Pezzo, L. (2018). Importance of transaction costs for asset allocations in
fx markets. Working Paper .
Maurer, T. A., To, T.-D., & Tran, N.-K. (2018). Optimal Factor Strategy in FX Markets
(Working paper). Washington University.
Mayshar, J. (1979). Transaction costs in a model of capital market equilibrium. Journal of
Political Economy, 87 , 673–700.
Mayshar, J. (1981). Transaction costs and the pricing of assets. The Journal of Finance,
36 , 583–597.
Meese, R., & Rogoff, K. (1983). Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do They
Fir Out of Sample? Journal of International Economics, 14 , 3-24.
Menkhoff, L., Sarno, L., Schmeling, M., & Schrimpf, A. (2012). Currency Momentum
Strategies. Journal of Financial Economics, 106 , 620-684.
Mertens, E. (2002). Comments on variance of the iid estimator in lo (2002). Working Paper .
Merton, R. C. (1980). On estimating the expected return on the market. Journal of Financial
Economics, 8 , 323–361.
Moeller, B., S., Schlingemann, P., F., & Stulz, M., R. (2007). How do diversity of opinion and
information asymmetry affect acquirer returns? Review of Financial Studies, 20 (6),
2047–2078.
Moreira, A., & Muir, T. (2017). Volatility managed portfolios. The Journal of Finance,
72 (4), 1611–1644.
Moreira, A., & Savov, A. (2017). The macroeconomics of shadow banking. The Journal of
Finance, 0 .
Muir, T. (2017). Financial crises and risk premia. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
132 (2), 765–809.
Muthuraman, K., & Kumar, S. (2006). Multidimensional portfolio optimization with proportional transaction costs. Mathematical Finance, 16 (2), 301–335.
Myers, J. D. (2009). Portfolio optimization with transaction costs and preconceived portfolio
weights (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Nagel, S., & Singleton, K. J. (2011). Asset pricing with garbage. The Journal of Finance,
66 (3), 873–909.

171

Newey, W., & West, K. (1987). A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica, 55 (3), 703–708.
Opdyke, J. (2007). Comparing sharpe ratios: so where are the p-values? Journal of Asset
Management, 8 (5), 308–336.
Pasquariello, P. (2014). Financial market dislocations. The Review of Financial Studies,
27 , 1868–1914.
Pastor, L., & Stambaugh, R. F. (2003). Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. The
Journal of Political Economy, 111 (3), 642–685.
Pippenger, J., & Phillips, L. (2008). Some pitfalls in testing the law of one price in commodity
markets. Journal of International Money and Finance, 27 , 915–925.
Pogue, G. A. (1970). An extension of the markowitz portfolio selection problem to include
variable transactions’ costs, short sales, leverage policies and taxes. The Journal of
Finance, 25 , 1005–1027.
Rapach, D., Ringgenberg, M. C., & Zhou, G. (2016). Short interest and aggregate stock
returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 171 (1), 46–65.
Roll, R. (1977). A critique of the asset pricing theory’s tests part i: On past and potential
testability of the theory. Journal of Financial Economics, 4 (2), 129–176.
Roll, R. (1992). A mean/variance analysis of tracking error. The Journal of Portfolio
Management, 18 (4), 13–22.
Ross, S. A. (1973). Return, risk and arbitrage. Wharton Discussion Paper, I. Friend and
J. Bicksler, eds., Risk and Return in Finance, 189–217.
Ross, S. A. (1976). The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing. Journal of Economic
Theory, 13 , 341-360.
Ross, S. A. (1978). A simple approach to the valuation of risky streams. The Journal of
Business, 51 , 453–475.
Savov, A. (2011). Asset pricing with garbage. The Journal of Finance, 56 (1), 177–201.
Schachermayer, W. (2017). Asymptotic theory of transaction costs. In Asymptotic theory
of transaction costs (p. 160).
Shreve, S. E., & Soner, H. M. (1994). Optimal investment and consumption with transaction
costs. The Annals of Applied Probability, 4 (3), 609–692.
Taksar, M., Klass, M. J., & Assaf, D. (1988). A diffusion model for optimal portfolio selection
in the presence of brokerage fees. Mathematics of Operations Research, 13 , 277–294.
Tobin, J. (1958). Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk. Review of Economic Studies,
25 , 65–86.
Wachter, J., & Seo, S. B. (2016). Option prices in a model with stochastic disaster risk.
Working Paper .
Wachter, J. A. (2013). Can time-varying risk of rare disasters explain aggregate stock market
volatility? The Journal of Finance, 68 (3), 987–1035.
Walker, D. (2015). Quarterly update: Foreign ownership of u.s. assets. Council on Foreign
Relations, www.cfr.org.

172

White, H. (2001). Asymptotic theory for econometrician. In Asymptotic theory for econometrician (p. 64).
Yu, J. (2011). Disagreement and return predictability of stock portfolios. Journal of Financial Economics, 99 , 162–183.

173

Appendix A
A Non-Parametric Test For
Representative Agent Pricing

A.1

Appendix A - Martin (2017) Lower Bound Existence Proof

First I show why LBt is a lower bound for the market risk premium Et [Rt+1 − Rt,f ] then I
derive equation (1.3).
Suppose there exist a stochastic discount factor Mt+1 > 0 satisfying the pricing equation (1.1), then by the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (FTAP, Ross (1973, 1978),
Harrison and Kreps (1979), Dybvig and Ross (1987)) there exist an equivalent risk-neutral
measure Q such that Rf = E[Ri ] for any gross return Ri (thus for the market return R as
well).
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By definition the conditional risk neutral variance for the market return at horizon t + 1 can
be written as
2
V artQ (Rt+1 ) ≡ EtQ [Rt+1
] − EtQ [Rt+1 ]2

where Rt+1 is the gross cum-dividend market return. Still from FTAP we can go back
2
]=
and forth from the physical probability measure and the risk-neutral one, thus EtQ [Rt+1
2
Et [Rt,f Mt+1 Rt+1
] and by definition of the risk-neutral measure, EtQ [Rt+1 ]2 = Rt,f 2 , hence

2
2
V artQ (Rt+1 ) = Et [Rt,f Mt+1 Rt+1
] − Rt,f

dividing the above equation by the gross risk-free return Rt,f and rearranging
V artQ (Rt+1 )
= Et [Rt+1 − Rt,f ] + Covt (Mt+1 Rt+1 , Rt+1 )
Rt,f
if Covt (Mt+1 Rt+1 , Rt+1 ) ≤ 0, which together with Mt+1 > 0 defines the NCC, then LBt ≡
V artQ (Rt+1 )
Rt,f

is a lower bound for RPt ≡ Et [Rt+1 − Rt,f ].

Next, I derive equation (1.3). From the definition of variance, using hats to denotes exdividend quantities and letting S be the cum-dividend market level
"

2 #

2
S
t+1
Q
Q
Q St+1
V art (Rt+1 ) ≡ Et
− Et
St
St


!2
Ŝ
t+1
=
EtQ 
DYt  − Rt,f 2
Ŝt
"
#
2
(DYt )2 Rt,f Q Ŝt+1
=
Et
− Rt,f 2
Rt,f
(Ŝt )2

175

by no arbitrage (see Martin (2017)), since the options are written on Ŝt
"
EtQ

2
Ŝt+1
Rt,f

#

Z
=2

∞

ˆ t (k)dK = 2
call

Z

0

F̂t

ˆ t (k)dK +
call

Z

!

∞

ˆ t (k)dK
call

F̂t

0

since deep-in-the-money call options are neither liquid in practice nor intuitive to think
h 2 i
Ŝ
about, it is convenient to split the range of integration for EtQ Rt+1
into two and use the
t,f
put-call parity to replace in-the-money call prices with out- of-the-money put prices. Assume
that Market Dividends are paid as lump sums Dt+1 at the and of the period [t : t + 1] but
before t + 1, then the following is true

max(St+1 − Dt+1 − k, 0) = max(k − St+1 + Dt+1 , 0) + (St+1 − Dt+1 ) − k

since Ŝt+1 = St+1 − Dt+1

max(Ŝt+1 − k, 0) = max(k − Ŝt+1 , 0) + (St+1 − Dt+1 ) − k

by linearity of the pricing equation
ˆ t (k) = put
ˆ t (k) + Ŝt − P V (Dt+1 ) − k
call
Rt,f
i
h
i
h
Q Ŝt+1
Dt+1
=
(1
−
DY
)E
=
where P V (Dt+1 ) = EQ
t
t
t
Rt,f
Rt,f
h
i
St+1
from Rt,f = EQ
. Applying the put-call parity
t
St
Z

F̂t

ˆ t (k)dK =
call

0

Z
0

=

F̂t

DYt −1
Ŝt
DYt

and the last equality comes



DY
F̂ 2
t−1
ˆ t (k)dK + F̂t Ŝt −
put
Ŝt − t
DYt
2Rt,f
!
Z F̂t
Ŝ
F̂
t
t
ˆ t (k)dK + F̂t
put
−
DYt 2Rt,f
0
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which implies
"
EtQ

plugging EtQ

h

2
Ŝt+1
Rt,f

2
Ŝt+1
Rt,f
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i

"Z
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in V artQ (Rt+1 ) =

LBt = 2

(DYt )2
(Ŝt )2

Ŝt
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−
DYt 2Rt,f
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h

2
Ŝt+1
Rt,f

i

!
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#

∞

ˆ t (k)dK
call

+
F̂t

− Rt,f 2 delivers equation (1.3)
!

ˆ t (k)dK
ˆ t (k)dK + call
put

(A.1)

0

setting DY = 1 delivers the original Martin (2017)’ measure used in the current study.

A.2

Appendix B - Linear vs. cubic spline Lower Bound
approximations

In order to compute the lower bound measure at time t, LBt , according to equation (1.3) I
use the SPX options (Put and Call) bid quotes at horizon 1 month for the different available
strikes as at the of the first business day of month t from Optsum and Optionmetrics.
ˆ
To approximate the integral in (1.3) we first need to interpolate the functions put(k)
and
ˆ
call(k)
over a continuum of strikes. In the study, following Martin (2017), I have used a
linear interpolation. Another popular interpolant option is the cubic spline.
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The figure shows the time-series of lower bounds in the main sample M S computed with the
linear as well as the cubic-spline method with and without dividends as an explicit argument
of LBt (see proof of Proposition 1 for an explicit formula of LBt as a function of dividends:
i.e. eq.(A.1)): the top panel uses the full available data: note how, independently from
the presence of dividends, the spline and the linear interpolation almost perfectly overlap
except for isolated points in the pre-1996 period. I adopt the most conservative of the
approaches by excluding from the main sample all instances in which the spline and the
linear interpolation differ proportionally (with respect to the linear scheme) by more than
50%. The new resulting sample (which is the one used in the main analysis), along with the
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lower bound estimates, is shown in the middle panel. All the estimates are now very close;
The same point can be more precisely appreciated by looking at the bottom graph which
plots the absolute percentage difference between the lower bound measures (with respect to
the linear scheme) when computed using the linear as opposed to the spline approximation
for the case the bound features dividends and for the case it does not. Again, it is impossible
to distinguish between the case in which dividends are included from the case in which they
are not, furthermore, the maximum discrepancy is now around 30% and on average the two
scheme only differ by 2%.

A.3

Appendix C - Rationale behind the choice of the
market risk premium predictors

In order to tackle the potential data-snooping issue discussed in Section 1.3, the selection
of the actual list Zt is disciplined by a constructive economic rationale. In particular, the
objective of this study is to find, if any, violations of the Martin’s class of representative
agent pricing: a key subclass is represented by the Consumption-based Representative Agent
Models (as we show in Section 1.2 all the mainstream CRAMs are inside the Martin’s class).
Any violation will thus contain instances of simultaneous failure of CRAMs; because these
are systematic failures they must be associated with the failure of, at least one, of the key
assumptions of these models. The key assumptions of CRAMs are: (CRA1) the existence
of a representative agent, (CRA2) the absence of market frictions, (CRA3) the absence of
arbitrage, and (CRA4) the presence of (closed) and real economies. Thus, predictors in Zt
will be selected as proxies against CRA1-CRA4. In other words, the predictors in Zt can be
viewed as state variables that should not be able to predict the excess market return πt+1
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under the null that CRAMs hold. While the selection does not require each predictor to
be uniquely associated with a single dimension going against the key CRAM assumptions,
to streamline the exposition, I offer a possible mapping of the variables into proxies against
each of the assumptions separately.
A representative agent exists (assumption CRA1) under symmetric information,90 market
completeness, and in general91 independence of preferences from wealth distribution. Because
market completeness is not easy to proxy for, I focus on proxies for wealth distribution and
asymmetric information. In particular, I exploit the percentage changes in the GIN I index,
GIN Ichg, from the United States Census Bureau to capture the wealth distribution effect,
while proxying for informational asymmetries through the Rapach et al. (2016) short interest
index SII and the Ludvigson et al. (2016) financial uncertainty index F . SII seizes “ the
superior informational content of short seller in anticipating future aggregate cash flows and
associated market returns” , while F , originally designed to capture the latent degree of
unpredictability in financial markets, has zero correlation with SII 92 and can be considered
as an asymmetric information proxy.93
90

This is true even in frameworks such as Basak (2005) or Bhamra and Uppal (2013) that allow aggregation
under heterogeneity in beliefs.
91
Unless preference are homotetic and identical.
92
See Table 1.2
93
Empirically Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) and the literature therein refer to uncertainty and
analyst forecasts dispersion measures as asymmetric information proxies, while from a theoretical point
of view, standard predictions of asymmetric information models, such as Grossman and Stigliz (1980) or
Kyle (1985), dictates a positive correlation with price impact measures, proxied in this study by the Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) (il)liquidity index ILLIQpi. The following table displays the correlation coefficients
over the overlapping period [1992 − 2005] of F and classical information asymmetry proxies such as the
I/B/E/S analysts earning growth forecast dispersions, (AnlystF orecastsDispIBES for the SP 500 and
AnlystF orecastsDispY u for an average of individual stocks forecasts as in Yu (2011)) and market volatility
proxies such as the CBOE V IX index or a GARCH(1,1) on the SP 500 return GARCH
Corr
F
GARCH
V IX

ILLIQpi
0.30
0.17
0.31

AnlystF orecastsDispIBES
0.67
0.72
0.62
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AnlystF orecastsDispY u
0.63
0.35
0.44

Turning to trading frictions, the opposite of CRA2, I track this dimension either by looking
at the impact of taxes, through the annual percentage changes in the aggregate dollar amount
paid in capital gain taxes, T AXchg, or by employing two popular (il)liquidity indexes: the
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) index, ILLIQpi, designed to capture the percentage cost
incurred in a 1 million 1962 USD trade in the market,94 and the mimicking portfolio for
the W. Liu (2006) index, ILLIQts, constructed with the aim of seizing the trading speed
dimension of liquidity.95
The absence of arbitrage, assumption CRA3, is a sufficient condition for the Law of One
Price (LoP) to hold thus if LoP fails there is arbitrage. Following the standard equilibrium
framework I look at price relations in the financial rather than the commodity markets96 and
track significant departures from the LoP through the Pasquariello (2014) market dislocation
index M DI which measures abnormal discrepancies between actual (mid-quote) and theoretical prices using three textbook arbitrage parities in stock, foreign exchange, and money
markets: the Covered Interest Rate Parity, the Triangular Arbitrage Parity and the American Depository Receipt Parity. I also add two more general and popular mispricing proxies:
the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, Sent, designed to capture miss-pricing due to
subjective valuations not reflecting rational risk compensation, and the Dow-Jones Industrial
Average book-to-market ratio BM .
Finally CRA4 dictates CRA models to be embedded in real and closed economies. I take
into account the effect of nominal forces and the impact of foreign markets by including
F and GARCH are the only proxies available throughout the required sample period {1973 : 2 − 2014 : 12}.
Note how F is the measure of uncertainty which simultaneously correlates the most with the price impact
proxy ILLIQpi and with the analyst forecast dispersions.
94
Similarly to the Amihud (2002) proxy, it is a price impact measure.
95
Another proxy constructed with the same aim is designed in Hou and Moskowitz (2005).
96
In the context of commodity markets Horvth, Rtfai, and Dome (2008), Pippenger and Phillips (2008)
and Crucini and Shintani (2008) find contrasting results concerning the validity of the LoP.
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the growth rate of the U.S. money supply, M 1g,97 and the rate at which the U.S. dollar
appreciate, U SDg,98 into the list of candidates.

A.4

Appendix D - ICM vs. OLS horse-race to forecast
the market risk premium

As shown by Goyal and Welch (2008), a naive OLS regression of excess market returns
on a large number of predictors will over-parametrize the model and lead to poor out-ofsample forecasts, I therefore combine the information from the set of predictors to obtain
optimal forecasts using the Iterated Combination Method (ICM) of Lin et al. (2016). First,
predictive regressions are run on each predictor and a constant to obtain individual forecasts.
Then a weighted average of the mean of all of the individual forecasts and the prevailing
mean of the excess market return using all observations till time t, serves as the t forecast.
This methodology basically amounts to a weighted average of a shrinked OLS regression, in
which the out-of-diagonal elements in the regressors’ matrix are set to zero and the regressors’
coefficients are divided by the number of regressors, and the prevailing dependent variable
mean.99
97

For the sake of parsimony and due to the high correlation of 0.55 with inflation I do not include the
latter.
98
The index is a weighted (over the volume of bilateral transactions) average of the foreign exchange value
of the U.S. dollar against the currencies of a broad group of major U.S. trading partners. The index captures
the impact of foreign financial markets on the domestic stock market through the weights: since the third
quarter of 1982 the U.S. runs a deficit in the current account (see Balance on Current Account, available
through FRED at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NETFI.html), and, as reported by Bertaut and Judson
(2014) on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the excess of imports over exports
has been funded primarily by foreign acquisitions of U.S. securities. See also Walker (2015).
99
The weights are designed to minimize the out-of-sample mean squared error and increase the out of
sample R2 . (See Lin et al. (2016))
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The next table compares the performance of the ICM and OLS approaches for the 6 selected
specifications
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for a given model (a specific panel among (1) trhough (6)) the in-sample (training) and outM
are produced with
of-sample (main) time series of next month excess return estimates100 πt+1

M ∈ {OLS, ICM }. The performances of the two different methods are judged using the
out-of-sample mean squared error statistic, MSE, and the following regression benchmark

M
πt+1 = α + βπt+1
+ εt+1

in terms of the produced coefficient and R2 . A good performance entails a (relatively) small
M SE, a (relatively) high R2 , α = 0 and β = 1. No matter which model we look at OLS beats
ICM in-sample (especially in terms of R2 and MSE101 ) but ICM consistently out-perform
OLS exactly where we care the most: out-of-sample in the period from January 1990 to
December 2014. The ICM method, while producing similar out-of-sample R2 , generates a
M SE 1.5 smaller, non significant αs, and βs which on average are much closer to 1 and 2.7
times bigger. In particular. according to the DM statistic, we always reject at the 95% the
null of out-of-sample OLS MSE grater than the ICM ones. These results ex-post validate the
choice of adopting the Lin et al. (2016) ICM method to generate the out-of-sample forecasts
for the market excess return.

100

Such estimates produced by either methods in either sample and for each model are not spurious: their
first autocorrelation parameters safely lies at least 2 standard errors below 0.95.
101
The Diebold and Mariano (1995) (DM) statistic has to be interpreted as the usual t-statistic design to
compare the OLS and ICM MSEs.
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A.5

Appendix E - Lower Bound violations imply too
high model-based Sharpe ratios

This subsection shows how the rejection periods are times in which representative agents with
preferences satisfying the N CC have ex-ante market Sharpe ratios systematically higher then
ex-post (empirical) counterparts and how this can be seen as a direct consequence of the
non-parametric test outcomes.
Since N CC is a restriction imposed on the SDF , it is linked to the preferences of any Martin’s
model representative agent; In particular, Martin (2017) shows how for the representative
102
log investor the N CC holds with equality and LBt = Elog
t [πt+1 ]. Given an objective proxy

for the conditional market volatility at time t, σt (Rt+1 ) ≡ σt (πt+1 ), we can compute the timeseries of conditional ex-ante Sharpe Ratios from the log investor perspective as SRtEx−Ante ≡
LBt
σt (Rt+1 )

ˆ |I v = 1].
and thus get an estimated average for the rejection periods as E[SRtEx−Ante

Note that since the conditional log investor risk premium is the lowest possible among
the Martin’s models, any representative agent from these models will have an (average)
ˆ |I v = 1]. It is therefore
market assessment in the rejection periods of at least E[SRtEx−Ante
ˆ |I v = 1] with the estimate for the ex-post Sharpe Ratio:
instructive to compare E[SRtEx−Ante
ˆ |I v = 1) ≡
i.e. (SREx−P ost

E[πt+1ˆ|I v =1]
.
σ(πt+1ˆ|I v =1)

Results from this exercise are illustrated in the next

table
102

Computed as the out-of-sample prediction from a GARCH(1, 1) model on the market return using a
rolling window of either 120, 60 or 30 observations.
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the first column contains the estimates for (SREx−P ost |I v = 1) − E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1] as well
as two different ways103 to compute its p-value against the alternative of (SREx−P ost |I v =
103

The econometric challenge here is to make inference on the ex-post Sharpe Ratio estimate while simultaneously taking into account the parameter uncertainty surrounding the estimates of E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1]
and (SREx−P ost |I v = 1). With respect to the first challenge I use the results from Lo (2002), Mertens
(2002), Christie (2005) and Opdyke (2007) who derive the normal limiting distribution for the Sharpe
Ratio measure only imposing stationarity and ergodicity on
q πt+1 : this gives us a way to compute the stanEx−Pˆost |I v =1)+0.25(λ −1)(SREx−Pˆost |I v =1)2
4
Ex−P ost
ˆ
Ex−P
ost
v
dard error of (SR
|I = 1) as SE(SR
) = 1−λ3 (SR
nI v =1 −1

with λ3 and λ4 representing the skewness and kurtosis of (πt+1 |I v = 1) and nI v =1 being the number of
rejection observations. Since the estimate for E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1] is a canonical OLS coefficient from regressing a constant on the available time series (SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1), its standard error, which we denote as
SE(E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1]), is an ordinary Newey and West (1987) corrected standard error. The second challenge is therefore tackled by estimating the standard error for (SREx−P ost |I v = 1)−E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1], as
q
SE(SREx−P ost )2 + 2SE(SREx−P ost )SE(E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1]) + SE(E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1])2 which correctly accounts for the potential correlation among the two estimates. I use such standard error to compute
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1) < E[SRtEx−Ante |I v = 1], each row refers to a different rule except the last raw which reports
the analogous results while conditioning on the non-rejection periods for the representative
case of the first rule Itv .104
The ex-ante Sharpe Ratios of the Martin’s Models are systematically above their ex-post
ˆ
ˆ ost |I v ) − E[SREx−Ante
counter parts in the rejection periods: (SREx−P
|I v ] is always negative
t
only when I v = 1 (5 out of 6 case at the 5% level and 1 out of 6 at the 10%). As column 2
and 3 show, this patter is generated by economically negative, albeit insignificant, average
ex-post Sharpe ratios and statistically positive ex ante counter-parts. Note how the situation
reverses when we condition on I v = 1: there things seem to work with ex-ante Sharpe ratios
implied by the Martin’s class solidly below their ex-post realizations.
These results can be viewed as a direct implication of the non-parametric test outcomes:
this is because
ˆ
E[SRtEx−Ante
|I v ]


ˆt
ˆ t |I v ]
LB
E[LB
|I v ≈
≡E
σt (πt+1 )
E[σt (πˆt+1 )|I v ]


where the approximation is justified by the fact that, across the six analyzed cases, the first
estimate is on average 1.07 the second with a maximum of 1.11, and these differences are never
ˆ |I v = 1] > (SREx−P ost
ˆ |I v = 1) is approximately
statistically significant. Then E[SRtEx−Ante
equal to
ˆ v = 1]
ˆ t |I v ]
E[πt+1 |I
E[LB
>
ˆ v = 1)
E[σt (πˆt+1 )|I v ]
σ(πt+1 |I

(A.2)

In light of this approximation column 4 and 5 of the above table compare the numerators
and the denominators of eq. (A.2): column 4 says that E[πt+1 |I v = 1] − E[LBt |I v = 1] ≡
E[yt+1 |I v = 1] is significantly samller than zero while according to column 5 we cannot reject
the first (base) p-value. As a robustness check I also compute the the p-value in the case λ3 and λ4 represent
the skewness and kurtosis of πt+1 over the entire available sample: this is the second p-value reported in the
table.
104
The other rules yield virtually identical results.
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the null of σ(πt+1 |I v = 1) = E[σt (πt+1 )|I v ]. This means that the results from this subsection
are implied by the lower bound LBt being on average above the risk premium in the rejection
periods which is the exact same statement made by the non-parametric test.

A.6

Appendix F - Performance of actual representative models

The non-parametric test rejects the entire class of Martin’s models conditional on periods
t such that Itv = 1. One of the advantage of the test is its ability to make inference over
equilibrium models which are usually difficult to test either because based on unobservable
state variables or because such variables, when available, are very noisy in the data. This
section, subject to the just mentioned data caveat, can be viewed as a robustness check
on the ability of the non-parametric test to correctly identify periods where indeed actual
mainstream models of the Martin’s class perform worse as well as a useful exercise to quantify
their performance.
I compare three cornerstone consumption-based models belonging to the Martin’s class: the
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) external habit model, CC99, the Bansal and Yaron (2004)
long run risk model, BY 04, and the J. A. Wachter (2013) time-varying rare disaster model,105
W 13. To ensure, by the logic of the test, that bed performance conditional on I v = 1 come
from the failure of the models’ FOCs, I use the original calibrations of these models (for
which Martin (2017) proofs the N CC holds) as shown in the following table
105

I am thankful to Professor Wachter for providing the original code used to perform the simulations in
her model.
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each model is reported detailing its state variables, parameters and SDF functional form.106
The last 2 columns display the parameters’ values in the original calibration as well as the
estimates for the current (main) sample of this study. Consumption is computed as in CC99
by the sum of non-durables and services, the state variables in BY 04 are recovered using the
procedure detailed in Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2011), and the time-varying disaster probabilities (intensities) are proxied using the monthly average daily SP 500 crash probabilities
as computed in Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) (BT).107
106

The SDF formula for the case of W 13 is derived using J. A. Wachter (2013) and the appendix of
J. Wachter and Seo (2016).
107
Because, as reported, the 95% confidence interval of such estimates contains the original values of the
parameters when applied to consumption crashes via simulations in W 13, for reasons already explained, I
use the original values.
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Having at disposal the SDFs time series I can compute the pricing errors for model i at
time t as P Eti ≡ Mti Rt − 1. Specifically, I evaluate the performance of these models via the
estimates of the following metric

|P E i ratio| ≡

i
E[P Et+1
|Itv = 1]
i
|Itv = 0]
E[P Et+1

and report the result in the following graph

for each of the six rules each model’s |P E ratio| is strictly grater than 1; The average
absolute pricing errors during rejection periods, Itv = 1, are on average 41% higher than in
the rest of the sample, with the average ratio being 44%,25% and 55% for CC99, BT 04 and
W 13 respectively. The table immediately below the bar graph reveals how in most cases the
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P E ratios are statistically grater than 1.108 The displayed results use the real gross market
return (deflated by the CPI), but are robust to the usage of the nominal gross market return
as well.
Finally, an unreported analysis,109 also rank these models in terms of their performance. The
ranking is found independent of the conditioning, (Itv = 1 or Itv = 0), and tells us that the
absolute pricing errors from W 13 are on average statistically smaller than those produced
by CC99 and BY 04 which are on average indistinguishable.

108
109

Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
Available upon request.
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Appendix B
Mean-Variance Portfolio Rebalancing
with Transaction Costs

B.1

Existence of Solutions to the Mean-Variance Setup
Under Transaction Costs

This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 2.
We start by assuming the cost function described in A3 to be such that c(P, S, θ0 ) = c(θ, θ0 )
and verify the claim later. Let us define

Uu ≡ r +

κ
1
(κV θB + µ − r1)0 V −1 (κV θB + µ − r1) − θB 0 V θB
2(κ + λ)
2

and
γ ≡ θ − θu

where θu is the ideal portfolio absent costs, defined in equation (2.2).
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We observe that
U (θ) = U (γ) = U u −

κ+λ 0
γ V γ − c(γ, γ 0 )
2

where c(γ, γ 0 ) = c(θ, θ0 ) follows from the definition of γ and the fact that c(P, S, θ0 ) =
c(θ, θ0 ). The problem class to solve is thus

maxn U (γ)
γ∈R

subject to
γ = γ0 + P − S
P ≥0
S≥0
Note that since the cost function is non-negative by construction U (θ) = U (γ) ≤ U u −
κ+λ 0
γV
2

γ ≡ J(γ) = J(θ) ≤ J(θu ) therefore any solution θ∗ , if it exists, is such that U (θ∗ ) ≤

J(θu ).
From mathematical convenience the problem can be equivalently restated as

Problem 10
max Ũ (γ)

γ∈Rn

subject to
γ = γ0 + P − S
P ≥0
S≥0
193

where
Ũ (γ) ≡ −

κ+λ 0
γ V γ − c(γ, γ 0 )
2

The aim of Theorem 2 is to show the existence of solutions to Problem 10. We proof this
statement by first looking at four special sub-problems.
Sub-problem 1: Optimum Absent Costs

maxn −
γ∈R

κ+λ 0
γ Vγ−K
2

This is the classical unconstrained mean-variance problem in which we subtract a constant,
K, from the objective function. For this problem K can be thought as c(γ, γ 0 ), where
c(γ, γ 0 ) = c(θ, θ0 ) = c(0, θ0 ) = c(θ0 ) = c(0, 0, θ0 ) = c(P, S, θ0 ) which is trivially linear
in γ and θ. The unique solution, γ = 0, of this problem is the unconstrained optimum
corresponding to θ = θu and an optimal objective function value of −K. The result follows
from the fact that the objective function is continuous, strictly concave and bounded above
(since V is positive-definite), and γ = 0 is feasible.
The next couple of sub-problems benefit from the following lemma

¯ with
Lemma 1 Given the positive definite variance covariance matrix V , the matrix I¯0 V I,
I¯ ≡ [−In , In ] where In is the n × n identity matrix, is positive semi-definite

Proof. Since I¯0 V I¯ is a square matrix we just need to show that its eigenvalues are non¯ = λx where x is the
negative. By definition any eigenvalue λ of I¯0 V I¯ issuch thatI¯0 V Ix
 V −V 
associated non-zero eigenvector. Note that I¯0 V I¯ = 
. Then we can re-write the
−V V
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V
eigenvalue representation of the matrix I¯0 V I¯ as 
−V
two cases:

 
 
−V  x1 
x1 
   = λ  . We now have
V
x2
x2

λ = 0 case: in this case any non-zero x = x1 = x2 is a solution
λ 6= 0 case: the solution is x1 = −x2 which implies 2V x1 = λx1 , but V is p.d. implying
0 < 2x01 V x1 = λx01 x1 which is only possible if λ > 0

Sub-problem 2
max −
P,S

κ+λ 0
γ V γ − P 0C P − S 0C S − K
2

subject to
γ = γ0 + P − S
P ≥0
S≥0
This problem is the proportional cost setup of Problem 3 in which a constant, K, is subtracted
from the objective function: thus we already know (see Section 2.4.1) the existence of a
unique solution θ = θ + P − S such that for any risky asset i either Pi ≥ 0 or Si ≥ 0 but
Pi > 0 and Si > 0 cannot happen. In this sub-problem c(P, S, θ0 ) ≡ P 0 C P + S 0 C S + K which
is linear in P and S, furthermore, due to the FOCs for every i, Pi and Si are linear functions
of θi trhough θi = θi0 + Pi 1[Si =0] + Si 1[Pi =0] thus c(P, S, θ0 ) = c(P (θ), S(θ), θ0 ) = c(θ, θ0 ) with
the latter still being a linear function of its arguments.
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The above problem can be more compactly re-written in the standard quadratic form
1
max Ũ (x) = a0 x + x0 Qx
x
2
subject to
x≥0
0

0

0

¯ and Q ≡ (κ + λ)I¯0 V I.
¯ From
where x0 ≡ [P 0 , S 0 ], c0 ≡ [C P , C S ], a0 ≡ [c0 − (κ + λ)γ 0 V I]
lemma 1, Q is positive semi-definite thus, from standard quadratic programing theory,110
any x satisfying the FOCs is a solution. As shown in Section 2.5, such x, for any arbitrary
n ∈ N solves LCP (a, Q). Furthermore, from Section 2.4.1 we know such x always exists and
it is unique so that the algorithm of Section 2.5 will provide it.
Sub-problem 3
max −
P,S

κ+λ 0
γ V γ − P 0 C P − S 0 C S − (K̄ 0 Dj )1
2

subject to
γ = γ0 + P − S
Dj P = 0
Dj S = 0
P ≥0
S≥0
110

See for e.g. Cottle et al. (1992).
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1j 0 
where K̄ 0 = [k1 , ..., kn ], Dj ≡ 
 with 1j being a 1 × j > 0 vector of ones and 0−j
0 0−j
being a 1 × (n − j) vector of zeros; 1j and 0−j together form the main diagonal of Dj . The
vector 1j contains the j assets which are constrained not to be traded while 0−j contains the
(n − j) assets that are allowed to be traded in this sub-problem; Note that setting j = 0
reduces the setup to the one of the previous sub-problem.
Because the domain of this sub-problem is a linear sub-space of that of sub-problem 2, given
γ 0 = [γj0 = γj0 0 , γ−j ], γ−j is the optimal solution of sub-problem 2 restricted to the (n − j)
traded assets with K ≡ (K̄ 0 Dj )1.
Sub-problem 4
maxn−j −

γ−j ∈R

κ+λ 0
γ V γ − (K̄ 0 Dj )1
2

where γ 0 = [γj0 = γj0 0 , γ−j ] and we solve for the optimal weights difference γ−j corresponding
to the subset of assets i ∈ {j + 1, ..., n} that are allowed to trade. The cost function for this
sub-problem is c(P, S, θ0 ) = (K̄ 0 Dj )1 ≡ K which is the same as the one discussed in subproblem 1. Thus c(P, S, θ0 ) = c(θ, θ0 ) = c(γ, γ 0 ) and it is trivially linear in all its arguments.
In terms
 we note that by decomposing the variance-covariance matrix V as
 of solutions
 Vj Vj,−j 
V ≡
 we can solve the equivalent problem instead
0
Vj,−j V−j
0

minn−j (κ + λ)γj0 Vj,−j γ−j +

γ−j ∈R

κ+λ 0
γ−j V−j γ−j
2

since V is positive definite, also V−j is positive definite. Thus this is an unconstrained
minimization problem with a strictly concave continuous and differentiable objective function
∗
0
which unique (feasible) solution is γ−j
= (V−j )−1 Vj,−j
γj0 .
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In summary, sub-problems 1-4 admit a unique fisible solution θ∗ , or the equivalent characterization γ ∗ in the space of weights difference. Moreover the cost function c(P, S, θ0 ) =
c(θ, θ0 ) = c(γ, γ 0 ) and it is linear in its arguments.
Putting the pieces together we can now proof the existence of solutions γ ∗ for Problem 10
which is equivalent to the existence of solutions θ∗ for the class of problems having objective
function 2.1 under assumption A1 − A3. By doing so we also provide the algorithm to solve
the general problem. We proof Theorem 2 case-wise:

Proportional costs: Look at Problem 10 with c(γ, γ 0 ) = P 0 C P +S 0 C S : this is sub-problem
3 with K = 0 thus we know that for this case there exist a unique feasible solution,
γ ∗ , or θ\P C in the space of weights θ, easily computable for large n via the algorithm
presented in Section 2.5.
Overall fixed cost: Look at Problem 10 with c(γ, γ 0 ) = 1[γ6=γ 0 ] k and P = S = 0 and solve
for γ: only two things can happen:
1. The investor does not trade: γ = γ 0 , c(γ, γ 0 ) = 0. This is feasible and yields an
0

γ0 V γ0
utility of Ũ (γ 0 ) = − κ+λ
2
2. The investor trades to the unconstrained optimum: γ = γ u = 0, c(γ, γ 0 ) = k > 0.
This (feasible) strategy yields an utility of Ũ (γ u ) = −k and corresponds to the
solution of sub-problem 1
The solution to the overall fixed cost problem is

γ ∗ = argmax(Ũ (γ 0 ), Ũ (γ u ))
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or, in the space of weights θ
θ\P C = γ ∗ + θu
such solution exists because the arguments of the argmax function are well-defined.
Asset-specific fixed costs: Look at Problem 10 with c(γ, γ 0 ) =

Pn
i

1[γi 6=γi0 ] ki , P = S = 0

and solve for γ: a finite number of cases might occur:
1. The investor does not trade: γ = γ 0 , c(γ, γ 0 ) = 0 which is (trivially) linear in γ.
0

γ0 V γ0
This is feasible and yields an utility of Ũ (γ 0 ) = − κ+λ
2
2. The investor trades in a subset of cardinality (n − j) > 0 of assets: This is subj∗
problem
4 for which
 we know that the unique (feasible) optimal solution is γ ≡

γj0


0
γ j∗ V γ j∗ − (K̄ 0 Dj )1.
 and the optimal value is Ũ (γ j∗ ) = − κ+λ

2
0
γj0
(V−j )−1 Vj,−j
Pn−1 n
Note that there are N = j=1
different subsets jk with k = 1, ..., N , so that
j

we have that many sub-problems 4 to solve, each one yielding solution γ jk ∗ .
3. The investor trades in all assets: this is sub-problem 1. Thus the unique (feasible)
optimum is γ = γ u = 0, yielding an utility of Ũ (γ u ) = −k.
The solution to the asset-specific fixed costs case is

γ ∗ = argmax(Ũ (γ 0 ), Ũ (γ j1 ∗ ), ..., Ũ (γ jN ∗ ), Ũ (γ u ))

or, in the space of weights θ
θ\P C = γ ∗ + θu
which exists because the arguments of the argmax function are well-defined. The
computation of such solution is practically feasible only for relatively small number
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of risky assets: with 10 assets there are 1022 sub-problems, with 20 already 1049574
many, while with 30 a total of 536870910. In general the number of sub-problems grows
at a rate of 2n with the n number of risky assets. This type of problem does not scale
up as nicely as the previous ones. Yet, it nonetheless represents a big improvement
over the current state-of-the-art in the literature where this kind of setups are only
solvable numerically with n ≤ 3.
Proportional and overall fixed costs: Look at Problem 10 with c(γ, γ 0 ) = P 0 C P +
S 0 C S + 1[γ6=γ 0 ] k, solve for P and S to get to γ = γ 0 + P − S: only two things can
happen:
1. The investor does not trade: γ = γ 0 , P = S = 0 and c(γ, γ 0 ) = 0 which is
0

γ0 V γ0
(trivially) linear in γ. This is feasible and yields an utility of Ũ (γ 0 ) = − κ+λ
2
2. The investor trades: γ 6= γ 0 , this is sub-problem 2 with K = k. The solution γ T
exists and it is unique, and is computable through the algorithm of Section 2.5.
The cost function is linear in γ (and θ).
The solution to the proportional and overall fixed costs case is

γ ∗ = argmax(Ũ (γ 0 ), Ũ (γ T ))

or, in the space of weights θ
θ\P C = {θ0 , θP C }
with θP C = γ T + θu . This solution exists because the arguments of the argmax
function are well-defined. Because the overall fixed cost applies to all assets we avoid
the combinatorial issues arising with asset specific fix cost and our setup can thus
deliver the solution for large number of risky assets n.
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Proportional and asset-specific fixed costs: Look at Problem 10 with c(γ, γ 0 ) = P 0 C P +
P
S 0 C S + ni 1[γi 6=γi0 ] ki , solve for P and S to get to γ = γ 0 + P − S: a finite number of
cases might occur:
1. The investor does not trade: γ = γ 0 , P = S = 0 and c(γ, γ 0 ) = 0 which is
0

γ0 V γ0
(trivially) linear in γ. This is feasible and yields an utility of Ũ (γ 0 ) = − κ+λ
2
2. The investor trades in a subset of cardinality (n − j) > 0 of assets: this is subproblem 3 for which we know that the unique (feasible) optimal solution is γ j∗ , ,
or θP C in the space of weights θ, computable with the aid of Section 2.5 algorithm,
the cost function is linear in γ and the optimal value is Ũ (γ j∗ ). Note that there are

P
n
N = n−1
j=1 j different subsets jk with k = 1, ..., N , so that we have that many
sub-problems 3 to solve, each one yielding solution γ jk ∗ (respectively θP Cjk ∗ ).
3. The investor trades in all assets: this is sub-problem 2 with K ≡

Pn
i

ki : thus the

unique (feasible) optimum is γ T All , yielding an utility of Ũ (γ T All ) with a linear
cost function.
The solution to the proportional and asset-specific fixed costs case is

γ ∗ = argmax(Ũ (γ 0 ), Ũ (γ j1 ∗ ), ..., Ũ (γ jN ∗ ), Ũ (γ T All ))

or, in the space of weights θ

θ\P C = {θ0 , θP Cj1 ∗ , ..., θP CjN ∗ , θP CT All }

with θP C(.) = γ (.) + θu . The solution exists because the arguments of the argmax
function are well-defined. Since this problem involves asset specific fixed costs, as
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shown above, combinatorial issues limit the actual number of risky assets for which
the problem is computationally feasible.
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Appendix C
Importance of Transaction Costs for
Asset Allocations in FX Markets

C.1
C.1.1

Details on Portfolio Optimization Problem
Characterization of the No Trading Region

In the main text we provide a graphical visualization of the no trading region of the optimal
trading strategy for the case of 2 risky assets when CP+
= CP−
= CS+
= CS−
(Figure 3.2).
t
t
t
t
Figure C.1 generalizes the cost structure in this illustration. From left to right Figure C.1
illustrates the no trading regions in the case of asset correlations equal to (1) ρ = 0.5, (2)
ρ = 0, and (3) ρ = −0.5. We choose the other parameters of the investment opportunity
set such that the 2 risky assets match the mean values of our full set of 29 currencies
from 1976 to 2016. In particular, we set µet = 2.4%, σt = 10% (the diagonal elements of
Vt ), CP+
= 1.45% for the costs of increasing long positions, CS+
= 0.71% for the costs
t
t
of decreasing long positions, CP−
= 0.71% for the costs of reducing short positions, and
t
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CS−
= 1.45% for the costs of increasing short positions.We set the coefficient of risk aversion
t
λ = 5.
The no trading regions are described as follows: blue for M VT C , red for M VT C\Corr , black
for M VT C if CP+
= CP−
= 1.45% and CS+
= CS−
= 0.71%, and yellow M VT C if CP+
=
t
t
t
t
t
CP−
= 0.71% and CS+
= CS−
= 1.45%. The arrows indicate the optimal actions ∆P+
t
t
t
t ,
P−
S−
∆S+
from any initial position θt0 outside the blue no trading region.
t , ∆t , ∆t

Under the black no trading region parallelogram (M VT C ), it is optimal to either not trade
at all (if the initial position is inside the parallelogram), trade only 1 asset at a time, along
vertical or horizontal straight lines up to the closest edge of the parallelogram, or trade in
both assets in the regions beyond the corners and outside the parallelogram up to the closest
= 0.71% (i.e. the blue
= CP−
= 1.45% and CS+
= CS−
corner. Under M VT C with CP+
t
t
t
t
no trading region), the closest to the actual M VT C performed in the data, the same trading
behavior occurs most of the time. The two no trading regions and optimal trading activity
only differ for the case of ρ = 0.5 in the neighborhood of the lower right and upper-left corners
of the black parallelogram, where the borders of the blue no trading region are horizontal
and vertical respectively, with trades in only one asset at a time proceeding vertically or
horizontally inside the area of the black no trading region. These two additional edges of
the blue no trading region are on a horizontal respectively vertical line that passes through
the origin.
Consider for instance an initial position θt0 to the left of the vertical line that passes through
the origin. The initial weight of asset 1 is negative and below the optimal level. The investor
would like to increase her position in this asset, ideally moving horizontally all the way to
the nearest edge of the yellow parallelogram, given the costs CP−
= 0.71%. But as soon as
t
the weight becomes positive the no trading region switches to the black parallelogram with
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the higher costs CP+
= 1.45%. In other words, given the costs increase to CP+
= 1.45%
t
t
when the position on asset 1 switches from negative to positive but the marginal benefit of
moving closer to θMV remains unchanged, the investor stops trading earlier than what she
has originally intended when facing the the lower costs CP−
= 0.71%.
t
Because the all trading regions in case (2) with ρ = 0 and case (3) with ρ = −0.5 lie in
the positive quadrant, the blue and the black no trading regions coincide while the yellow is
shifted towards the upper-right corner. Finally, in case (2) with ρ = 0 the red and the blue
no trading regions coincide because they are solving the same problem.

C.1.2

Algorithms

Problem 9

Following the solution approach of Dybvig and Pezzo (2018), we can rewrite Problem 9 as a
standard quadratic program of the form
1
min q0 x + x0 Hx
x
2
subject to
x≤x≤x
0
0
0
0
where q0 ≡ b0 + λθ̂t0 0 Q¯Ī − µet Ī¯Ī with b0 ≡ [CPt + 0 , CPt − 0 , CS+
, CS−
], θ̂t0 0 ≡ [θt0+ , θt0− ], Q ≡
t
t

Ī0 Vt Ī, Ī ≡ [In , In ], ¯Ī ≡ [I2n , −I2n ] and Ia is the a × a identity matrix, and the hessian H
0
0
0
0
S− 0
is given by λ¯Ī Q¯Ī. The program returns the solution x ≡ [∆P+
, ∆P−
, ∆S+
t
t
t , ∆t ] from
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which the optimal portfolio θtM VT C is obtained by
θtM VT C = θt0 + ¯Īx.

We solve this strictly convex quadratic program using the Matlab Optimization ToolBox.

Simplifying Problem 9: Uncorrelated Assets

H. Liu (2004) suggests that the assumption of uncorrelated assets greatly reduces the complexity to optimize a portfolio subject to transaction costs. This is because with uncorrelated
assets we can solve N independent problems each one associated with only one asset. We
continue to use the true correlation matrix to compute θtMV but impose the assumption of
uncorrelated assets when we construct the no trading region surrounding θtMV .
We proceed in two steps. First, we solve two sub-problems. The frist one assumes that
the costs of opening new long or closing existing short positions both are CP,1
≡ CP−
t
t ,
and closing existing long or opening new short positions both are CS,1
≡ CS+
t
t . The second
sub-problem assumes that the costs of opening new long or closing existing short positions
both are CP,2
≡ CP+
t
t , and closing existing long or opening new short positions both are
CS,2
≡ CtS− . Both sub-problems ignore correlations between assets when we construct the
t
no trading region around θtMV . Given µet , Vt and θt0 and the generic costs CP,j
and CtS,j for
t
sub-problem j ∈ {1, 2}, the First Order Conditions (FOCs) are DyPe2018
(j)

θt ≡

Vt−1 e
V−1
(j)
(j)
(µt − CtP,j ) ≤ θt ≤ t (µet + CtS,j ) ≡ θt .
λ
λ
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When the correlations between assets are ignored, the solution is given for each asset i by

(j)

θi,t =




0

θi,t





(j)

θi,t






θ(j)
i,t

(j)

(j)

if

0
θi,t ≤ θi,t
≤ θi,t

if

0
θi,t
> θi,t

if

0
< θi,t .
θi,t

(j)

(j)

0
we decide for each asset i which of
In the second step, conditional on the initial position θi,t
(1)

MVTC\Corr

(2)

the two sub-problem solutions θi,t or θi,t is the correct solution for θi,t

(1)

. Because (in

S−
P−
P+
0
0
the data) CS+
i,t ≤ Ci,t and Ci,t ≤ Ci,t , it follows that if θi,t > 0 and θi,t ≥ 0 or θi,t < 0
(1)

MVTC\Corr

and θi,t ≤ 0 then θi,t

MVTC\Corr

(1)

= θi,t , otherwise θi,t
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(2)

= θi,t .

Figure C.1: No Trading Regions: General Cost Structures and Correlations between Assets
No trading regions for setting of two risky assets with correlations (1) ρ = 0.5, (2) ρ = 0, and (3) ρ = −0.5, and
µet = 2.4%, σt = 10% (the diagonal elements of Vt ), CP+
= 1.45%, CS+
= 0.71%, CP−
= 0.71% , CS−
= 1.45%, and
t
t
t
t
P−
λ = 5. The no trading regions are: blue for M VT C , red for M VT C\Corr , black for M VT C if CP+
=
C
= 1.45% and
t
t
S+
S−
P+
P−
S+
S−
Ct = Ct = 0.71%, and yellow M VT C if Ct = Ct = 0.71% and Ct = Ct = 1.45%. The arrows indicate the
S−
P−
S+
from any initial position θt0 outside the blue no trading region.
optimal actions ∆P+
t , ∆t , ∆t , ∆t
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C.2

Data Sources: Spot and Forward Exchange Rates

In Table C.1 we list the Datastream mnemonics for spot and forward exchange rate quotes
against the GBP, whereas those against the USD are listed in Table C.2. To obtain mid-, bidand ask-exchange rates, the suffixes (ER), (EB) and (EO) are added to the corresponding
mnemonics.
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Table C.1: Datastream mnemonics for currency quotes against the British pound

Currency

Spot rate

Forward rate

Quote convention

Canadian dollar
Danish krone
French franc
German mark
Irish punt
Italian lira
Japanese yen
Netherlands guilder
Norwegian krone
Portuguese escudo
Spanish peseta
Swedish krona
Swiss franc
U.S. dollar

CNDOLLR
DANISHK
FRENFRA
DMARKER
IPUNTER
ITALIRE
JAPAYEN
GUILDER
NORKRON
PORTESC
SPANPES
SWEKRON
SWISSFR
USDOLLR

CNDOL1F
DANIS1F
FRENF1F
DMARK1F
IPUNT1F
ITALY1F
JAPYN1F
GUILD1F
NORKN1F
PORTS1F
SPANP1F
SWEDK1F
SWISF1F
USDOL1F

FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
FCU/GBP
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Table C.2: Datastream mnemonics for currency quotes against the U.S. dollar

Currency
Australian dollar
Brazilian real
British pound
Canadian dollar
Czech koruna
Danish krone
Euro
French franc
German mark
Greek Drachma
Hungarian forint
Icelandic krona
Irish punt
Italian lira
Japanese yen
Mexican peso
Netherland guilder
New Zealand dollar
Norwegian krone
Polish zloty
Portuguese escudo
Singapore dollar
South Africa rand
South Korean won
Spanish peseta
Swedish krona
Swiss france
Taiwan new dollar

Spot rate
BBAUDSP
BRACRU$
BBGBPSP
BBCADSP
CZECHC$
BBDKKSP
BBEURSP
BBFRFSP
BBDEMSP
GREDRA$
HUNFOR$
ICEKRO$
BBIEPSP
BBITLSP
BBJPYSP
MEXPES$
BBNLGSP
BBNZDSP
BBNOKSP
POLZLO$
PORTES$
BBSGDSP
BBZARSP
KORSWO$
SPANPE$
BBSEKSP
BBCHFSP
TAIWDO$

Forward rate Quote convention
BBAUD1F
FCU/USD
USBRL1F
FCU/USD
BBGBP1F
USD/FCU
BBCAD1F
FCU/USD
USCZK1F
FCU/USD
BBDKK1F
FCU/USD
BBEUR1F
FCU/USD
BBFRF1F
FCU/USD
BBDEM1F
FCU/USD
USGRD1F
FCU/USD
USHUF1F
FCU/USD
USISK1F
FCU/USD
BBIEP1F
USD/FCU
BBITL1F
FCU/USD
BBJPY1F
FCU/USD
USMXN1F
FCU/USD
BBNLG1F
FCU/USD
BBNZD1F
FCU/USD
BBNOK1F
FCU/USD
USPLN1F
FCU/USD
USPTE1F
FCU/USD
BBSGD1F
FCU/USD
BBZAR1F
FCU/USD
USKRW1F
FCU/USD
USESP1F
FCU/USD
BBSEK1F
FCU/USD
BBCHF1F
FCU/USD
USTWD1F
FCU/USD
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